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1in 1959  Edwin Honig wrote that “Opinion about allegory in literary histo-
ries is fairly unanimous: most agree that it is dead but disagree about the date 
of its demise” (5). Nearly forty years later Theresa Kelley pronounced simi-
larly on the fate of allegory: scholarly objections to allegory, “which become 
commonplace in English culture by the late seventeenth century, mark the 
end of [it] as a viable symbolic mode” (1). Even E. D. Hirsch has recently 
advised that “Allegory  .  .  . has more or less gone away” (“Transhistorical” 
551). By far the most entertaining obituary for allegory comes from the poet 
Billy Collins in “The Death of Allegory”:
I am wondering what became of all those tall abstractions
that used to pose, robed and statuesque, in paintings
and parade about on the pages of the Renaissance
displaying their capital letters like license plates.
Truth cantering on a powerful horse,
Chastity, eyes downcast, fluttering with veils.
Each one was marble come to life, a thought in a coat,
Courtesy bowing with one hand always extended,
Villainy sharpening an instrument behind a wall,
Reason with her crown and Constancy alert behind a helm.
Introduction
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They are all retired now, consigned to a Florida for tropes.
Justice is there standing by an open refrigerator.
Valor lies in bed listening to the rain.
Even Death has nothing to do but mend his cloak and hood,
and all their props are locked away in a warehouse,
hourglasses, globes, blindfolds and shackles.
Even if you called them back, there are no places left
for them to go, no Garden of Mirth or Bower of Bliss.
The Valley of Forgiveness is lined with condominiums
and chain saws are howling in the Forest of Despair.
Here on the table near the window is a vase of peonies
and next to it black binoculars and a money clip,
exactly the kind of thing we now prefer,
objects that sit quietly on a line in lower case,
themselves and nothing more, a wheelbarrow,
an empty mailbox, a razor blade resting in a glass ashtray.
As for the others, the great ideas on horseback
and the long-haired virtues in embroidered gowns,
it looks as though they have traveled down
that road you see on the final page of storybooks,
the one that winds up a green hillside and disappears
into an unseen valley where everyone must be fast asleep. (27–28)
 These thoughtful and entertaining obituaries notwithstanding, critics 
have never quite managed to retire allegory—or any particular instance of 
it. While it is certainly true that a very particular kind of didactic-religious-
personification composition from the Middle Ages and the Renaissance has 
mostly faded from the best-seller lists and from our collective critical con-
sciousness, to say more globally that allegory is dead is manifestly untrue, 
and Honig, Kelley, Hirsch, Collins, and others of their leaning understand of 
course that they greatly exaggerate the rumors of allegory’s death.1 They do 
so, I think, partly for rhetorical effect—there is something impressive about 
 1. Collins even has a poem in the same collection that revives one of those “tall abstrac-
tions” parading around in capital letters. In “The Lesson” Collins writes of “. . . History / snoring 
heavily on the couch. . . .” (6).
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breathing life into an entity previously thought dead—and partly to under-
line a claim about the multiple meanings that inhere in the term “allegory”; 
it is perhaps dead if we only think of it as the kind of didactic composition 
peopled by upper-case abstractions, but not if we allow ourselves to recon-
ceptualize, redefine, or rehabilitate it.
 In short, allegory has not died, despite the passage of centuries since its 
popular zenith and despite the attempts of a number of influential critics 
(most notably Coleridge) to kill it. Certainly no contemporary writers whom 
the academy values pen allegories of Christian salvation along the lines of 
The Pilgrim’s Progress or The Divine Comedy, but even so these earlier works 
survive and continue to make themselves heard in the grand conversation 
of literary history; in that sense they are as vital as ever. Yet allegory has 
also been kept alive because readers and critics apparently have too much at 
stake to let it fade completely away and because writers continue to find pro-
ductive ways to incorporate allegorical elements into their fictions. We find 
ourselves tending to allegory—especially when it seems severely wounded—
because allegory embodies something about the literary experience that we 
value highly. This, I think, is the only way to explain the constant lure of a 
much-maligned literary phenomenon.2
 My aim in this book is to explore the ways in which allegory—or the 
ghosts of allegory—continue to haunt narrative fiction. Primarily, I intend 
to demonstrate that allegory can be present in a narrative to different degrees 
and in different ways and to argue that the presence of allegory can produce 
a variety of results within a fictional narrative.3 I contend that many of the 
problems we face in dealing with allegory stem from the limits imposed 
by our common, conventional conception of the term and from our gen-
eral insistence on applying the conventional designation “allegory” or “alle-
gorical” only to entire works. As Edwin Honig claims in Dark Conceit: The 
Making of Allegory, “The form of an allegory must also be the form of the 
medium (prose or poetry, drama or novel) conveying it. But in whatever 
medium, it is a form that characterizes the allegory as a totally achieved lit-
erary creation” (14). This claim—and in particular its emphasis on totality—
compels Honig to see allegory only as a genre. While we certainly do find 
entire works of fiction that are allegorical and that, taken together, might 
constitute a kind of genre, this does not exhaust the potential of allegory. My 
 2. I will explore the trope of the death of allegory more fully in chapter 1.
 3. Ralph Flores makes a similar claim when he argues that since the late 1970s we have 
seen “a plethora of studies on allegory, and in the writings especially of Rosemond Tuve, Walter 
Benjamin and Paul de Man, allegory has been detected in surprising places and discovered to 
have uncanny powers of renewal. Or perhaps allegory did not really die but remained at play in 
texts—as the enigmatic textuality of texts” (4).
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aim is to broaden our conception of allegory by acknowledging not only this 
kind of complete narrative work but also the many narratives that are not 
really allegories in Honig’s holistic and generic sense but that have traces or 
hints of allegory in them.
 The challenge I have set before myself is to devise a theoretical approach 
to allegory that will account for both the generic conception of allegory 
favored by the majority of critics and the fact that we often find evidence of 
allegory in literary texts that—taken as a whole—do not seem allegorical in 
the final analysis. I am convinced that the path to this theoretical solution 
I seek must take us back through allegory’s rhetorical roots. So, I will begin 
there, move toward a novel generic conceptualization of allegory, and finally 
show how that conceptualization can also accommodate the presence of alle-
gory in nonallegorical narratives.
 I understand allegory as belonging to the extended family of tropes. Thus, 
allegory bears some resemblance to figures such as synecdoche, metonymy, 
simile, and metaphor. Each of these figures of speech asks readers to under-
stand or to see one thing in the terms of another; they are all substitutive in 
nature. The classical rhetorician Quintilian was one of the earliest to insist on 
a close association between allegory and other tropes that rely on an implied 
or explicit comparison or substitution. For Quintilian, allegory in its most 
common form actually depends upon and consists of metaphor, which he 
considers by “far the most beautiful of tropes” (427):
Allegory, which people translate inversio, presents one thing by its words 
and either (1) a different or (2) sometimes even a contrary thing by its 
sense. (1) The first type generally consists of a succession of Metaphors, 
as in
O ship, new waves will take you back to sea:
what are you doing? Be resolute, make harbour,
and that whole passage of Horace in which he represents the state as a ship, 
the civil wars as waves and storms, and peace and concord as the harbour. 
(451)
If we view allegory from Quintilian’s perspective, it amounts to something 
close to extended metaphor, and this is a view that has held considerable 
sway over the intervening centuries.
 I contend, on the other hand, that we need to recognize a significant 
and qualitative distinction between metaphor and allegory. We can begin 
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to reveal this distinction by first thinking about the resemblances between 
metaphor and the other tropes closely related to it: synecdoche, metonymy, 
and simile. As I claimed above, this group of figures of speech operates on 
the premise of substitution—take x for y, or see x in terms of y. Synecdoche 
and metonymy substitute one thing for another based on contiguity while 
simile and metaphor encourage substitutions based on comparison, or simi-
larity. These latter two tropes require a different kind of interpretive work 
because they force the reader (or auditor) to recognize the common ground 
between the two terms or concepts being compared. For Quintilian, allegory 
is more or less an extension of metaphor.
 But pronouncements about allegory are complicated by the fact that it 
has a dual nature, both aspects of which are captured by Quintilian’s example. 
First, when we speak of allegory we might refer to an individual textual 
element—an allegorical figure such as Horace’s ship. As Quintilian notes, 
however, this figure of speech—the state implicitly compared to a ship—is 
essentially a metaphor. And we can produce countless other examples of the 
same phenomenon. If we encounter a narrative, for instance, that describes a 
character who “has a cross to bear” we have what amounts to a metaphorical 
reference to Christ, though we might be tempted to call this an allegorical 
character. If there is no substantial difference between calling this figure a 
metaphor and calling it an allegory, then why do we need the term allegory 
at all? Why not simply call metaphors—whether they occur individually or 
in series—metaphors?
 The answer to this question lies in what Quintilian’s example implies 
happens when we get a series of this kind of coordinated metaphoric figura-
tion in the context of a narrative. All of the metaphors that Quintilian uses 
as examples from Horace’s poem—the state as a ship, “the civil wars as waves 
and storms, and peace and concord as the harbour”—work in concert to 
produce an effect that differs, certainly in degree but also perhaps in kind, 
from the effect of any single metaphor. Using the term “ship” to refer to 
the “state” on its own invites readers to understand the latter term through 
those aspects that it shares with the former (the ground for the compar-
ison); this enterprise, viewed from the perspective of the author, amounts 
to a strategy for description. But when that author adds metaphoric plot 
elements (storms as civil wars) and metaphoric states of affairs (safe harbors 
as times of peace) we have moved from the realm of description to the realm 
of narrative, which is the second fundamental aspect of allegory. The series 
of metaphors that Quintilian cites, in other words, constitutes a figural nar-
rative that enacts the transformation of some phenomenon, in this case an 
idea about governance.
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 Precisely how this kind of transformation occurs may not yet be clear, 
so a brief example might prove helpful. Consider the well-known parable of 
the fox and the grapes from Aesop: “A famished fox, seeing some bunches 
of grapes hanging from a vine in a tree, wanted to take some, but could not 
reach them. So he went away saying to himself: ‘Those are unripe.’” There 
would likely be near-universal agreement that this kind of animal parable 
constitutes an allegorical narrative. However, a close examination of the par-
able reveals that it does not constitute a series of metaphors, as Quintilian 
would argue. If this were so, then the fox would have to be a metaphor for 
humankind, the grapes would be a metaphor for anything humans desire 
but cannot obtain, and the tree would be a metaphor for some obstacle that 
frustrates our attempts to get what we want. If we evaluate these instances of 
figural language on their own—outside of the context of the brief narrative 
in which they occur—they fail as metaphors; at best, they are paralogical 
metaphors, or metaphors with no substantial ground connecting the tenor 
and the vehicle. What, for example, is the intrinsic similarity between the 
fox and humans? Why not use a dog, or a goat, or a pig? It seems to me 
that the author could achieve essentially the same result with any number of 
different animals, a fact that argues against the claim that the fox is a meta-
phor for humankind.4 And we could easily make similar arguments against 
calling the tree and the grapes metaphors. The fox, the grapes, and the tree 
do act as substitutes (and herein lies the rationale for calling allegory a kind 
of trope) for humans, desires, and obstacles, respectively, but I would not 
call those substitutions metaphorical ones. The substitutions in this parable 
do not depend on similarity; instead, they result from the author’s need to 
realize his rhetorical purpose (to satirize humankind’s remarkable ability to 
rationalize our failures) via a narrative. Thus, the tropes that he uses function 
as elements of a figural narrative, but they do not necessarily work well as 
individual figures of speech, nor do they need to.
 If one remains committed to defining allegory through the concept of 
metaphor, then he or she might claim that the parable as a whole functions 
as a metaphor. In this scenario, the narrative acts as the vehicle and the 
author’s rhetorical purpose acts as the implied tenor. Even this proposal—
which seems plausible at first blush—strains the logic behind metaphor. 
There is no common ground between the narrative, strictly speaking, and 
Aesop’s message; the similarities surface only after we have interpreted the 
 4. As a counterexample, consider a textbook case of the Homeric simile: Homer uses a 
lion as a metaphorical figure for Achilles, and to substitute a gopher for that lion would destroy 
the effect he seeks to produce. Similarly, one could argue that a fox does resemble a human more 
than does some other animal in terms of the capacity for rationalization, but I am not convinced 
by this. The ability to rationalize our decisions strikes me as distinctly human, and in that sense 
no other animal would work well metaphorically here.
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story, only after we have decided what the message is. To say, therefore, that 
the story of the fox and the grapes is a metaphor for humanity’s penchant for 
explaining away our shortcomings is tantamount to making the tautological 
claim that the author’s meaning is a metaphor for his message. In reaching 
this point in the hermeneutic process, we have actually recognized but not 
articulated the fact that the figural elements in the parable are the result of 
the author’s desire to narrativize his rhetorical purpose.
 So, what we end up calling allegorical figures can be recognized as such 
only after we determine how they function in the context of a narrative. 
Sometimes a metaphor is just a metaphor, but sometimes it does become 
allegorical. We must also recognize the existence of a more ambiguous 
middle ground, an interpretive realm in which we might not be sure whether 
a figure is “merely” metaphorical or whether it is allegorical. Some exam-
ples of figuration—including the Christ reference I used above—immedi-
ately evoke such powerful and well-known narratives that we often jump to 
the conclusion that they must be intended as allegories. When a character 
becomes a Christ figure or a Satan figure, or when a garden appears Eden-
like, the whole Christian narrative of humanity’s Fall gets activated and we 
tend to read these figures as allegorical ones because we assume that the text 
in which they appear is a transformation of that prior cultural narrative into 
a new story. We might be wrong in jumping to this conclusion, but the fact 
that we do so often make the leap to the allegorical in cases such as these 
helps to illustrate my larger point that allegory, unlike metaphor, is a concept 
that we can apply only within the context of a narrative. Quintilian suc-
cinctly defines a trope as “a shift of a word or phrase from its proper meaning 
to another” (425), but allegories need more time and space to develop than 
what is afforded by a single word or phrase. Thus, I contend that allegories 
are figures of narrative more than they are figures of speech, taken in the 
traditional sense.5 For this reason, among several others, I will be proposing 
a theory of allegory that is predicated on a rhetorical approach to narrative.
 If allegory does belong to the family of tropes, then a rhetorically 
inflected approach to allegory must pay heed to the root meaning of the term 
“trope”—that is, “to turn.” If we want to identify a genre of allegory, then this 
tropological foundation strikes me as a good starting point. Rather than by 
virtue of the more traditional generic markers such as form, technique, or 
 5. This distinction between figures of speech and figures of narrative is meant only to con-
vey the idea that allegory tends to work on a larger scale than do most (other) figures of speech, 
which often are indeed confined to a single word or phrase. Figures of speech and figures of 
narrative both apply to “verbal” utterances, but I want to stress that allegory entails the kind 
of extension characteristic of narrative; when we find allegory, we find not just words, but also 
(at least) agents, events, and often narrators, not to mention authors who tell stories to achieve 
some rhetorical end.
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subject matter, the individual texts that comprise the family of allegorical 
narratives resemble one another primarily through the distinguishing fea-
ture of the authors’ intention to transform something (turn something) into 
something else. When we are dealing with allegory, the “something else” in 
this formulation is always a narrative that is highly figural. Aesop, to return 
to the example of the fox and the grapes, has as his ultimate aim the sati-
rizing of humankind’s penchant for rationalizing our failures; to achieve 
this purpose he transforms his observation about humans into a narrative 
that relies on figuration—things representing or standing for other things. 
Generalizing from this particular case, I suggest that we define allegory as 
that class of works that fulfills its rhetorical purpose (whatever that pur-
pose might be) by means of the transformation of some phenomenon into 
a figural narrative. Paying close attention to the author’s rhetorical purpose, 
which I maintain is the governing principle behind allegory, will allow us 
to account for both the whole-text type allegories on which critics such as 
Honig focus and the various textual manifestations of allegory on which I 
want to shed more light.
 In the first section of this book, I deal with the kinds of texts that most 
readers most closely associate with allegory—those complete narratives 
that readers interpret, often confidently and relatively unproblematically, 
as entirely allegorical. I situate these texts on a continuum, ranging from 
what I call strong allegory (the subject of the next chapter) to weak allegory 
(chapter 2). I use the terms “strong” and “weak” in a value-free way; I do not 
intend to privilege the strong over the weak, or vice versa. Rather, as will 
become clear, these terms simply designate degrees of allegoricalness that we 
can measure, however roughly, on a narrative scale. Approaching allegory in 
this way will allow us to talk productively but not reductively about allegory 
while also allowing us to understand how some texts that are not clearly 
allegorical (that are not “strong” allegories, in other words) elicit very strong 
allegorical readings.
 While developing the criteria by which to establish a continuum of alle-
gorical narratives can help us to understand and appreciate entire works 
of fiction—those narratives that Honig calls “totally achieved literary cre-
ations”—we also need to be aware that allegory can be present in a narrative 
without being the defining aspect of it; indeed, allegorical narratives can be 
present in a larger work of fiction that is not itself an allegory. Thus, in the 
later sections of the book I move to a discussion of what I call “embedded 
allegory,” subdividing this category into “independent,” “dependent,” and 
“interdependent” embedded allegory (chapter 3). Next, I examine further 
manifestations of allegory in narrative fiction. Chapter 4 addresses “thematic” 
allegory (a work that presents allegory as one of the themes of the narrative), 
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and chapter 5 lays out a theory of “ironic” allegory (an allegorical narrative 
that the reader is not meant to take seriously, or to accept at face value).
 I realize that such a taxonomic approach to allegory might make it appear 
as though I am implying that all instances of “allegory” will fit neatly into one 
of these categories or subcategories and that I can provide clear-cut criteria 
that we can use to classify these instances. I am not; many, if not most, exam-
ples of allegory offer some resistance to this process. I recognize, therefore, 
that the model I am proposing needs to provide some flexibility and that 
the borders between different kinds of allegory are somewhat amorphous. 
Moreover, several of what at first glance appear to be binary oppositions 
within my schema (most notably strong or weak and interdependent or non-
interdependent) might actually work better if we think of them on a con-
tinuum rather than as categories with fixed and impermeable boundaries. 
Similarly, I readily acknowledge that many allegories will be combinations 
of the categories I have devised—weak independent embedded allegories or 
strong ironic allegories, for example.
 The complexity that becomes apparent as we analyze contemporary 
instances of allegory will make clear the value of the heuristic I am devel-
oping, a heuristic designed not to forge Procrustean categories but rather to 
provide a flexible schema for recognizing and analyzing the varieties of alle-
gory in what many assume to be an age that is inhospitable to allegory. My 
aim throughout this book is to provide what I think are good examples of 
the basic categories I have described above while at the same time acknowl-
edging that some cases are less clear-cut than others. I find this more invigo-
rating than threatening. In my penultimate chapter (chapter 6) I devote my 
full attention to a very complex story—“Click” by John Barth—that serves 
as a good test case in the sense that it does not fall neatly into any one area. 
As we will see, though, even such an evasive narrative will reveal the utility 
of the rhetorical approach to allegory that I am proposing.
 To begin examining in more detail how allegory works, I want to return 
to my definition of allegory (that class of works that fulfills its rhetorical pur-
pose by means of the transformation of some phenomenon into a figural narra-
tive) in order to parse it; I explicate the key terms in the order in which they 
appear in my definition.
“Rhetorical Purpose”
This phrase denotes an author’s intended effect(s). As I mentioned earlier, 
the author’s rhetorical purpose is the governing force behind allegory. This 
question of authorial intention (and whether it is knowable or something 
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that should be sought) is of course a central concern in the theorizing of lit-
erature, especially since the mid-twentieth century. I do not intend to add to 
the debate that surrounds that issue; instead, I take it as a given that authorial 
intention is a crucial component of allegory. I concede that we might never 
know definitively what an author wants to convey through his or her work, 
but a rhetorical approach to allegory operates under the premise that an 
author has hermeneutic intentions and necessitates that we make an effort 
to figure out what these are. This process is not complete guesswork; indeed, 
the author’s intention becomes knowable through the details of the text and 
its construction. A text progresses in one way as opposed to another, and 
that fact provides readers with valuable hermeneutic information.
“Transformation” and “Phenomenon”
By “transformation,” I mean a change in form, either from nonnarrative to 
narrative or, if the phenomenon transformed is itself a narrative, from that 
narrative into another. As a means of supporting this aspect of my defini-
tion of allegory I turn here to a rather unlikely source, the historiographer 
Hayden White. In The Content of the Form, White makes the provocative 
and somewhat contentious claim—at least for other historians—that all nar-
rative works of history must be considered allegorical because the process 
of transforming literal events into a narrative requires “tropes and figures 
of thought” (48). We should avoid, White cautions, “mistaking a narrative 
account of real events for a literal account thereof. A narrative account is 
always a figurative account, an allegory” (50). While I would stop short of 
labeling all works of narrative history allegories, I do think that White has 
the right idea regarding how allegory works. It metamorphoses a real (pos-
sibly historical) phenomenon into a narrative structure. If we are to under-
stand allegory, we must recognize it in these terms.
 Arguing that allegory is a transformation emphasizes what I see as its 
“progressive” nature—something happens in allegory, and by that I mean 
something fundamentally different from what we mean when we say that 
something happens in a realistic narrative. In this latter instance, we refer 
to the incidents of the narrative, or the plot, when someone asks us what 
happens in the work; in the former, we refer to the kind of transformation 
that occurs as some “thing” is repackaged in a narrative structure. Thus, for 
example, if I ask someone what a novel such as Richard Ford’s Independence 
Day is about, a response along the lines of “a man, struggling with middle 
age, the death of a child, and the dissolution of his marriage, takes a trip with 
his adolescent son” will generally suffice. I would be less satisfied, on the 
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other hand, if someone were to tell me that Orwell’s Animal Farm is about 
pigs in conflict. Although accurate in the most literal sense, this response 
fails to capture what most readers would consider the essence of Orwell’s 
novel. Judith Butler’s formulation of allegory as “a way of giving a narrative 
form to something which cannot be directly narrativized” perhaps overstates 
the case slightly (I will argue that the “something” can indeed be and often 
is narrativized directly); it does, however, capture the idea that in allegory 
some thing (that “thing” that a synopsis of the literal Orwell story misses) 
is transformed into a narrative and that that indirect way of achieving some 
rhetorical purpose has merit (369).
 The phenomenon—the “something”—that is transformed in an allegory 
could be nearly anything—an idea, a historical event, a lesson or moral, a 
situation or predicament, or even a previous narrative.6 The transformation 
of the phenomenon can be understood as occurring on four levels. In the 
first level, the phenomenon exists as the allegory’s main object of “imitation.” 
Aesop, in his fable of the fox and the grapes, wants to represent a particular 
human foible—our habit of rationalizing our failures, of devaluing those 
desires we are unable to attain; this is his phenomenon. At the second level, 
he constructs a literal narrative (the one with the fox and grapes) that illus-
trates the phenomenon and provides a bridge to the third level. In the third 
level, the reader infers the figural intent behind the literal narrative: the fox is 
a stand-in for any human and the grapes for something the human strongly 
desires. That inference, in turn, allows us to move to the fourth level, the 
recognition of Aesop’s rhetorical purpose: using satire to goad his readers 
into recognizing this particular human failing and to reflect on it.
 It is my contention that this quadripartite structure—including the 
object or phenomenon to be represented and transformed, a literal narra-
tive that enacts the transformation, a secondary narrative that emerges from 
the figural interpretation of the literal narrative, and the author’s intention—
characterizes all allegorical narratives. To further illustrate how this struc-
 6. I anticipate that this idea of the “phenomenon” will prove to be the most contentious 
component of my definition of allegory; it does, I concede, raise some legitimately thorny ques-
tions: Is the category “phenomenon” too broad to be of any real help? Does a reader have to 
know the phenomenon before reading the text in order to “get” the allegory? Does, therefore, 
allegory depend on an “elite” readership? Is a text (still) an allegory if it is misread or “under-
read”? Can a text be an allegory if the author did not have a particular phenomenon in mind 
when he or she composed the work? Recognizing that they present serious challenges, I will 
address these questions in the chapters that follow, and even more directly in the concluding 
chapter. At this point, though, we should note that many of the issues that lie behind these 
questions—meaning, intention, reception—pertain not just to my conception of allegory, but 
to the interpretation of most any narrative; indeed, these issues have animated hermeneutics for 
centuries. This takes us back to a basic tenet of my approach to allegory—that is, the recognition 
of its narrative nature.
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ture functions and how the four levels intersect, we can look at Jean de La 
Fontaine’s reworking of the fable of the fox and the grapes. In his version, La 
Fontaine makes a slight but significant addition to the opening lines:
A starving fox—a Gascon, Normans claim,
But Gascons say a Norman—saw a cluster
Of luscious-looking grapes of purplish luster
Dangling above him on a trellis frame. (205)
The rest of the story remains largely unchanged from Aesop’s telling of it, but 
La Fontaine’s decision to note that the fox’s identity—as determined by its 
geographical and ancestral heritage—changes depending on who does the 
observing allows us to look freshly at this fable as an example of allegory.
 The slight change that La Fontaine makes to the literal narrative of the 
fox and the grapes does not change the basic way that we read the parable; 
we recognize the same hermeneutic clues and perform the same interpretive 
maneuvers toward the same end of discovering his purpose. The observation 
of the human tendency to rationalize our failures also remains a constant 
in La Fontaine’s version; however, the “name calling” element of the later 
variation of the story forces a reexamination of the particular phenomenon 
that the author seeks to narrativize. In addition to bringing to light a par-
ticular human tendency, La Fontaine adds another dimension to it: we see 
this tendency as an existential failing and understand that groups of people 
are more likely to notice and point out this failing in others than they are in 
themselves. In other words, La Fontaine shares Aesop’s purpose of asking his 
audience to confront a human weakness, but he adds a wrinkle to that pur-
pose by making it difficult for us to say that the weakness exists in others but 
not in ourselves. La Fontaine’s observation about the human character might 
be summed up as “humans are quick to ascribe faults to others that they 
do not recognize in themselves.” In a general sense, La Fontaine’s rhetorical 
purpose is quite similar to Aesop’s: to force readers to confront a human 
foible. The particular weakness, however, or the “phenomenon” represented, 
is slightly different in the two versions of the story.
“Figural”
The addition of the adjective “figural” is meant to designate the transforma-
tion of the phenomenon from level two to level three: we recognize that a 
literal narrative stands in for another, usually more general, narrative. In this 
sense, the figuration is implicit in the literal narrative, as it is imbued with 
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the authorial purpose. When encountering an allegorical narrative, readers 
who remain with its literal components are underreading—they remain 
stuck at the second level of the allegorical transformation. Because allegory 
is figurative in nature, it bears some resemblance to metaphor, a trope that, 
as we have seen, some critics actually use to define it. In their Handbook 
to Literature, for example, Holman and Harmon contend, echoing Quin-
tilian, that allegory “may be thought of as an elaborate metaphor in which 
the tenor is never expressed, although it is implied” (288). While it can be 
helpful to think of the real phenomenon or rhetorical purpose in my defi-
nition as a kind of “tenor,” I do not think it is adequate to conceive of the 
figural narrative that emerges after the transformation as a “vehicle,” because 
that conception does not account for the radical change in form—the nar-
rativization—that is fundamental to allegory. Allegory does more than com-
pare—whether implicitly or explicitly—two “things”; it changes, as I tried to 
show with my reading of Aesop’s fable involving the fox and the grapes, one 
“thing” into something else.
 Still, like metaphor, allegory is figurative or symbolic, and this serves to 
distinguish it from mimetic fiction. In mimetic narratives, real phenomena 
are frequently incorporated into a narrative structure—as themes or settings, 
for example—but this incorporation differs from the kind of transformation 
that I see operating in allegory. As Scholes and Kellogg note in their land-
mark study The Nature of Narrative, “Allegory is distinguished from other 
forms of fictional narrative by the illustrative character of its imagery” (109). 
This illustrative aspect of allegory necessitates a typological approach that 
often comes at the expense of mimetic representation. I would argue for a 
continuum, however, stretching from the most obviously allegorical to the 
most determinedly mimetic rather than trying to fix a clear line of demarca-
tion between the two.
“Narrative”
Critics have long recognized a close association between allegory and nar-
rative.7 The congruence of allegory and narrative is obvious in cases of narra-
tive allegories—allegorical stories or narratives, in other words. Gay Clifford, 
for example, claims that literary allegory “is distinguished by its reliance on 
structured narrative” (14). Speaking to the now well-rehearsed distinction 
between allegory and symbol, Clifford goes on to argue that “It would be 
 7. I use the term “narrative” here, but I do not want to limit the scope of my project 
to literary narrative exclusively. There are certainly narratives in other media (film, painting, 
sculpture, etc.) that could be allegorical.
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ridiculous to say that symbolism is impossible without narrative: of allegory 
it would be true” (14). Narrative is essential for allegory because allegory 
entails “some form of controlled or directed process” (15), and narrative is 
the vehicle through which such a process is both represented and structured. 
The idea of process clearly invokes concepts connected to narrative, concepts 
such as plot and temporal progression. It is not surprising, then, that Clifford 
understands allegory as a “kinetic” mode.
 But the connection between allegory and narrative runs even deeper 
than the coincidental convergence that we see in narrative allegories. Indeed, 
even Paul de Man, a theorist who focuses on allegorical signs within a work 
of fiction rather than on entire narratives, finds that allegory rests on a struc-
ture that is inherently narrative. Subsequent to an interpretation of one of 
Wordsworth’s “Lucy” poems, de Man argues that the structure of allegory 
manifests itself “in the tendency of the language toward narrative” (Blindness 
225). De Man’s larger aim is to contrast irony and allegory, and he does so 
through the issue of temporality. Irony is synchronic, allegory diachronic. 
Even in a lyric poem, what de Man identifies as allegory entails duration, 
and duration in the context of a literary work implies narrative more than it 
does lyric, for example.8
 As a side note, and with the understanding that I will return to de Man in 
more detail in chapter 2, I want to acknowledge here that in one important 
way I am following the direction set by de Man when he began the pro-
cess of rehabilitating allegory in the 1960s by reemphasizing its rhetorical 
nature; however, de Man’s use of “rhetoric” differs markedly from the idea 
of rhetoric as the “art of persuasion.” De Man focuses much of his attention 
on what he calls the “allegorical sign,” which he holds in opposition to the 
concept of “symbol.” Temporality, as I showed above, distinguishes the two; 
whereas symbol functions synchronically, de Man argues, allegory operates 
diachronically:
In the world of the symbol it would be possible for the image to coincide 
with the substance, since the substance and its representation do not differ 
in their being but only in their extension: they are part and whole of the 
same set of categories. Their relationship is one of simultaneity, which, in 
truth, is spatial in kind, and in which the intervention of time is merely a 
matter of contingency, whereas, in the world of allegory, time is the origi-
nary constitutive category. The relationship between allegorical sign and 
its meaning (signifié) is not decreed by dogma. . . . We have, instead, a rela-
 8. Robert L. Caserio arrives at a different conclusion regarding de Man’s ideas concerning 
narrative. See his “‘A Pathos of Uncertain Agency’: Paul de Man and Narrative.”
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tionship between signs in which the reference to their respective meanings 
has become of secondary importance. But this relationship between signs 
necessarily contains a constitutive temporal element; it remains neces-
sary, if there is to be allegory, that the allegorical sign refer to another sign 
that precedes it. The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then 
consist only in the repetition (in the Kierkegaardian sense of the term) of a 
previous sign with which it can never coincide, since it is of the essence of 
this previous sign to be pure anteriority. (Blindness 207)
 In keeping with his deconstructionist predilections, de Man clearly 
favors allegory because of its failure to have signifier and signified coin-
cide. As Jim Hansen points out, in de Man’s approach, “. . . in opposition to 
symbol, allegory consciously points to its own temporality and, in so doing, 
embarrasses its own claims to truth” (672). And it is of course precisely this 
kind of embarrassment that the deconstructionist seeks in and from a text. 
The value of de Man’s approach lies in his recasting of allegory as a rhetorical 
figure; this move opens up significant possibilities for recognizing the variety 
of ways in which allegory can figure into a narrative text even if it does not 
finally define the generic or ontological status of that text. These kinds of 
texts will be the central concern of chapters 3–6.
 In the first section of this book I intend to address the kinds of narra-
tive texts that reveal the most obvious gap in de Man’s rhetorical approach: 
its apparent lack of concern for complete narratives that not only contain 
“allegorical signs” but that seem to be—or even insist on being—allego-
ries. Northrop Frye calls such works “actual” allegories, which we have, he 
explains, “when a poet explicitly indicates the relationship of his images to 
examples and precepts, and so tries to indicate how a commentary on him 
should proceed” (90). Because de Man focuses exclusively on texts that are 
not typically considered allegorical in this sense, it is unclear how such a 
narrative would fit into the de Manian schema. Readers of actual allegories, 
I contend, usually find that the allegorical signs succeed pretty well in repre-
senting something, no matter what a critic practicing what Hansen calls de 
Man’s “relentless strain of deconstruction” might argue to the contrary (665).
■
Clearly, a refocusing of allegory through a narratological lens such as I am 
proposing requires, in addition to a definition of allegory, a clear articulation 
of what I mean by narrative. My approach to reading narrative—including 
allegorical narratives—borrows from the work of James Phelan, who pro-
poses a rhetorically inflected version of narratology in a series of five works: 
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Worlds from Words, Reading People, Reading Plots, Narrative as Rhetoric, 
Living to Tell About It, and most recently, Experiencing Fiction. In each of 
these works, Phelan starts from the premise that “narrative itself can be 
fruitfully understood as a rhetorical act: somebody telling somebody else on 
some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something happened” (Living 
19). As for analyzing and interpreting such a rhetorical act, Phelan “locates 
meaning in a feedback loop among authorial agency, textual phenomena 
(including intertextual relations), and reader-response. In other words,” 
Phelan continues, “for the purposes of interpreting narratives, the concep-
tion assumes that texts are designed by authors in order to affect readers in 
particular ways, that those designs are conveyed through the language, tech-
niques, structures, forms, and dialogic relations of texts as well as the genres 
and conventions readers use to understand them, and that reader responses 
are a function, guide, and test of how designs are created through textual and 
intertextual phenomena” (18).
 I find two aspects of Phelan’s approach to be particularly useful. One 
is his recognition of the multifaceted nature of narrative. This recognition 
allows him to transcend the textuality of narrative and to view narrative as an 
act whose primary manifestation is as a text. Such an approach necessitates 
the reintroduction of authorial intention (or “agency”) and reader response, 
issues that can be easily overlooked in the textually oriented incarnation of 
narratology that had its origins in Russian Formalism and French Structur-
alism. The second point of Phelan’s that I find helpful as I wrestle with alle-
gory is the “feedback loop” as a heuristic for explaining the phenomenon of 
meaning in narrative. We can see the utility of this approach for my purposes 
by looking forward to the question that I will claim ultimately decides how 
critics have approached allegory; that is, to what entity should we turn in 
order to decide whether a narrative is or is not allegorical? I will posit three 
possible answers: 1) genetic issues, including the author, his or her intention, 
and the context of composition; 2) the text itself; and 3) readerly concerns. 
These coincide neatly with Phelan’s tripartite hermeneutic feedback loop 
consisting of “authorial agency, textual phenomena (including intertextual 
relations), and reader-response” (18). Rather than aligning myself with any 
of the three broad allegorical camps I have described above, I am going to 
argue that each of these entities plays an important role in allegory and that 
we cannot reduce allegory to a single, primary cause or essential feature. 
I want to be faithful to what I see as the complexity and variety of actual 
instances of allegory by offering an approach to allegory that remains flex-
ible. This flexibility can come from something like Phelan’s feedback loop 
because it (the feedback-loop idea) locates meaning in a recursive relation-
ship among a variety of crucial features of the narrative act.
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 Rather than identifying one particular feature of an allegorical narrative 
or its origins as the source of its ontological status, I will argue that allegory 
emerges from a complex interaction among authorial intention, the nature 
of the narrative text in question, the rhetorical situation that gave rise to that 
text, and the reader’s response to it. This conception of allegory understands 
it as a kind of gestalt, and it differs significantly from the ways in which 
critics have traditionally treated this subfield of literary studies. To illustrate 
how a narrative-rhetorical approach offers a new perspective from which 
to view allegory, I would like to turn to an exemplary text, George Orwell’s 
Animal Farm. I have chosen this novel because it is so widely known and so 
widely accepted as an allegory; beginning with such a text will relieve me 
of the task of “proving” that it is an allegory and allow me to focus instead 
on examining two issues that are central to my concerns in this book. The 
first of these is the question of how critics usually determine whether a text 
is allegorical, and the second is why we can achieve consensus about some 
texts, such as Animal Farm, but not about others. My hypothesis is that lin-
gering questions about the allegorical status of some works of fiction point 
to problems with the usual means we employ to assign that status and that 
these are problems that a narrative-rhetorical approach can mitigate, if not 
eliminate completely.
Allegory and Genetic Concerns
 a. authorial Intention
Broadly speaking, we can classify the different conceptions of and approaches 
to allegory that we find in twentieth-century literary criticism according to 
how they answer one key question: to what entity should we turn in order 
to decide whether a narrative is or is not allegorical? Traditional concep-
tions of allegory give deference to the author; allegory is an intentional act. 
This remains the dominant idea for a number of contemporary critics and 
probably for a majority of contemporary readers; for people of this inclina-
tion, the intentions of the author are of paramount importance and are the 
compelling force behind the interpretive act.
 If genetic considerations are the standard for judging allegoricalness, 
then the case for Orwell’s Animal Farm would seem to be fairly clear-cut, 
even if authorial intention is the only piece of evidence we have. From his 
own writing on the subject of this novel, we know that Orwell felt that the 
Russians had perverted the socialist ideal and that he was “convinced that 
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the destruction of the Soviet myth was essential if we wanted a revival of 
the Socialist movement” (405);9 he apparently intended his narrative to be 
a means for achieving a larger political end. Indeed, in the preface to the 
Ukrainian edition of the novel, Orwell confesses that, following a trip to 
Spain,
I thought of exposing the Soviet myth in a story that could be easily under-
stood by almost everyone and which could be easily translated into other 
languages. However, the actual details of the story did not come to me for 
some time until one day (I was then living in a small village) I saw a little 
boy, perhaps ten years old, driving a huge cart-horse along a narrow path, 
whipping it whenever it tried to turn. It struck me that if only such animals 
became aware of their strength we should have no power over them, and 
that men exploit animals in much the same way as the rich exploit the 
proletariat.
 I proceeded to analyze Marx’s theory from the animals’ point of view. 
To them it was clear that the concept of a class struggle between humans 
was pure illusion, since whenever it was necessary to exploit animals, all 
humans united against them: the true struggle is between animals and 
humans. From this point of departure, it was not difficult to elaborate the 
story. (405–6)
Such an explicit pronouncement from the author concerning both the 
genesis of his work and his aims in writing it cannot be dismissed lightly 
and must surely influence the ways in which readers engage the narrative. 
This pronouncement, in other words, provides the basis for an interpretive 
hypothesis that the reader can then test against the details of Orwell’s text. 
If Orwell claims that he intends his story to expose the reality of Soviet-
style socialism, then it behooves his readers, on some level (an ethical one, I 
would argue), to read it in such a way that they take that claim seriously and 
as if it were made in good faith, at least until other evidence emerges that 
might call into question Orwell’s professed intention.10
 9. This quotation, and those that follow from Orwell, are from his own preface to the 
Ukrainian edition of Animal Farm. It is reprinted in The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Let-
ters of George Orwell.
 10. Readers of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene face a similar dynamic. In a letter to 
Sir Walter Raleigh, Spenser writes: “Sir knowing how doubtfully all Allegories may be con-
strued, and this booke of mine, which I have entituled the Faery Queene, being a continued 
Allegory, or darke conceit, I have thought good as well for avoyding of gealous opinions and 
misconstructions, as also for your better light in reading therof, (being by you so commanded,) 
to discover unto you the general intention and meaning, which in the whole course thereof I 
have fashioned, without expressing of any particular purposes or by-accidents therein occa-
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 In making this kind of prefatory pronouncement, Orwell arouses in 
his readers certain expectations concerning the kind of narrative they are 
going to encounter. Although I have resisted adopting an exclusively generic 
approach to allegory, the concept of genre is nevertheless relevant to our 
discussion. Rather than thinking of genre as a kind of literature, we need 
to understand it, following E.  D. Hirsch, as “a type of meaning” (Validity 
72).11 Although Hirsch largely restricts his discussion of genre to a section 
of his book devoted to explaining verbal meaning, what he says has defi-
nite implications for our discussion of the interpretation of narrative. This 
is especially true in the case of allegorical narratives because the author of 
an allegory writes with a specific purpose in mind and with the intention 
of transforming some phenomenon that the reader is meant to recognize. 
For Hirsch, the concept of genre is central to the successful realization of 
such a purpose, and it applies more to the interpreter than to the speaker of 
the text because, as he explains, “the details of meaning that an interpreter 
understands are powerfully determined and constituted by his meaning 
expectations. And these expectations arise from the interpreter’s conception 
of the type of meaning that is being expressed” (72). Generic expectations, 
then, are expectations concerning what type of meaning a speaker (or an 
author) intends, and such expectations are often critical in the process of 
interpretation. Rather than trying to argue for allegory in all of its various 
manifestations as a genre with commonly identifiable characteristics, we 
might more profitably argue that some authors, including Orwell in the case 
of Animal Farm, intend their works to mean something identifiable on a 
figurative level. In other words, Orwell’s preface prepares us to respond to a 
narrative that meets my definition of allegory: the fulfillment of a rhetorical 
purpose by means of the transformation of some phenomenon into a figural 
narrative. The phenomenon, as Orwell makes clear, is the Soviet implemen-
tation (or perversion) of Marxist theory, and the fabulist story, of course, 
is the figural narrative. Once the reader knows that this is what the author 
sioned” (1). As is the case with Orwell, we do not ultimately have to accept this pronouncement 
as the defining one concerning the text in question, but we do have to take it seriously.
 11. In his later work, The Aims of Interpretation, Hirsch puts forward a fairly persuasive 
argument against a model of interpretation that relies heavily on applying the concept of genre 
to literature entirely or to some subset of it. Critics who pursue this angle, according to Hirsch, 
“assume that literature as a whole or some sub-genre of it has a definable essence or telos which 
can govern the formulation of criteria. But we may be permitted to be skeptical so long as that 
essence is not satisfactorily defined. According to Aristotle, the essence of any class is that sys-
tem of characteristics which are shared by all its members, and which are not shared by things 
outside the class. Thus, a true class requires a set of distinguishing features that are inclusive 
within the class and exclusive outside it; it requires a differentia specifica. That, according to Ar-
istotle, is the key to definition and to essence. But, in fact, nobody has ever so defined literature 
or any important genre within it” (120–21). This applies to allegory.
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has in mind, the act of mapping correspondences between narrative and the 
historical phenomenon (Napoleon the pig = Stalin, for example) becomes a 
fairly straightforward process. This is the work that needs to be done if one 
is to “get” the allegory.
 The question of Orwell’s intentions raises an important issue regarding 
the interpretation and evaluation of a work of literature: aesthetic merit. In 
fact, we can attribute directly to this issue a significant portion of the “death 
wish” that some critics have harbored for allegory. If we hold Orwell to the 
standards that have dominated literary studies over the past two centuries 
and that have been at least partly responsible for the negative connotations 
that allegory has carried during that time, then we might incline toward a 
negative evaluation of Animal Farm as an aesthetic object—as a fictional nar-
rative, some might argue, it is too contrived and its meaning is too obvious. 
Moreover, as his preface makes clear, Orwell’s primary intention might have 
been to produce political results (“exposing the Soviet myth in a story that 
could be easily understood by almost everyone and which could be easily 
translated into other languages”), an aim that some might see as being at 
cross purposes with more “purely” aesthetic objectives. And, indeed, many 
critics have focused almost exclusively on the political aspect of Animal 
Farm. Witness the perspective of Richard Rorty:
Orwell was successful because he wrote exactly the right [book] at exactly 
the right time. His description of a particular historical contingency was, 
it turned out, just what was required to make a difference to the future 
of liberal politics. He broke the power of what Nabokov enjoyed calling 
“Bolshevik propaganda” over the minds of liberal intellectuals in England 
and America. He thereby put us twenty years ahead of our French opposite 
numbers. They had to wait for The Gulag Archipelago before they stopped 
thinking that liberal hope required the conviction that things behind 
the Iron Curtain would necessarily get better, and stopped thinking that 
solidarity against the capitalists required ignoring what the Communist 
oligarchs were doing. Whereas Nabokov sensitised his readers to the per-
manent possibility of small-scale cruelties produced by the private pursuit 
of bliss, Orwell sensitised his to a set of excuses for cruelty which had 
been put into circulation by a particular group—the use of the rhetoric of 
“human equality” by intellectuals who had allied themselves with a spec-
tacularly successful criminal gang. (“The Last Intellectual” 141)
This evaluation of the novel does not privilege complexity or ambiguity 
or even beauty as much as it does clarity of vision and descriptive efficacy. 
Orwell provided a new way of seeing a particular historical situation, and his 
Introduction  •  21
intention was to make this as clear as possible.
 But should the political and didactic aims of Orwell’s novel—even if 
those aims are undeniably met—automatically engender a harsh aesthetic 
judgment? Or, perhaps we simply and necessarily have a lower standard of 
aesthetic merit for works whose genesis is political and whose intentions 
appear to be didactic? A rhetorically oriented approach to allegory can help 
us with these seemingly intractable issues by providing a more solid ground 
from which to offer an aesthetic judgment. Rather than beginning with some 
ineffable standard of aesthetic merit to which a particular work either mys-
teriously (and sometimes inexplicably) rises or fails to, the rhetorical critic 
starts by asking what an author’s purpose in writing that work might have 
been. Phelan explains that “our question is whether the work under consid-
eration is a high-quality example of how to achieve [some] purpose what-
ever that purpose happens to be” (Experiencing 142). Once we have made 
a hermeneutical determination concerning the author’s purpose, Phelan 
continues, “we can then proceed to judge the quality of the work within the 
terms appropriate to that kind” (142). Proceeding in this manner allows the 
critic to value Animal Farm as a work of art that aims for very specific ends 
and that achieves those ends in a way that speaks to the author’s mastery of 
his aesthetic craft. Orwell, in other words, does not have to write Madame 
Bovary in order to produce a novel that has artistic merit, because he was 
aiming for a different target than was Flaubert.12
 B. historical Context and the author
If we expand the range of genetic criticism beyond the author’s (explicitly 
stated) intentions and look as well at the historical circumstances in which 
Orwell wrote and at his own biography, some readers might conclude that 
Orwell’s work was bound to be allegorical, whether or not he consciously 
intended it to be. Fredric Jameson, in his work on postcolonial literary 
theory, adopts this kind of position regarding allegory. In “Third-World Lit-
 12. Simply recognizing the need to include the author’s purpose in any consideration of 
aesthetic value, however, does not eliminate the subjective aspect of this kind of judgment. 
Thus, we are unlikely ever to arrive at some universal standard of aesthetic merit. For a thor-
ough treatment of this issue, and an interesting case of applied aesthetic judgment, see chapter 
6 of Phelan’s Experiencing Fiction. Here Phelan describes four levels of aesthetic judgments, 
with the fourth allowing for the comparison of whole works even if they have different aims. 
Phelan comes to the conclusion that we will not find any elusive universal standards on which 
to base our judgments, but he does not find that this makes comparative evaluations impossible. 
They will, in all likelihood, be subjective, but this does not mean that they will be completely 
idiosyncratic.
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erature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” Jameson makes the sweeping 
claim that “All third-world texts are necessarily . . . allegorical” (69). This is 
so, Jameson maintains, because the historical, political, and material con-
text of third-world literature always makes the private story of an individual 
(generally the stuff of novels) a statement about the collective whole. Thus, 
when Jameson uses the term allegory he intends it in a particular way; 
he believes that all third-world texts must be read as “national allegories” 
because these works, “even those which are seemingly private and invested 
with a properly libidinal dynamic—necessarily project a political dimension 
in the form of national allegory: the story of the private individual destiny is 
always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture 
and society” (69, emphasis in original). Jameson contrasts the situation of the 
third-world text with that of the first-world text. In the case of the latter, we 
Western readers have the “luxury” of accepting the private realm described 
in literary texts as simply and exclusively private. This “view from the top,” 
as Jameson describes it,
is epistemologically crippling, and reduces its subjects to the illusions of a 
host of fragmented subjectivities, to the poverty of individual experience 
of isolated monads, to dying individual bodies without collective pasts or 
futures bereft of any possibility of grasping the social totality. This placeless 
individuality, this structural idealism which affords us the luxury of the 
Sartrean blink, offers a welcome escape from the “nightmare of history,” 
but at the same time it condemns our culture to psychologism and the 
“projections” of private subjectivity. All of this is denied to third-world 
culture, which must be situational and materialist despite itself. And it is 
this, finally, which must account for the allegorical nature of third-world 
culture, where the telling of the individual story and the individual experi-
ence cannot but ultimately involve the whole laborious telling of the expe-
rience of the collectivity itself. (85–86)
In this passage Jameson significantly attaches the adjective “allegorical” not 
to “text,” “story,” or “literature,” but rather to “culture” itself. Thus, we must 
recognize that in his view, the determining force behind allegory is culture 
and its historical and materialist situation.13
 13. For a trenchant critique of Jameson’s position on national allegory, see Aijaz Ahmad’s In 
Theory: Class, Nations, Literatures. Ahmad’s arguments against Jameson include the assertions 
that Jameson simply ignores many third-world texts that are not allegories and that Jameson 
makes out all third-world writers to be inherently nationalistic. For more on the debate that 
ensued as a result of the work of Jameson and Ahmad, among others, see On Jameson: From 
Postmodernism to Globalization, edited by Caren Irr and Ian Buchanan. The essays “National 
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 At first glance, this conviction that allegory can arise—perhaps even 
unbidden by a specific author—out of a particular historical situation might 
not seem to apply directly to Orwell. I think it does, however, for two rea-
sons. First, in his famous essay “Shooting an Elephant,” Orwell’s thesis echoes 
what Jameson says, albeit from the perspective of the colonizer rather than 
the colonized. Orwell writes of his experience as a police officer in Burma 
during the time of British rule, and he makes it clear that everything he did 
and everything the native Burmese did reflected the political and historical 
realities of the context. The impetus for the essay, Orwell recalls, was “a tiny 
incident in itself ” (Collected 2), but he comes to see it as revealing of “the real 
nature of imperialism—the real motives for which despotic governments 
act” (2). At issue in this case was what to do about an elephant that was 
“ravaging the bazaar” of a small Burmese village. Orwell, in his capacity as 
a security officer, was summoned to do something about the situation. With 
his rifle in hand, Orwell confronted the elephant before a crowd of more 
than two thousand interested Burmese. While he never intended to harm the 
elephant, Orwell comments that his position as an officer of the imperialist 
power and his possession of “the magical rifle” made it so that he would have 
little choice in the matter. “And suddenly,” he writes,
I realized that I should have to shoot the elephant after all. The people 
expected it of me and I had got to do it; I could feel their two thousand wills 
pressing me forward irresistibly. And it was at this moment, as I stood there 
with the rifle in my hands, that I first grasped the hollowness, the futility of 
the white man’s dominion of the East. Here was I, the white man with his 
gun, standing in front of the unarmed native crowd—seemingly the leading 
actor of the piece; but in reality I was only an absurd puppet pushed to and 
fro by the will of those yellow faces behind. I perceived in this moment that 
when the white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom that he destroys. He 
becomes a sort of hollow, posing dummy, the conventionalized figure of a 
sahib. . . . He wears a mask and his face grows to fit it. (5)
Orwell feels deeply his position here, apparently having internalized the larger 
political struggle in which he plays only a minor role. Moreover, Orwell’s 
acute consciousness of the plight of the native people and his developing 
sense of the insidious folly of the British imperial project predispose him to 
recognize the allegorical potential of this “tiny incident” with the elephant.
 Using Orwell’s expository essay as background material, we might rea-
Allegory Today: A Return to Jameson,” by Ian Buchanan, and “Who’s Afraid of National Al-
legory? Jameson, Literary Criticism, Globalization,” by Imre Szeman, are of particular interest.
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sonably draw some conclusions about how Orwell views himself and his 
position in the world. In particular, we can say with some confidence that 
Orwell was the kind of person for whom certain historical contexts were also 
“rhetorical situations.” When I refer to the rhetorical situation, I do not mean 
simply the setting of the narrative proper, but rather the context of its actual 
composition. Following Lloyd Bitzer, we shall define the rhetorical situation 
as “a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or 
potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, 
introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as 
to bring about significant modification of the exigence” (386). Clarifying his 
terminology, Bitzer explains that an “exigence” constitutes “an imperfection 
marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, 
a thing which is other than it should be” (386). “Shooting an Elephant” is 
essentially an essay describing Orwell’s epiphany concerning the true nature 
of colonialism and its impact on both the colonizer and the colonized; this 
is the exigence that his work seeks to unmask. Such exposure of the exigence 
might, we can hope, lead to an eventual change in the situation.
 Turning back to the fictional Animal Farm, the reader will certainly rec-
ognize a similar rhetorical dynamic: a writer recognizes a situation that is 
“other than it should be” and he sets to writing about it in such a way to 
effect some change. As Rorty argues, rhetorical acts—or “redescriptions”—
that “change our minds on political situations . . . are the sort of thing which 
only writers with very special talents, writing at just the right moment in 
just the right way, are able to bring off ” (143). Rorty makes a good case that 
Orwell is one of the writers with these special talents, and I would contend 
that his ability to translate historical contexts into rhetorical situations is 
chief among them. When we view the author of Animal Farm in this way 
the allegorical nature of the novel seems, if not predetermined, then at least 
unsurprising. The combination of Orwell’s personal predilections and the 
historical moment in which he lived and wrote is a powerful indicator of 
how we should read this narrative.14
Allegory and Textual Phenomena
A second view of allegory—a formalist one—shifts the focus from the autho-
rial and genetic issues I discussed above to the text itself. Morton Bloomfield 
 14. While clearly “fictional” in an important sense of that word, Orwell’s narrative, as 
Rorty’s analysis makes clear, comes close to being a work of history, a narrative constructed 
around “real” historical actors and a series of “actual” historical events. This is why Rorty’s claim 
that Animal Farm amounts to a “redescription” makes sense.
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gives voice to one version of this approach when he writes that “The only 
stable element in a literary work is its words, which, if we know the language 
in which it is written, have a meaning. The significance of that meaning is 
what may be called allegory. The problem of interpretation is the problem of 
allegory” (301). Bloomfield sounds very much like the critics who emphasize 
the reader’s role in constructing allegory, but the emphasis on language and 
the implication that the arrangement of words in a text results in a meaning 
that the reader can uncover give Bloomfield’s pronouncement a decidedly 
more formalist air. Orwell would seem to give some credence to this view 
when he claims that Animal Farm should be able to voice its own meaning.
 We might take a single word from Orwell’s novel to illustrate what Bloom-
field calls the significance of the meaning of the novel’s language. Indeed, the 
first word actually spoken by Old Major—“Comrades” (7)—goes a long way 
toward introducing the overarching theme of the work, situating it histori-
cally, and identifying the nature and identity of the characters because it is 
a term so inextricably and resonantly associated with the communist move-
ment. As this example demonstrates, the most basic and fundamental of all 
textual phenomena—the words that comprise the novel—do in fact play a 
significant role in the transformation of Orwell’s rhetorical purpose into the 
narrative. And in some ways, the careful choice of language (as the term 
“comrades” reveals) can make the “problem” of interpretation that Bloom-
field identifies far less problematic than it could otherwise be.15
 When we endeavor to interpret Animal Farm, however, we are dealing 
not only with issues of language per se—issues of the meaning of words and 
the significance of those meanings, that is—but also with certain aspects 
of narrative, which also constitute “textual phenomena.” Take character as 
just one example. The personified animals in this work point readers rather 
unambiguously toward an allegorical interpretation. When the pig called 
Old Major addresses his fellow farm animals to tell them about his “strange 
dream” and the nature of the life of a farm animal (7), sophisticated readers 
recognize the obvious allegorical possibilities, or what Wayne Booth would 
call the “invitation” of allegory (A Rhetoric of Irony 25). Clearly, we are not 
meant to rest on the literal level of the narrative, as these fabulous characters 
offer the reader an invitation to respond to the text differently than we might 
respond to a more mimetically oriented narrative. Thus, the very nature of 
the characters has a significance that is at least as meaningful as the nature of 
 15. I do not mean to put undue emphasis on this single word; indeed, for a writer such 
as Walt Whitman “comrades” simply means “fellow men.” But, given the historical moment in 
which Orwell worked, this word does carry considerable and special weight. As a general point, 
I want it to illustrate the importance of this kind of textual phenomenon to the allegorical en-
terprise.
26  •  Introduction
the language that Orwell uses. In addition to language and character, other 
textual phenomena that can contribute to the allegorical nature of a narra-
tive include plot, point of view, and themes. I will address these more fully 
in the following chapters.
Allegory and Readerly Concerns
As reader-response critics are quick to point out, every text needs a reader if 
it is not to remain forever inert. The reader of a work of fiction, according to 
both these critics and rhetorical critics, encounters not only the textual phe-
nomena that I addressed above but also the whole range of genetic consid-
erations with which I opened this section. And the ethical reader—the very 
one who feels some obligation to give due credence to an author’s claims 
about his or her own work—has divided loyalties. While there is an obliga-
tion that attends genetic considerations, the reader must also be true to him 
or herself as a reader and maintain room for doubt. In other words, good 
readers will not simply take an author at his or her word concerning inten-
tions and meanings, for the possibility always exists that a particular work 
of fiction will belie any authorial pronouncements about it. Despite what 
Jameson says about the power of context to impose “allegoricity” on a fic-
tional narrative, we should be skeptical of such a sweeping claim. For these 
reasons, a number of critics—especially those with formalist leanings—have 
adopted the stance that allegory is primarily, if not wholly, a function of 
reading and that authorial intention and the context of composition have 
little or no role to play in deciding whether a work of fiction is, finally, alle-
gorical or not.
 Emphasizing the reader’s role in constructing allegory has a long his-
tory, going back at least to neo-Platonic Christian interpreters of Homer.16 
Dante, one of the most influential early theorists of allegory, also conferred 
considerable power on the reader, power to uncover the truth that was often 
hidden behind the “beautiful lie” of a fictional work’s surface-level mean-
ing.17 For Dante, validation of literature itself was at stake, and he needed 
a way to justify expending time and energy producing and reading “mere” 
fiction. His solution was similar to that hit upon by the Christian exegetes 
 16. See Robert Lamberton’s Homer the Theologian for an insightful history of allegorical 
reading.
 17. Dante’s most sustained discussion of allegory comes in Book II, chapter 1 of the Con-
vivio [The Banquet]. Allegory is also the topic of the Epistle to Can Grande, but scholars cannot 
definitively attribute this work to Dante.
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of classical texts: to use allegoresis as a tool to get at the moral and spiritual 
truths hidden beneath the literal level of literature. In this way readers can 
allow themselves to continue to enjoy and value works that might not at first 
seem reconcilable with a particular religious faith.
 We can see, then, that allegory develops along two different tracks, a 
compositional track and a hermeneutic one. This split has been the source of 
some confusion, and critics often fall on one side of the divide or the other, 
depending on their critical inclinations. In the twentieth century, theorists 
such as Hirsch focused on the compositional side while others emphasized 
the reader and his or her role in interpreting a text. For this second group 
of critics, allegory is an interpretive enterprise rather than a genetic one. 
Maureen Quilligan, for example, remarks that “[Critics] have had to remind 
us that all literature is, in essence, allegorical, if only because all literature 
has readers, and readers, as is their wont, think about what the work ‘really’ 
means . . .” (15). Striking a similar chord, Northrop Frye famously notes that 
“all commentary is allegorical interpretation, an attaching of ideas to the 
structure of poetic imagery. The instant that any critic permits himself to 
make a genuine comment about a poem . . . he has begun to allegorize” (89). 
Sayre Greenfield echoes this sentiment in The Ends of Allegory, in which he 
argues that “Allegory is always . . . a way of interpretation” (52). From this 
angle, it seems to be the reader who bears the responsibility of realizing lit-
erary allegory. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, there would appear 
to be nothing—including the author’s original intentions—that could stop 
a particular reader from construing any particular work as an allegory of 
something else.18
 In practice, though, nearly all readers recognize certain constraints on 
their interpretive freedom; there are limits on what we can make Animal 
Farm mean, for example, even if we disregard Orwell’s commentary on it, 
his tendencies as a writer and thinker, and the circumstances in which he 
composed it. Indeed, in the preface that I have already cited, Orwell restrains 
himself from more extensive commentary on the narrative because, he 
asserts, “if [the novel] does not speak for itself, it is a failure” (406). One 
 18. Peter Berek has proposed an interesting way of reconciling the competing desires of the 
genetic critics and the reader-response critics—drawing a strict distinction between the act of 
interpreting an allegorical text and allegoresis, or the act of reading allegorically. “I argue,” Berek 
writes, “that interpreting the meaning of allegorical texts, like interpreting the meaning of other 
writings, has a claim to validity resting ultimately upon evidence as to the writer’s intended 
meaning. Allegoresis, on the other hand, though its practitioners make interpretive statements 
which at first sound much like those made by interpreters of allegorical works, ultimately makes 
claims to validity that have nothing to do with authorial intention, but rather with a truth the 
allegorizing reader knows which may well have been beyond the awareness, whether conscious 
or unconscious, of the work’s author” (118).
28  •  Introduction
senses here that Orwell looks at his own work as Gay Clifford understands 
allegory, and that is as a mode that “presupposes an audience who will 
respond to it in specific ways” (36). Eliciting that response depends on what 
is in the actual narrative, on what the narrative literally says.
 A rhetorical approach to narrative—and by extension to allegory—seeks 
to allow for the intersection of the compositional and hermeneutic tracks 
via the concepts of purpose (which I discussed above in relation to the idea 
of aesthetic merit) and authorial audience. Returning to Phelan’s conception 
of the rhetorical approach to narrative, we can see how the three apparently 
discrete variables I have been discussing operate together to allow for the 
emergence of meaning. Phelan explains that,
for the purposes of interpreting narratives, the [rhetorical] approach 
assumes that texts are designed by authors in order to affect readers in par-
ticular ways [this would constitute “purpose” and would involve an under-
standing of genetic concerns]; that those designs are conveyed through 
words, techniques, structures, forms, and dialogic relations of texts as well 
as genres and conventions readers use to understand them [broadly con-
sidered, these are the “textual phenomena”]; and that reader responses are 
a function of and, thus, a guide to how designs are created through textual 
and intertextual phenomena. (Experiencing 4)
Phelan’s model also works under the assumption that some readers of fic-
tional narratives “[seek] to enter the authorial audience,” an audience con-
stituted by “the author’s ideal reader” (4).19 It is from this assumption that 
Phelan develops his account of “rhetorical reading.” The reader, in such a 
schema, gains access to the authorial audience through a holistic approach 
to the text, one in which he or she takes into consideration the interplay of 
intention, context of composition, and textual phenomena.
 The argument that I want to put forward regarding allegory—at least 
full-length allegories such as Animal Farm—is that they are by nature nar-
rative rhetorical acts, and in order to understand them we must recognize 
the importance and the interrelatedness of all three of the aspects I have 
described above: genetic concerns, readerly concerns, and textual phe-
nomena. When it comes to interpreting such narratives, Phelan’s feedback-
loop metaphor, which positions these three narratological issues at the 
points of a rhetorical triangle, can help us see how they tend to initiate and 
then to compound or reinforce a meaning for the text.
 19. I will address the idea and the significance of the authorial audience in more detail in 
the following chapter.
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 The feedback-loop metaphor strikes me as particularly apt for allegor-
ical narratives because an actual feedback loop involves a system in which 
a transformation occurs, and as I conceive of the term, transformation is a 
defining characteristic of the allegorical enterprise. But rather than trying 
to identify one agent—whether it be the author, the rhetorical situation, the 
text, or the reader—responsible for that transformation, I prefer to attribute 
the change to the interplay of some, most, or all of these elements. Regarding 
a work such as Animal Farm, one that I call a strong allegory, the “input” into 
the feedback loop tends to be overwhelmingly “positive.” In other words, 
all of our acts in the reading process tend to produce results that positively 
reinforce the transformative impetus. In nontextual feedback loops, such a 
situation would lead to exponential growth (think of compounding interest, 
for example) or decline, whereas with a text, it leads to a particularly strong 
rhetorical effect.
 As Phelan understands the hermeneutic process, the reader “may begin 
the interpretive inquiry from any one of [the] points on the rhetorical tri-
angle, but the inquiry will at some point consider how each point both influ-
ences and can be influenced by the other two” (Living 18). Today, many—
perhaps most—readers of Animal Farm will begin from the genetic point, 
knowing something about Orwell’s intentions or the circumstances under 
which he composed the novel, or both. This information might come from 
teachers, from “Introductions” published with the actual novel, or simply 
from a cultural familiarity with the text. When this is the case, the reading 
process might become essentially an exercise in confirmation, one in which 
the textual phenomena are more or less simply and uncritically found to 
reinforce the stated desire of the author or to support the analysis of previous 
readers.
 Similarly, a reader could begin the process of interpretation from a reac-
tion to the text that precedes any actual engagement with it. For example, a 
reader with communist sympathies or socialist leanings might have formed 
an opinion of the work based on reactions to what he or she might have 
heard about the work and the politics of its author. Such an approach could 
certainly color one’s response to and interpretation of the work. We would 
hope, however, that a careful and ethical reader would still be able to recog-
nize the phenomenon that Orwell has transformed even if that reader does 
not share Orwell’s particular worldview. From the other end of the spec-
trum, I could also imagine a reader raised on a farm who happens upon a 
novel called Animal Farm and who immediately finds him- or herself predis-
posed to like the work. It might take a while for this reader to recognize that 
Orwell’s work is not really meant to be primarily about a farm, but, again, 
we would hope that the evidence provided by the text itself would bring this 
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reader around to a valid interpretation of the text.
 Finally, the possibility certainly exists that a reader—perhaps one com-
pletely unfamiliar with Orwell and his work or with life on a farm—might 
start by directly engaging the textual phenomena. Even in this case, though, 
most interpreters seem to have a basic desire to understand what a speaker 
or an author intends by an utterance, and most begin with what Hirsch calls 
a generic expectation that takes the form of a “type idea” and that func-
tions as a heuristic device. When a narrative provides textual cues that point 
toward allegory, allegory becomes this kind of type idea, and it guides our 
interpretive activities at least until we have evidence that this idea is not or 
is no longer tenable (Validity 88). If the narrative bears out our initial guess 
and does not fit as well with alternative type ideas, then we can be reasonably 
sure that we have hit upon what Hirsch calls the “intrinsic genre,” or “that 
sense of the whole by means of which an interpreter can correctly understand 
any part in its determinacy” (86, emphasis in original). Again, it is impor-
tant to note that this “sense” resides in the interpreter and it manifests itself 
in that interpreter because of the rhetorical effect produced by a narrative 
(or a speaker). With strong allegories, this rhetorical effect is nearly over-
whelming, and that makes the interpreter’s guess about the intrinsic genre a 
fairly risk-free enterprise.
 Applying these hermeneutic concepts to Animal Farm, we might say that 
the early appearance in the narrative of talking pigs raises some rather spe-
cific and powerful expectations concerning the type of meaning that Orwell 
intends to produce.20 This is a preliminary rhetorical effect produced by a 
textual phenomenon, but it does not ensure that what the reader is reading is 
“an allegory.” As the reader continues, new textual evidence arises that either 
strengthens or fails to strengthen this preliminary rhetorical effect. Despite 
the allegorical potential inherent in the personified animals, the narrative as 
a whole cannot result in a strong allegorical effect without the presence of 
other textual phenomena that reveal the author’s thematic intentions. Obvi-
ously, corroborating narrative evidence in Animal Farm abounds. Indeed, 
as Old Major continues the speech that begins with “Comrades,” his words 
serve only to strengthen Orwell’s rhetorical effect. That speech is, as Orwell 
explains, essentially “Marx’s theory from the animals’ point of view,” as it 
emphasizes the fact that man has been unjustly and cruelly exploiting the 
animals for their labor and keeping all that the animals have produced for 
their own consumption and profit.
 20. One legitimate expectation, of course, might be that we have begun reading a work of 
children’s literature. Such an expectation would not preclude the possibility of allegory; it might 
in fact heighten it. I address the role of children’s literature in allegory more fully in chapter 3, 
“Weak Allegory.”
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 As readers of Animal Farm progress through the narrative, the textual 
phenomena continually reinforce our early sense that Orwell has allegorical 
intentions and remain congruent with the theme of the communist revolu-
tion in Russia. At the same time, the import of this theme and the rhetorical 
situation that inspired it become increasingly clear as what started out as 
a noble and just cause becomes, in the hands (hooves?) of the unscrupu-
lous, traitorous, and dictatorial pig Napoleon, a disillusioning power-grab. 
This is not a tract meant as a blanket condemnation of communism and 
socialism—indeed Old Major himself and his ideas are portrayed in strik-
ingly positive terms—but rather a work meant to decry the misappropriation 
and misapplication of Marxist ideology by corrupt and illegitimate leaders. 
As Orwell claims in his preface to the Ukrainian edition, the work does 
“speak for itself,” and what it reveals most clearly is the rhetorical situation 
that called it into being.
 Recognizing Orwell’s allegorical intent and identifying the fundamental 
theme of his narrative can make a reader confident in calling Animal Farm 
an allegory, but the case is strengthened even further when we are aware 
of the rhetorical situation that gave rise to it and makes clear the author’s 
aims in addressing that situation. A narrative that produces the strongest 
allegorical effect also straddles the line between literature and pure rhetoric 
more precariously than do other narratives; this helps to explain the distaste 
for and distrust of allegory on the part of many literary critics. Whether one 
likes them or not, those works that strike us as the strongest examples of 
allegorical writing are also the ones that seem to address directly some kind 
of exigency, but they do so from within the framework of a fictional nar-
rative. Given Bitzer’s claim that the “exigence and the complex of persons, 
objects, events and relations which generate rhetorical discourse are located 
in reality, are objective and publicly observable historic facts in the world we 
experience, [and] are therefore available for scrutiny by an observer or critic 
who attends to them” (390), we would seem to have good reason for skepti-
cism regarding my claim that the rhetorical situation plays such a central 
role in producing the allegorical effect. But fiction that produces a strong 
allegorical effect on the reader often needs a rhetorical situation as much as 
does the kind of discourse about which Bitzer theorizes. We must weaken 
Bitzer’s claim that the constituent elements of the rhetorical situation must be 
“observable historical facts” if we are to apply the idea to allegorical fiction,21 
but we must also recognize that some real exigency—even if it is a general 
concern about the state of the human soul—gives rise to and manifests itself 
in allegorical narratives. This explains the pedantic quality of many works 
 21. Though in the case of Animal Farm, of course, they are.
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that feel strongly allegorical; it also explains how Fredric Jameson can claim 
that, in some cases, the rhetorical situation alone is enough to produce a 
strong allegorical effect.
 In the following chapter I will examine more carefully what I am calling 
“strong allegories,” paying particular attention to the rhetorical effect pro-
duced when the hermeneutic feedback loop receives input that propels an 
interpretive transformation so powerfully in one direction. In addition to 
accounting for these strong allegorical transformations, the narrative-rhe-
torical approach to allegory that I am proposing will also help to explain 
how some works that seem allegorical—or that seem as if they should be 
allegorical—do not produce the same degree of certitude as does Animal 
Farm. I will address these weaker allegories in chapter 2.
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T h e a n T i paT h y  that many literary critics have felt for allegory applies 
most directly to what I am calling “strong allegory,” a designation that 
encompasses those complete works of fiction that comprise the “genre” of 
allegory. Works such as The Pilgrim’s Progress, The Psychomachia, and even 
Animal Farm clearly evince some characteristics that readers and critics gen-
erally associate with allegory. Yet these same characteristics—including the 
presence of personified abstractions or animals, the overriding sense that 
there is a “message” to be gleaned, and a pronounced antimimeticism—also 
serve as the metaphorical shovels that many critics have used to dig alle-
gory’s grave. Thus, before looking more closely at strong allegory, it will be 
worth our effort here to pursue what we might fittingly see as the figurative 
(more precisely, metaphorical) death of allegory.
 Looking back over the course of the history of literary criticism, one will 
note that the numerous twentieth-century obituaries for allegory constitute 
what would seem to be the natural result of earlier decrees from literary 
scholars, many of which called for something like a death sentence for alle-
gory. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, for example,
the demotion of allegory was the dominant concern of German classicism; 
that concern inevitably resulted from the emergence of the concept of 
genius and from art’s being freed from the fetters of rationalism. Allegory 
is certainly not the product of genius alone. It rests on firm traditions and 
Strong Allegory
Shirley Jackson
 1
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always has a fixed, stable meaning which does not resist rational compre-
hension through the concept—on the contrary, the concept of allegory is 
closely bound up with dogmatics: with the rationalization of the mythical 
(as in the Greek Enlightenment), or with the Christian interpretation of 
Scripture in terms of doctrinal unity (as in patristics), and finally with the 
reconciliation of the Christian tradition and classical culture, which is the 
basis of the art and literature of modern Europe and whose last universal 
form was the baroque. With the breakup of this tradition allegory too was 
finished. For the moment art freed itself from all dogmatic bonds and 
could be defined as the unconscious production of genius, allegory inevi-
tably became aesthetically suspect. (79)
The combination of the distaste for dogmatics and rationalism and the con-
ception of the artist as genius ultimately manifests itself in the devaluation 
of allegory, as Gadamer shows, and the concomitant elevation of a highly 
idiosyncratic notion of the symbol. As opposed to allegory, the symbol was 
seen as a more natural trope, one that might spring organically from the 
mind of a true poet.
 The allegory/symbol distinction was most famously articulated by 
Coleridge (who was strongly influenced by the German classicists), and it 
reflects Romantic ideas concerning the nature of the poet and his craft. “Of 
most importance to our present subject is this point,” Coleridge writes, “that 
the latter (allegory) cannot be other than spoken consciously;—whereas in 
the former (the symbol) it is very possible that the general truth may be 
unconsciously in the writer’s mind,—as the Don Quixote out of the perfectly 
sane mind of Cervantes, and not by outward observation or historically. The 
advantage of symbolic writing over allegory is, that it presumes no disjunc-
tion of faculties, but simple dominance” (qtd. in Fletcher 17). In this scheme, 
the symbol is preferable to allegory primarily because it is less calculated 
and more natural. According to Angus Fletcher, the trouble with allegory, as 
Coleridge uses the term, is that “there is always . . . an attempt to categorize 
logical orders first, and fit them to convenient phenomena second, to set 
forth ideal systems first, and illustrate them second” (18). Such planning and 
ordering works against the more naturalistic predilections of the Romantics, 
and might lead to the kind of “disjunction” to which Coleridge refers.
 In Dark Conceit: The Making of Allegory Edwin Honig effectively demon-
strates the extent to which Coleridge’s ideas regarding allegory and symbol 
(and what differentiates the two) depend on Coleridge’s personal aesthetic 
prejudices. “Coleridge’s idea of the way symbolism works,” Honig explains, 
“includes the notion of a general truth concealed in the writer’s unconscious 
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mind, having its origin there and growing spontaneously into the fictional 
work. But this view illustrates Coleridge’s principle of organic form better 
than it does the symbolic principle” (46–47). It is not surprising, then, that 
allegory suffers, in Coleridge’s system, from seeming less organic and more 
“denotative”; “its form must be imposed from the outside, ‘consciously.’ Hence 
allegory must be taken as a specimen of mechanical, and not of organic form” 
(Honig 47). Whatever the origin of Coleridge’s particular biases, however, 
the end result was that allegory, in comparison to the symbol, emerged with 
the stigma of being less artistic because more artificial. This belief has been 
surprisingly persistent, despite the numerous rehabilitative efforts aimed at 
allegory since the middle part of the twentieth century.
 The second complaint against allegory has grown out of these perceived 
shortcomings of allegorical works, but it also reflects a twentieth-century 
change in the emphasis of literary criticism. The problem with allegory, in 
this second scenario, has evolved from a concern with its suspect aesthetic 
credentials to a belief that it handcuffs the literary critic by too consciously 
limiting the text’s signifying potential. In other words, the relationship 
between reader and allegorical text has too little mystery. This is precisely 
the point that Northrop Frye makes in Anatomy of Criticism: “The com-
menting critic is often prejudiced against allegory without knowing the real 
reason, which is that continuous allegory prescribes the direction of his 
commentary, and so restricts its freedom” (90). This is especially apparent 
in what Frye calls “actual allegory,” which we have “when a poet explic-
itly indicates the relationship of his images to examples and precepts, and 
so tries to indicate how a commentary on him should proceed” (90). In a 
literary climate that prizes the autonomy, freedom, and creativity of the 
reader, a prescriptive mode such as allegory is unlikely to find favor with 
the very critics whom it “directs.”
 Like the argument against the aesthetic aspect of allegory itself, the argu-
ment against the interpretive limitations supposedly inherent in allegory has 
a second component. This second component involves what I will call the 
distaste for exhaustibility. The problem with allegory might not simply be 
that it controls and directs our commentary, as Frye argues, but also that 
once we have “correctly” commented on allegory we have done all there is to 
do. If allegory simply “says one thing and means another” (Fletcher 2), then 
once we have arrived at that other meaning we have exhausted the text. In the 
twentieth century, the ascendance of undecidability as both the aim and the 
result of much interpretation made such interpretive closure highly suspect.
 The suspicion of closure has extended beyond recognizably allegorical 
texts, however, and encompassed the idea of interpretation more gener-
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ally. As Fredric Jameson notes in The Political Unconscious, “. . . a criticism 
which asks the question ‘What does it mean?’ constitutes something like an 
allegorical operation in which a text is systematically rewritten in terms of 
some fundamental master code or ‘ultimately determining instance.’ On this 
view, then, all ‘interpretation’ in the narrower sense demands the forcible or 
imperceptible transformation of a given text into an allegory of its particular 
master code or ‘transcendental signified’: the discredit into which interpre-
tation has fallen is thus at one with the disrepute visited on allegory itself ” 
(58). At this point, the suspicion of closure is now cast in a different direc-
tion. It is not that allegory inherently closes off or too easily exhausts inter-
pretive possibilities, but rather that readers, when they “interpret” a work, 
necessarily do this themselves. The result, however, is the same—a text and 
a reader that are both too easily exhausted.1
 Regardless of where one stands on the issue of the aesthetic or her-
meneutic value of allegorical narratives, we must recognize that when we 
are dealing with certain kinds of allegories the limits on interpretation are 
real and intentional. Despite the persistent claims by numerous theorists of 
allegory that it is, as Jon Whitman claims, “an oblique way of writing” (1), 
that it “conceals many of its secrets” (1), and that “it provides an initiation 
into a mystery” (2), there is often nothing particularly mysterious about the 
intended meaning of an allegory. That meaning, in fact, is often so obvious 
and so pedantic, so “sermonlike,” that readers reject the narrative used to 
convey it precisely for this reason. As Fletcher points out, “By means of his 
‘message,’ . . . the allegorical poet is . . . trying to control his audience. He seeks 
to sway them . . . to accept intellectual or moral or spiritual attitudes” (192).
 As we saw in the previous chapter, Orwell’s Animal Farm provides a good 
example of this particular bias. So, while I postulated that the interplay of 
genetic considerations, textual phenomena, and readerly concerns accounts 
for the allegorical nature of this novel, it seems clear to me that much of the 
“input” that makes that novel an allegory comes from Orwell himself and, 
through him, his text. We can safely call this work a strong allegory largely 
because we know that its author intended it as such and because he com-
posed it in such a way that it would convey that intention fairly clearly to his 
readers. Those readers, then, find themselves in the position of discovering 
and verifying Orwell’s meaning rather than creating it through the reading 
process, and this is the usual position of readers vis-à-vis strong allegories.
 1. In “Allegory and Allegoresis, Rhetoric and Hermeneutics,” Rita Copeland and Stephen 
Melville make the plausible claim that, since the work of Paul de Man to reenergize discussion 
of allegory, “The older polarity ‘symbol-allegory,’ which valued symbol over allegory, appears 
to have been replaced with the polarity ‘allegory-allegoresis,’ in which allegory stands as the 
preferred mode” (161–62).
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 To understand more clearly what I mean by the term “strong allegory” 
and the reader’s role in realizing it, we need to return to my definition of alle-
gory: that class of works that fulfills its rhetorical purpose by means of the 
transformation of some phenomenon into a figural narrative. In strong alle-
gories, the reader has the overriding sense that the author both intends and 
does the work of the transformation, and this intuition activates, as I indi-
cated in the previous chapter, what E. D. Hirsch calls the “intrinsic genre,” 
or “that sense of the whole by means of which an interpreter can correctly 
understand any part in its determinacy” (Validity 86, emphasis in original). 
When the reader senses that the whole is allegorical, he or she will adopt a 
reading strategy that attempts to uncover the phenomenon that has been 
transformed into a narrative structure, or, if the author has made it clear 
what that phenomenon is, to verify its transformation by a process of recon-
ciling the text and the phenomenon.
 Such a reading strategy approximates what Peter J. Rabinowitz calls 
“authorial reading.” In Before Reading: Narrative Conventions and the Politics 
of Interpretation, Rabinowitz proposes that we recognize three categories for 
the reader of fictional narratives: the actual audience, which is composed of 
the individual flesh-and-blood readers; the narrative audience, which Rabi-
nowitz describes as a “role” in which the reader is willing to enter the world 
of the narrative on its own terms (95–96); and the authorial audience, or the 
hypothetical audience for whom authors have designed their works (21). In 
many cases, that authorial audience will be more sophisticated and more 
educated than the narrative audience, as this former group is expected to be 
capable of joining “a particular social/interpretive community,” one whose 
membership includes the author him- or herself (22). This authorial audi-
ence is a construct that is presumed to be capable of “getting” the author’s 
full intended meaning, even as members of the actual or narrative audi-
ence, or both, might not. As Rabinowitz makes clear, though, that meaning 
is determined by the author and his or her text, and, as far as the reader is 
concerned, is “found rather than made” (22).
 Strong allegories, I submit, ensure a significant gap between the narra-
tive and the authorial audiences;2 they encourage readers to enter into the 
authorial audience, and, most significantly perhaps, actively facilitate that 
entry.3 While it is conceivable that a reader (a child, perhaps) could miss the 
 2. Rabinowitz uses the distance that separates these two audiences as a way to characterize 
realistic versus antirealistic texts. In the former, he argues, the narrative audience and authorial 
audience are very close, whereas in the latter—which would include allegorical tales, I believe—
there is a significant distance between the two (99).
 3. Indeed, in some cases that entry is more or less guaranteed, and this is one of the as-
pects of allegory that has turned many critics against it.
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figural aspect of Animal Farm, for example, both Orwell and his text guide 
us strongly toward an understanding that the real significance of the novel is 
not in the plot or characters, but rather in how that plot and those characters 
are really the transformation of a political conviction into a figural story. A 
sophisticated reader, then, would have to resist willfully moving from the 
relatively naïve position of the narrative audience (a position that would 
credit talking animals, etc.) toward the more informed position of the autho-
rial audience, where he or she can “discover” the full meaning of the text 
and enter into a kind of community with the author. Wayne Booth points 
out an interesting distinction between allegory and irony in this regard. In 
A Rhetoric of Irony he claims that “A naïve reader who overlooks irony will 
totally misunderstand what is going on. A naïve reader who reads an alle-
gory without taking conscious thought, refusing all invitations to reconstruct 
general meanings out of the literal surface, will in effect obtain an experience 
something like what the allegory intends: the emotional and intellectual pat-
tern will be in the direction of what it would be for the most sophisticated 
reader” (25). When one becomes aware of the “second order of meanings” in 
allegory, Booth adds, “a mild pleasure is added, but the essential experience 
remains the same” (25). As Booth notes, with some allegories any reader 
who takes “conscious thought” and who recognizes the author’s hermeneutic 
“invitations” will in all likelihood find his way to the authorial audience.
 I disagree, however, that all that is at stake if the reader does not make 
that transition is the lost opportunity for the addition of “a mild pleasure” 
to the reading experience. Consider tennis as an analogy: does actually 
playing a tennis match add only a mild pleasure to the act of hitting balls 
back and forth as one does, for example, when warming up? A tennis court 
is a space the structure of which has been determined by a set of rules meant 
to encourage a specific activity; similarly, an allegorical narrative has a form 
that emerges from an author’s intended purpose, and that purpose should 
guide the reader’s engagement with the text. While this does not have to 
be the case (just as people do not have to use a tennis court to play tennis, 
properly speaking), two readers, one of whom understands or acknowledges 
the author’s purpose and one of whom does not, will end up doing very 
different things with that author’s text. A reader of Orwell’s Animal Farm 
who remains confined to the narrative audience—a reader, that is, who is 
oblivious to the second order of meaning and who processes the novel only 
as a story about life on a peculiar farm for some animated animals—has, 
like the person simply returning volleys from a partner across the net, a very 
different experience with this narrative than does a reader (or tennis player) 
who truly engages with what he or she is meant to be doing. Orwell’s stated 
aim, after all, was to “Expose the Soviet myth”; if the reader never makes the 
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jump from pigs and sheep to Trotsky and Lenin, then the entire rhetorical 
premise of the act of narrative communication has broken down. We are 
not simply dealing with some measurement of how much fun one might be 
having—as Booth’s comments would imply—but rather with basic issues of 
comprehension.
 While we can acknowledge some validity to Booth’s point that one can 
read an allegory from the perspective of the narrative audience and still 
derive some enjoyment from the activity, just as we can surely observe two 
people happily hitting a ball back and forth on a tennis court, successfully 
facilitating entry into the authorial audience strikes me as being an essential 
aspect of strong allegory, just as understanding the aims of tennis as a com-
petition is an essential aspect of making full and good use of a tennis rac-
quet and balls. As the anonymous author of the strongly allegorical medieval 
morality play Everyman avers, “The matter [of the play] is wonder precious, / 
But the intent of it is more gracious / And sweet to bear away” (7–9). To my 
mind, the author here implies that reading this play from the authorial posi-
tion will result in not just a slightly more pleasurable experience, but rather 
in an experience that differs qualitatively from that experienced from the 
narrative perspective. Moreover, this claim, coming as it does at the outset of 
the play, serves as an invitation into the authorial community by facilitating 
recognition on the part of the reader-audience, a recognition that we are 
both welcome and expected to uncover the transformation that the “matter” 
of the play (the textual phenomena, in other words) represents.
 The reader’s recognition in cases such as Animal Farm has two compo-
nents: that the literal text is the transformation of some extratextual phe-
nomenon and that that phenomenon actually occupies a position of primacy 
even if it remains implied. When a reader recognizes allegory, she tends 
to realize at the same time that she is close to “meaning,” in the sense that 
E. D. Hirsch uses that term in Validity in Interpretation.4 Indeed, if we are 
to believe the author of Everyman, authorial intent is accessible and there to 
be borne away in allegory. The recognition that accompanies allegory sets in 
motion a distinctive hermeneutic reader response. The strongest allegories 
produce the strongest sense of recognition, and the stronger the recognition, 
the more certain the reader is of the ultimate nature of his or her interpreta-
tion—the more certain he or she is, in other words, of gaining access to the 
authorial audience. This dawning certainty activates a mode of interpreta-
tion that I will label concordant, a term that applies when the reader has clear 
 4. “Meaning is that which is represented by the text,” Hirsch claims; “it is what the author 
meant by his use of a particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent” (8, emphasis in 
original).
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indications that the author and the author’s text are paving a clear path from 
narrative to authorial reading. In the terms of the feedback-loop metaphor, 
such texts produce a positive feedback loop, one in which all of the inputs 
propel the interpretation in the same direction. As Rabinowitz notes, the 
authorial audience does not remain entirely passive in the reading process, 
but its job is not to invent or construct its own meaning; rather, it “makes 
what the author intended to be found” (28). In the case of allegory, what the 
audience makes are connections and concordance between the narrative and 
the implied phenomenon that has been transformed but not entirely effaced 
by that narrative.
 Narratives that produce the strongest allegorical effect comprise a subset 
of narratives that also encourage and reward thematic interpretation. This 
is so because these narratives are generally constructed so that the disparate 
parts of an individual narrative work together to produce a strong sense 
of thematic coherence, something that is not usually characteristic of more 
mimetic narratives. Typically, when we think of “theme” we do so along the 
same lines as those proposed by Eugene Falk in his Types of Thematic Struc-
ture: “the term ‘theme,’” Falk explains, “may . . . be assigned to the ideas that 
emerge from the particular structure of such textual elements as actions, 
statements revealing states of mind or feelings, gestures, or meaningful envi-
ronmental settings” (2). Falk refers to these various “textual elements” as 
“motifs,” and he concludes that “the idea that emerges from motifs by means 
of an abstraction” is a “theme” (2). Yet in the context of strong allegory, this 
conception of theme does not go far enough; I do want to propose that the 
authors of strong allegories construct narratives that not only facilitate the 
process of abstraction and that limit both the number and range of themes 
that might be abstracted from the various motifs, but I also suggest that 
the theme of a strong allegory includes what we might call a predicate, or 
a proposition, relating to the emergent idea. In other words, the rhetorical 
concept of purpose must guide our thinking about theme as it relates to 
allegorical—particularly strongly allegorical—narratives.
 The dominant theme(s) of narratives that produce a strong allegorical 
effect can almost always also serve as the narrative’s meaning or message, that 
which defines authorial purpose in my rhetorical approach to allegory. Falk, 
however, cautions against equating theme and message: “A message  .  .  .  is 
the result of reflections in which motifs are not under immediate consider-
ation. The theme is a ‘first intention,’ whereas the message is a conception 
obtained through reflection upon a previous conception gained by abstrac-
tion from the motifs themselves. A message is thus a ‘second intention’; and 
when we confuse a message with a theme we do so at the risk of assuming 
wrongly that a work is a preconceived embodiment of a ‘philosophy’” (3). 
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Yet in the case of strong allegory, narratives often are the embodiment of a 
philosophy, an ideology, or some other authorial position, intention, or pur-
pose. Strong allegory effectively collapses Falk’s distinction between theme 
and message. Thus, as we will see below, when the reader of a work that pro-
duces a strong allegorical effect extrapolates themes from the textual phe-
nomena (or “motifs”), he or she also uncovers the narrative’s purpose.5 With 
regard to such narratives, to say what they are about is also to say what the 
author intends by them. Such a hermeneutic move serves to take us deeper 
into the authorial audience and to cement our sense of community with the 
(implied) author and other readers.
 At this point we would be well served by moving to a concrete example 
and some practical criticism as a means of anchoring this theoretical dis-
cussion. The text I have chosen for this task is Shirley Jackson’s “The Lot-
tery.” Jackson’s story, first published in June 1948 in the New Yorker, is the 
well-known and oft-anthologized tale of a small town’s annual lottery, the 
“winner” of which is subjected to a brutal stoning that results in his or her 
death. The implied rationale for the lottery in Jackson’s story harks back to 
the ancient practice of using scapegoating and ritual sacrifice as a way to 
appease a deity and, often, to ensure a good harvest. Yet Jackson has set the 
story in what seems to be contemporary times—at least as of her writing in 
the mid-twentieth century—and in the United States, so we cannot dismiss 
the ritualized scapegoating that she describes as the product of a time long 
past or of some benighted culture.
 By nature more circumspect about the meaning of her work than was 
Orwell, Jackson was reluctant to offer much in the way of interpretive keys 
in her subsequent commentary on the text. Her reticence on this score 
proved troubling to many readers of the story, one that garnered, according 
to Jackson in a piece that she called “Biography of a Story,” “more mail than 
any piece of fiction [the New Yorker] had ever published” (127), undoubtedly 
because the narrative’s cold cruelty leaves many readers emotionally dis-
turbed. As Judy Oppenheimer attests in her biography of Jackson, “No one, 
not then, not ever, would be able to read the story without having a powerful 
reaction. Its quiet tones and everyday setting only contributed to the force 
of its final, shattering climax” (128). Given the powerful emotional effect of 
“The Lottery,” the incredulity and inquisitiveness of Jackson’s readers make 
perfect sense, even if Jackson herself was left with the impression—based on 
the responses that she received—that “people who read stories are gullible, 
rude, frequently illiterate, and horribly afraid of being laughed at” (“Biog-
raphy” 127). Jackson’s rather harsh view of her reading public (the “actual 
 5. I treat the idea of theme in more detail in chapter 4.
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audience” in Rabinowitz’s terms), or at least the segment of it that bothered 
to write to her through the New Yorker, undoubtedly results from the fact 
that those readers proved largely incapable of making the interpretive tran-
sition from the narrative audience to the authorial audience. As a result, 
they are left with the nagging sense that other readers might be more in the 
know and therefore liable to mock their failure to understand the text,6 and 
Jackson is left wondering if they are actually capable of reading with enough 
sophistication to be considered literate.
 As I indicated above, the gap between the narrative audience and the 
authorial audience is large and significant in what Rabinowitz calls “anti-
realistic” texts. A narrative such as “The Lottery” does not announce its 
antirealism in quite the same way as does Animal Farm, for example, but 
rather leaves one with the disquieting sense—almost a hope, really—that 
what transpires in the story does not actually happen somewhere in modern 
America. Without the equivalent of Orwell’s scheming and talking farm ani-
mals, though, the allegorical markers in Jackson’s text prove less obvious, 
potentially putting even very astute readers on uncertain footing. Describing 
the period between Jackson’s submission of her story to the New Yorker and 
its publication, Oppenheimer relates that
Even The New Yorker must have sensed some of [the story’s] potential for 
disturbance. The magazine bought it immediately, but fiction editor Gus 
Lobrano thought it prudent to call Shirley and ask if she had any explana-
tion she would like to pass along. Editor Harold Ross, he said apologeti-
cally, was wondering—Ross had often said he would never publish a story 
he himself did not understand. Was there anything special she was trying 
to convey? Not really, said Shirley, who hated explaining her work, it was 
just a story. Well, said Lobrano, even more apologetically, did she think the 
story might be called an allegory which made its point by an ironic jux-
taposition of ancient superstition and modern setting? Sure, said Shirley 
kindly (she had no use for that kind of fancy-pants academic drivel), that 
would be fine. Good, good, said Lobrano, that was what Ross thought it 
meant. (128)
This episode speaks to Hirsch’s idea of the intrinsic genre (that “sense of 
the whole”) that experienced readers of narrative fiction formulate as they 
make their way through “The Lottery.” At the same time, it illustrates the fate 
of readers who fail to do so: the inability to access the authorial audience, 
 6. Many of those who wrote letters apparently demanded that they not be published, 
thereby convincing Jackson of their fear of being mocked (“Biography” 127).
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the failure to have properly read the story, and a nagging sense of literary 
inadequacy.
 Jackson’s rather flippant and dismissive response to the question that 
Lobrano poses notwithstanding (if indeed Oppenheimer has presented it 
faithfully), the allegorical reading Ross proposes hits the mark and helps to 
explain why the readers who failed to see the story as an allegory seemed 
so hopelessly far off the mark; we are not dealing just with varying levels of 
enjoyment here, but rather with examples of misprision egregious enough 
to cause people to cancel their subscriptions to the New Yorker and, in some 
cases, to write abusive and threatening letters to the magazine and the sto-
ry’s author (“Biography” 127–28). The gulf separating those in the narrative 
audience—characterized by readers who wrote to Jackson curious about 
“where these lotteries were held, and whether they could go there and watch” 
(“Biography” 128)—and those who, like Ross, joined her in the authorial 
audience is wide indeed.
 Although Jackson apparently preferred to let her work speak for itself 
rather than to interpret it for others, she did provide a revealing comment 
concerning her rhetorical aim to the San Francisco Chronicle on July 22, 
1948, less than a month after her story had appeared in the New Yorker and 
during the height of the small maelstrom that it produced. “Explaining just 
what I hoped to say is very difficult,” Jackson confesses. “I suppose I hoped, 
by setting a particularly brutal ancient rite in the present and in my own vil-
lage, to shock the story’s readers with a graphic dramatization of the point-
less violence and general inhumanity in their own lives” (qtd. in Oppen-
heimer 131). Even if it does lack some of the traditional and obvious markers 
of allegory—personified animals or abstract qualities as characters foremost 
among them—“The Lottery” does contain numerous contextual and textual 
clues that, when we piece them together, reveal the narrative to be a strong 
allegory built to effect this rhetorical aim.
 One of the reasons that the text has such a powerful effect on so many 
readers seems, at first glance, to be counterintuitive: Jackson’s narrator adopts 
a style that exhibits little emotion and that abjures any kind of overt com-
mentary on what is happening in the story. Such a style departs significantly 
from the kind of overt moralizing that we often associate with the strong, 
mainly religious allegories from the Middle Ages. Yet Jackson’s intent also 
differs significantly from these earlier examples of strong allegory; rather 
than imparting a moralistic lesson, Jackson wants to provoke a particular 
reaction, and restricting her narrator to the matter-of-fact reporting of a 
series of increasingly disturbing events effectively serves that purpose.
 As that description of the narration suggests, the allegorical nature of 
the story becomes apparent only through the relatively leisurely progres-
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sion of the plot. This buildup to the work’s climax (which coincides with 
the readers’ recognition of the allegorical nature of the text) heightens the 
shock value that Jackson sought. Thus, Jackson has her story begin posi-
tively idyllically, in “the fresh warmth of a full-summer day,” with flowers 
“blooming profusely,” the grass “richly green,” and children poised to break 
into “boisterous play” (291)—a description that could easily be occasioned 
by a Norman Rockwell Saturday Evening Post cover typical of the era.
 The small-town agrarian setting further reinforces the Rockwell-like feel 
of the story’s opening, a feel that relies heavily not only on the ludic qualities 
that attend summer vacation but also on the reassuring cadence of cyclical 
routine in the adult world, a cadence that is mirrored in both the content 
and the rhythm of Jackson’s prose: “Soon the men began to gather, sur-
veying their own children, speaking of planting and rain, tractors and taxes” 
(291). The lottery and the ritual behind it—including the continued use of 
a “shabby” receptacle for the slips of paper that function as the lots only 
because “no one liked to upset even as much tradition as was represented by 
the black box” (293)—contributes to the comfort that certain abiding rites 
or traditions can engender in a society.
 Aside from its occasionally striking lyricism, the other distinguishing 
feature of Jackson’s style is the distance that characterizes her narrator from 
the events that she tells. This distance—which takes the form of a remark-
ably disinterested reportorial style—characterizes the story even from the 
opening paragraph:
The people of the village began to gather in the square, between the post 
office and the bank, around ten o’clock; in some towns there were so many 
people that the lottery took two days and had to be started on June 26th [the 
day before it occurs in the location Jackson describes], but in this village, 
where there were only about three hundred people, the whole lottery took 
less than two hours, so it could begin at ten o’clock in the morning and still 
be through in time to allow the villagers to get home for noon dinner. (291)
While the narrator is heterodiegetic, her detailed knowledge of the logistics 
of the lottery and, indeed, her initial reference to it simply as “the” lottery, 
with no additional information, also suggests that she is an insider rela-
tive to the community she describes, and this position affords her a certain 
authority in the mind of the reader. Thus, Jackson’s narrator is able to invite 
us readers into what at first seems to be a very hospitable setting of which 
she (the narrator) has personal knowledge.
 Even so, a careful reading of the language that Jackson employs reveals 
blemishes on this pastoral image of mid-century Americana, blemishes that 
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should put readers at least slightly ill at ease about what we are reading, 
even if we do not yet know how the story concludes. As the men discourse 
on “planting and rain, tractors and taxes,” for example, they stand together, 
but “away from the pile of stones in the corner, and their jokes were quiet 
and they smiled rather than laughed” (292). Even without full knowledge 
of the intended use of the stones, readers can sense the apprehension that 
dampens the men’s jokes and prevents smiles from evolving into laughs. 
And later, as Mr. Summers prepares to get the lottery underway, we are 
told that he announces “soberly” that they had better “get started, get this 
over with” (295). We sense at this point that the winner of this lottery will 
not likely feel fortunate to draw the distinguishing mark. And finally, as the 
men of the families go about drawing their slips of paper from the black 
box, Jackson’s narrator remarks that those who had already drawn were 
“holding the small folded papers in their large hands, turning them over 
and over nervously” (297).
 By this point the slow progression of the narrative has heightened the 
suspense and anxiety that both characters and readers experience. Speaking 
for herself, her family, her entire community, and, I suspect, the majority 
of Jackson’s readers, Mrs. Dunbar finally exclaims to her older son, “I wish 
they’d hurry  .  .  . I wish they’d hurry” (298). The moment of release finally 
does come for all involved (characters and readers) when, after the “long 
pause, a breathless pause” that follows the last family’s pulling of lots (298), 
Tessie Hutchinson realizes that her husband Bill has the tainted slip of paper. 
Tessie reacts so forcefully that no doubt about the endgame remains: “You 
didn’t give him [Bill] enough time to take any paper he wanted,” she protests 
to Mr. Summers. “I saw you. It wasn’t fair!” (298). We know now how serious 
the consequences of the lottery truly are, but readers who participate in the 
authorial audience also realize that what is about to happen to someone 
in the Hutchinson family should not be taken literally; we strongly suspect 
we are dealing with allegory because we believe, at least intellectually, that 
nothing that could occasion Tessie’s terrified response should be determined 
by random chance without some compelling and rational social need (which 
would not include superstitions about crop yield).
 What doubt remains in the reader’s mind at this point about Jackson’s 
intentions dissipates quickly as the second stage of the lottery occurs. Now, 
each member of the Hutchinson family must choose lots among themselves 
to determine the sacrificial scapegoat. The image of “little Davy,” too young 
to understand that he should pull just one slip of paper from the box, the 
thought of Bill and Tessie’s two older children forced to confront the pos-
sibility of their own or a sibling’s imminent death, and the anguish that the 
two parents must be experiencing, all drive the increasingly incredulous 
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reader toward the necessary conclusion that this cannot be real. Yet this 
growing conviction of the text’s “antireality” does not, I should stress, com-
promise the force of Jackson’s narrative because by this point most readers 
have also been strongly drawn into the narrative audience, and in that place 
we feel the affective and ethical force of the Hutchinsons’ situation.
 Jay A. Yarmove helps us to understand the allegorical resonance that 
Jackson’s story has for a mid-twentieth-century audience by providing an 
important contextual reading, one that addresses the rhetorical situation in 
which Jackson was working:
The underpinnings of Shirley Jackson’s famous post–World War II story 
“The Lottery” demonstrate that the work is far greater than the sum of 
its parts. The date of the lottery, its location, and the symbolic or ironic 
names of its characters all work to convey a meaning that is even more 
disturbing than the shock created by its well-known ending, namely, that 
despite assurances during the late 1940s that “it couldn’t happen here,” a 
microcosmal holocaust occurs in this story and, by extension, may happen 
anyplace in contemporary America.
Yarmove understands “The Lottery” as an allegory, and one that gains some 
of its force from its appearance just a few years after the Holocaust, when 
more and more information about the extent of the Nazi genocide was being 
discovered. Thus, even though Jackson’s story is not a direct allegory of the 
Third Reich’s final solution (the Christian villagers, after all, sacrifice one 
of their own members), it does, as Yarmove contends, “help to create the 
specter of a holocaust in the United States” because it forces readers to con-
front the fact that “custom and law, when sanctioned by a selfish, unthinking 
populace, can bring an otherwise democratic and seemingly just society to 
the brink of paganism.”
 As readers piece together the meaning of this text and thereby make 
sense of what it means to enter the authorial audience, we must also come 
to terms with the fact that Jackson invites us to discover her own distance 
from her narrator, a narrator who appears to have intimate knowledge of this 
microcosmic holocaust, but who chooses to accept it. Looking back with a 
full understanding of what the lottery accomplishes and what it means for 
the person who draws the unfortunate lot, we can draw two important con-
clusions: 1) the narrator understands the full meaning of the lottery from the 
outset without appearing to be disturbed by its implications and 2) refuses to 
question it. Indeed, so ingrained is this ritual that virtually the entire com-
munity—including the victim herself, who objects to the unfairness of the 
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process but not the concept of the lottery—simply accepts it. The fact that 
Jackson’s narrator appears to go along with the crowd in this regard makes 
the gap between her and the author enormous and leaves us with the distinct 
possibility that Jackson’s work critiques such passive acceptance as much as it 
critiques a heartless and senseless act. Jackson folds both of these aspects of 
her rhetorical target nicely into a subtly horrific scene immediately following 
the revelation that Tessie is the Hutchinson to die. “Although the villagers 
had forgotten the ritual and lost the original black box,” the narrator tells us, 
“they still remembered to use stones” (301). And more coldly to the point, 
without a hint of approbation or sympathy: “The children had stones already, 
and someone gave little Davy Hutchinson a few pebbles” (301).
 These revelations and the certainty that we are dealing with a figural 
narrative force the reader into a radical reconfiguration of the earlier parts 
of Jackson’s story. The reader’s incredulity at the narrator’s insensitivity only 
increases as events and descriptions previously encountered that should 
produce moral outrage, or at least prompt serious questions, mount. In the 
second paragraph, for example, the village children, recently released from 
school for the summer, begin to gather the stones that will be used as murder 
weapons to conclude the story, but the narrator describes this as if she were 
observing a group of kids about to enjoy a harmless snowball fight on an 
unexpected day off from classes: “Bobby and Harry Jones and Dickie Dela-
croix—the villagers pronounced this name ‘Dellacroy’—eventually made a 
great pile of stones in one corner of the square and guarded it against the 
raids of the other boys” (291). And just a page later, the narrator connects 
this abhorrent lottery—albeit indirectly—with a trio of utterly inoffensive 
social rituals: “The lottery was conducted—as were the square dances, the 
teen-age club, the Halloween program—by Mr. Summers, who had time and 
energy to devote to civic activities” (292). Blithely associating the oversight 
of a ritualized stoning with “other” civic commitments surely offends the 
sensibilities of most contemporary readers.
 And this is precisely the point: the narrator’s general lack of emotional 
or ethical engagement is provocative, and its provocations contribute sig-
nificantly to the feedback loop that produces the allegory for the reader. The 
narrator’s flat affect focuses readers’ first attention acutely on the events of 
the story; rather than getting caught up in an analysis or critique of the nar-
rative’s voice, readers are left to encounter the shocking and bare fact of the 
action that lies at its center. Jackson herself noted in “Biography of a Story” 
that early readers of “The Lottery” were somewhat transfixed by the story’s 
signature event: “People at first were not so much concerned with what the 
story meant; what they wanted to know was where these lotteries were held, 
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and whether they could go there and watch” (128). This rather morbid reac-
tion does illustrate the power of the central action of Jackson’s narrative and 
her ability to focus her readers’ initial gaze on it.
 Once the reader commits to this figural turn, the hermeneutic feedback 
loop provides nothing but positive reinforcement to the allegorical hypoth-
esis, as we can see by looking at Jackson’s use of character names. Mr. Sum-
mers oversees the lottery that occurs each summer, of course, and his name 
carries a seasonal appropriateness as well as a healthy dose of irony; his 
somber duty stands in stark contrast to the more positive connotations we 
associate with the summer season. Mr. Graves’s name, on the other hand, 
captures perfectly the tenor of the story and its main event, and one can 
imagine a slight nod of Shirley Jackson’s head as she penned the line “[Mrs. 
Graves] watched while Mr. Graves came around from the side of the box, 
greeted Mr. Summers gravely, and selected a slip of paper from the box” 
(297, emphasis added), confident that she was pointing readers in the right 
direction.
 And of course we have Old Man Warner, who objects strenuously when 
Mr. Adams points that some communities have purportedly abandoned 
the ritual of the lottery, implying that perhaps their own could follow suit. 
“Nothing but trouble in that,” Mr. Warner warns, convinced that it’s the lottery 
and the scapegoat that it produces that are responsible for ensuring a good 
harvest every year (297). The scapegoat herself is called Mrs. Hutchinson, 
whose name necessarily recalls that of Anne Hutchinson, another New Eng-
land woman who was victimized by what we now see as backward-thinking 
communal paranoia. Fittingly, Mrs. Hutchinson taps one Mrs. Delacroix on 
the arm “as a farewell” just before the former makes her way to the front of 
the crowd and toward the box that contains her fate. Meaning “of or from 
the cross” in French, “Delacroix” calls to mind for the careful reader the 
entire narrative of Christianity’s most central wronged martyr/scapegoat/
victim and functions as an effective bit of foreshadowing regarding what 
will ultimately befall Mrs. Hutchinson. The thematic potential in so many 
of the names in “The Lottery” makes it clear that Jackson’s intentions were 
more figural than verisimilar and strongly reinforces the notion that we are 
dealing with allegory.
 A short essay by Nathan Cervo illustrates the amplification of a figural 
hypothesis that occurs in the hermeneutic feedback loop of a strong alle-
gory. Cervo agrees that the name “Delacroix” “plays a key thematic role” 
in the story, a role that has unmistakable religious overtones. This conclu-
sion then helps Cervo to see equal significance in the date on which the 
story takes place, June 27. “That Jackson wishes to suggest the specifically 
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Christian parallel or intent of ‘Delacroix’/‘Dellacroy,’” Cervo contends, “is 
supported by the fact that the lottery takes place on June 27. Twenty-seven 
is three cubed. So what we have is the motif of the Trinity in a total, intensi-
fied interplay with itself, rather than the hypostatic interplay of the Three 
Persons comprising it.”7 I am less interested in the issue of whether Cervo 
is on target or overreading than I am in the way that his analysis illustrates 
the kind of interpretive activity prompted by the recognition that the story 
is a strong allegory. For Cervo, the name “Delacroix” invokes the theme of 
Christianity; the date on which the story takes place confirms and amplifies 
this invocation. From here it is a short step to the idea of the scapegoat and 
to Cervo’s ultimate conclusion that Mrs. Hutchinson “is a parodic Christ-
figure, slain to appease a demonic entity that is the personification of invo-
luted . . . ignorance masquerading as primitivistic piety.”
 Finally, I want to return to Yarmove’s interpretation of “The Lottery” 
and argue that we can extend the point he makes about the work being “far 
greater than the sum of its parts” to all strong allegories. In these works, the 
individual textual phenomena invariably produce an impact that exceeds the 
value of the sum of each individual textual unit. Authors consciously con-
struct strong allegories so that the hermeneutic feedback loop amplifies the 
thematic value of such phenomena as names, dates, and so forth, ultimately 
producing a work whose intended meaning emerges clearly. Strong allegory 
results, in other words, when the careful reader picks up on the significant 
textual phenomena, understands how the details fit together, and thereby 
arrives at an interpretation that is concordant with the author’s aims. This 
process is one of the hallmarks of an authorial reading.
 As we saw at the outset of this chapter, many critics have viewed this 
process as overly contrived, mechanistic, or perhaps even stultifying for the 
ambitious reader, but as Yarmove implies and as readers’ letters to Jackson 
testify in a different way, strong allegories can still have a profound, haunting, 
and chilling effect on the reader. Jackson set out to shock her readers through 
the transformation of a ritual of violence (in the form of the lottery) into a 
figural narrative that transcends the literal. The history of the work’s recep-
tion and its continued relevance today speak to its ultimate success and, by 
extension, to the persistent vitality of allegory.
 7. It is unclear whether Cervo is aware that the June 27 date was actually suggested by the 
editors of the New Yorker because it coincided with the release date of the issue that contained 
Jackson’s story. Jackson, according to Oppenheimer, had originally set the story a few days 
earlier in June.
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i  open  this chapter with a brief discussion of a children’s book, one that I 
am familiar with because I have two children, and one that can help to illus-
trate how we, as readers, arrive at the conclusion that an individual text we 
happen to be reading is an allegory. The book is Coco the Carrot, and other 
than knowing that this was a book meant for children,1 I had no familiarity 
with the story before I read it the first time with my wife and my own chil-
dren. As the title reveals, Coco is a carrot, and she is the protagonist of the 
story that bears her name. Had this book been located in the library’s general 
fiction section rather than in the children’s section, the mere fact that the 
narrative focuses on an anthropomorphized carrot would certainly alert the 
reader to allegorical potential. With a children’s book, however, a talking 
carrot might be nothing more than a verbal vegetable, so at the outset I had 
no reason to suspect that Coco’s creator had allegorical aims. But almost 
immediately my take on the narrative began to evolve.
 Two related textual phenomena catalyzed this changed reader response: 
1) Coco’s status as a female character and 2) her dramatic situation as the 
narrative opens, which the author, Steven Salerno, describes as being unhap-
pily confined to the refrigerator. Coco, it seems, has dreams of a life beyond 
the vegetable crisper. For this reader at least, the appearance of a female 
character who feels hemmed in by her domestic space and the expectation 
 1. Admittedly, this knowledge and how we come by it are not unproblematic, but this is 
an issue that, if pursued, would take me too far off track at this point.
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that she stay there signals the strong possibility of allegory; we are only 
one page into the story, but we have good evidence that Salerno might be 
transforming at least a portion of the narrative of Western feminism into a 
redemptive allegory featuring a female carrot. And much of what follows this 
opening confirms this initial reaction. Coco escapes and boards a steam liner 
for Paris, where she mingles with the rich passengers and impresses them 
with the hat she has made for herself. Eventually, Coco becomes a successful 
and famous hat designer.
 The plot, however, is complicated by a series of events that occurs between 
the ocean voyage and the onset of Coco’s career as a hatmaker. On board the 
ocean liner, the ship’s cook recognizes Coco as a carrot and attempts to force 
her back into the kitchen, where she will surely perish. Coco’s attempts to 
elude the cook result in her falling overboard. After floating at sea for sev-
eral days, she washes up on an island, where she befriends a monkey. Coco 
decides to make the best of her new situation and begins making hats for 
the passengers she met on the ship. Her monkey friend makes boxes for the 
hats and then they fling the boxes into the ocean with a tag marked “Hats 
by Coco.” Amazingly, the hats reach their targets and the mysterious Coco 
becomes a renowned designer, even though nobody knows who or where 
she is. Ultimately, word of Coco’s talents reaches a famous Parisian hatmaker, 
who spares no expense to locate Coco. Once found, Coco and her monkey 
friend go to work for the Parisian firm, where they become internationally 
known and respected, a true phenomenon in the world of haute couture.
 The story ends with a twist, as both Coco and the monkey decide that 
their newfound celebrity does not adequately compensate for the stress and 
the demands of the hatmaking industry. They miss their island and decide to 
forgo the fame and fortune they have in order to return to the tranquility that 
their previous seclusion had provided them. The narrative ends with Coco 
and the monkey happy again, making hats and building boxes according to 
their own whims and on their own schedule.
 Immersed as I was in my work on allegory, my first exposure to Coco 
the Carrot proved to be fortuitous, as it provided me with a kind of labora-
tory in which to test some of the ideas I put forward in this book. As I have 
indicated, the opening lines of Salerno’s book alerted me to the possibility 
of allegory, and so I continued reading with that as my tentative “sense of 
the whole” (Hirsch, Validity 86). The progression of the narrative continu-
ally compelled me to reconsider this preliminary sense, and Coco’s deci-
sion to abandon her career challenged my initial sense that Salerno intended 
to transform the ideal of a woman liberated from the domestic sphere and 
newly fulfilled by a professional life into his narrative. This ending makes it 
more likely that Salerno intends to put a more contemporary spin on this 
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idea: woman is liberated from domestic sphere, finds success in the profes-
sional world, and ultimately liberates herself from the confines of that realm 
as well. Thus, the dominant theme of the work emerges as the fully emanci-
pated woman completely in control of her own destiny and willing to define 
her success by her level of personal satisfaction rather than by her prowess 
in the kitchen or in the world of work.
 Would, then, I label this work a strong allegory, as I did Animal Farm or 
“The Lottery”? As I pondered this question, two issues came to mind. The 
first involves the reader; more specifically, who is the implied reader of a 
children’s book, and does the answer to that question have any bearing on 
the question of allegory?2 Clearly, my five-year-old son and two-year-old 
daughter—the ostensible implied “readers” of this narrative—would be inca-
pable of seeing the transformation that I just identified and, for that matter, 
would in all probability be completely uninterested in it were I to point it 
out. For these two readers, then, readers happy to remain exclusive members 
of the narrative audience (though I would guess that even they do not believe 
that a carrot could talk and make hats or that she would be likely to forge a 
friendship and a working relationship with a monkey), the work cannot be 
allegorical. Their input in the feedback loop of interpretation cannot stray 
from the literal, and this means that the narrative itself, in their eyes, will 
not be an allegory, no matter what the author’s intentions were or what the 
textual phenomena seem to imply.3
 But what about for me and my wife, readers who have the cognitive 
ability and the qualifying social and educational status to enter into the 
authorial audience? Do we constitute the real implied readership for this 
book, since we are, after all, the ones who have to do the actual reading? I 
suspect that on some level we are the ideal readers for this children’s book, if 
only because another adult wrote it. A children’s book might well appeal to 
children while also presupposing a readership composed of adults who can 
enter into the kind of authorial community that Rabinowitz identifies.4 This 
 2. Readers interested in theories of the implied reader in children’s literature can consult 
Aiden Chambers’s “The Reader in the Book” and Neil Cocks’s “The Implied Reader. Response 
and Responsibility: Theories of the Implied Reader in Children’s Literature Criticism.”
 3. In the introduction I conceded that my definition of allegory, and in particular my 
claim that some phenomenon is intentionally transformed in an allegory, raised some difficult 
questions. Does allegory, for example, depend on an “elite” readership? Or can a work be an al-
legory—no matter what the author’s intentions were—if it is not read as such, if, in other words, 
it is not read as an allegory? My encounter with Coco crystallized some of these issues for me. 
As for these particular questions, a rhetorical approach to allegorical narratives would hold that 
it does take an informed reader—one who makes his or her way into the authorial audience—to 
realize an author’s allegorical intentions.
 4. I have frequently had this experience while reading the works of William Steig with my 
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might be especially true of a children’s book that belongs to the subgenre 
of juvenile fiction, as does Coco, because these narratives require an adult 
reader since the audience they ostensibly target cannot yet read, at least not 
sufficiently well to grasp the story. In short, it matters who the reader is, and 
who the implied reader is, as we think about allegory.
 For the two juveniles to whom my wife and I were reading, Coco the 
Carrot cannot be an allegory because they have neither the experience nor 
the cognitive capacity to recognize that the narrative they are hearing could 
be the transformation of some other cultural phenomenon. This fact vali-
dates the kind of rhetorical approach to allegory that I am pursuing here 
because it illustrates that recognizing allegory depends both on the narrative 
text and on the reader. For the two adult readers, on the other hand, the 
nature of the narrative clearly presents the possibility of allegory, but we are 
left to puzzle through the question of what kind of allegory we are dealing 
with. Is this story a strong allegory?
 The more I thought about Coco the Carrot the more convinced I became 
that this narrative does not have the allegorical strength of either Animal Farm 
or “The Lottery,” for example. It took a while to put my finger on the reason 
for this, but eventually I began to focus my attention on the monkey; I just 
cannot quite make sense of him. The monkey “function” does not seem nec-
essary for the plot; if Coco can make a hat, she can certainly make a box for it. 
And even if this function were necessary, why is the character that performs 
it a monkey? Wouldn’t a coconut be a more fitting and appropriate helpmate 
for a carrot marooned on a desert island?5 Are (adult) readers supposed to 
credit the possibility of a deep friendship—or even a working relationship—
between two entities that do not even inhabit the same phylum? The pos-
sibility of something “romantic” is even more incongruous and troubling. 
Thus, in the interpretation of this story, the monkey functions as a source of 
negative feedback for an allegorical hypothesis. This one textual element does 
not eliminate the possibility of allegory, but it does give the interpreter pause. 
But, as we all know, and as the popularity of the Curious George books makes 
clear, kids like monkeys, and so the very element of the narrative that weakens 
the work’s allegorical nature might strengthen its appeal for those who remain 
contentedly ignorant of the entire realm of allegory.
own children, both of whom adore Sylvester and the Magic Pebble, The Magic Bone, and Rotten 
Island, among others. While they enjoy the books, my wife and I appreciate them in ways that 
they are not yet able to do. 
 5. I actually talked about these issues with the members of a college class on literary 
theory and criticism that I was teaching at the time; one of the students suggested that the mon-
key makes sense because a monkey would not be a threat to eat Coco. I am not sure whether 
monkeys eat carrots or not, but even if they do not, I’m still not convinced.
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 If allegory is on our interpretive radar screens, I think we have to call 
Coco the Carrot a relatively weak allegory. To define this concept “weakness” 
in the narrative domain more clearly, I turn to Brian McHale, whose work on 
avant-garde narrative poetry (admittedly, about as far removed from Coco 
the Carrot as one can get) led him to coin the phrase “weak narrativity.” 
Weak narrativity, according to McHale, “involves . . . telling stories ‘poorly,’ 
distractedly, with much irrelevance and indeterminacy, in such a way as to 
evoke narrative coherence while at the same time withholding commitment 
to it and undermining confidence in it; in short, having one’s cake and eating 
it too” (165). The terms in this definition that at first blush sound negative 
(“weak” itself, “poorly,” “distractedly,” “irrelevance,” “indeterminacy”) are not 
intended to be pejorative, but rather serve to distinguish a certain kind and a 
degree of narrativity that McHale wants to contrast with the kinds of narra-
tives that function as the exemplars of strong narrativity. I want to propose a 
similar contrast between strong allegory—examples of which I discussed in 
the two previous chapters—and narratives that manage to seem allegorical 
and not at the same time. Thus, I propose that weak allegory involves trans-
forming some phenomenon “poorly” or distractedly, or with some or much 
irrelevance and indeterminacy, into a narrative structure. The result is a nar-
rative that evokes allegory while at the same time withholding commitment 
to it and undermining confidence in it. To return one last time to Coco the 
Carrot, it is the irrelevance or the randomness of the monkey that weakens 
the allegory that the rest of the narrative clearly engenders.
 And it just might be that a weak allegory serves the author Salerno’s pur-
poses better than a strong allegory would have. If we presume that the author 
intended his work to be enjoyed—if not actually read—by children, then we 
must recognize that he would have little concern with my (adult) inability 
to make his monkey track with some coherent secondary narrative. Anyone 
who has or has had children will recognize that their enjoyment of a book, 
movie, or television show does not depend on the “tightness” of the plot 
or on the exactness of allusions or figuration; in many cases, a certain ran-
domness seems to produce immense pleasure in a young audience—think 
for instance of the bizarre plot twists of a typical Curious George book or 
the general incongruity of the television series SpongeBob SquarePants. Ulti-
mately, Salerno almost certainly did not have the single, unified purpose in 
mind that my desire to read his work as a strong allegory demands. Coco the 
Carrot carries a message, certainly, and Coco the character has allegorical 
qualities, but, given his target audience, Salerno was undoubtedly not intent 
on producing a narrative that seamlessly transforms the ideal of a fully liber-
ated woman who is comfortable in her own skin into a strong allegory. This 
is not a knock against the author or his book; on the contrary, if my kids’ 
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reaction is typical, the work is quite successful just as it is: a weak allegory.
■
In the realm of fiction for an adult audience, the figure of Franz Kafka stands 
out as the most prolific and effective purveyor of weak allegory. One can 
easily find critics on both sides of the fence, and a great many straddling 
the fence itself, regarding the question of Kafka and allegory.6 Such diversity 
of opinion regarding the status of Kafka’s fiction obviously says something 
about the enigmatic nature of the works themselves, but it also seems to say 
something about how we think about allegory. Perhaps rethinking allegory 
will better allow us to accommodate “problematic” texts and authors. Kafka 
will be our first test case.
 Critics have long suspected that readers of Kafka’s fiction might be the 
butt of some kind of perverse joke perpetrated by the author himself, that 
we are lured, in other words, into a vulnerable position expressly to have the 
rug pulled out from under us. As Clayton Koelb argues, for example, much 
of Kafka’s fiction “cries out for interpretation,” while it simultaneously “frus-
trates our expectations by offering no hint of a principle by which it could 
possibly be interpreted” (Kafka’s Rhetoric 165).7 That is not to say, Koelb 
continues, that no interpretation is possible, but rather to point out that 
none—even an allegorical one—will ever be wholly satisfactory: “There is 
no plausible allegorical reading that does not harbor a contradiction” (168). 
Such contradictions, however, are precisely what conventional allegories 
promise to eliminate. For Koelb, “the most likely allegorical meaning” of 
Kafka’s work is, therefore, “one that actually denies the efficacy of allegory, 
so that the reader is sent back chasing his logical tale in a hopeless attempt 
to do what the story wants him to do” (168–69). Koelb proposes to skirt this 
Kafkaesque hermeneutic problem by arguing that this “antithetical gesture” 
is a fundamentally rhetorical one insofar as it “actualizes in a particularly 
 6. The authors of A Franz Kafka Encyclopedia provide a helpful historical look at the 
relationship between allegory and Kafka’s body of work. They note four major stages in this 
relationship: Max Brod’s influence on early Kafka scholarship resulted in a tendency toward 
theological-leaning allegorical interpretations. Erich Heller’s work in the 1970s then shifted the 
emphasis away from allegory and toward the idea of symbolism. This view was picked up by 
Heinz Politzer, who argued that “Kafka’s narratives were based not on any univocality of mean-
ing, but were grounded instead in the multivocality and semantic tensions of paradox” (Gray 
et al. 7–8). Finally, Walter Benjamin’s reinterpretation of allegory—a view that distances it from 
the sense of univocality that had characterized it—encourages new allegorical interpretations 
of Kafka.
 7. Koelb limits himself to Kafka’s parables in this chapter, but his claims can easily and 
effectively be extended to all of Kafka’s fiction.
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dramatic way the coexistence of two opposed systems of meaning in a single 
signifying structure” (169). Seen in this light, Kafka’s corpus stands as a testa-
ment to the inherent intrigue of rhetoric as it is understood by a poststruc-
turalist critic: it is perpetually “unreadable though longing to be read” (180).
 While there is undoubtedly much truth to this claim, it does not help 
us to understand what I see as the artistry of Kafka’s writing, his ability, 
in other words, to invite and deny, in one stroke, allegorical interpretation. 
Kafka’s narratives, which exhibit all of the symptoms of allegory as “a totally 
achieved literary creation,” tempt us toward allegorical interpretation but 
refuse us the “satisfaction” of feeling as though we have truly and definitively 
unlocked their meaning. The allegorical bait of a Kafka story takes the form 
of a narrative world filled with the kinds of exigencies that Bitzer describes, 
a world in which apparent injustice, confusion, and hopelessness are both 
endemic and epidemic. While not uncommon in allegorical works—think, 
for example, of Dante’s Inferno—the representation of such a world in a con-
ventional strong allegory always offers both a cure to our ills and a key to 
our understanding the narrative in which they are depicted. Kafka’s texts, 
however, leave the reader in a predicament that in some ways resembles that 
of perhaps his best-known protagonist—Gregor Samsa. We feel immediately 
confused as the narrative opens, but eventually we stagger to our feet and 
begin to cope with the bizarre situation unfolding before us.
 In The Metamorphosis, as Gregor, the pitiable young clerk who awakes 
to find himself transformed into an insect and locked in his room without 
the means to get out, makes some admittedly small steps toward a kind of 
reorientation he starts to feel himself “drawn once more into the human 
circle” by the sound of his family and by their decision to call a doctor and a 
locksmith. He has hopes “for great results from both,” we are told, “without 
really distinguishing precisely between them” (80). For Gregor, the doctor 
and the locksmith represent highly pragmatic choices within the context of 
Kafka’s narrative world, for these figures can diagnose and potentially cure 
his illness and provide access into and out of his room, respectively. But the 
doctor and the locksmith also seem perfectly suited for roles in an allegorical 
interpretation of this novella; they are figures that we can extend easily into 
the allusive realm because that which doctors and locksmiths do (healing 
and facilitating ingress or egress) has proved to be easily allegorizable. Thus, 
the claim that “there is something wrong with Gregor, and he is trapped” 
beckons us toward the allegorical while it functions adequately as a literal 
description of the situation as Kafka’s novella opens. Like Gregor, we readers 
eagerly await the key and then the diagnosis and healing.
 Conventional allegorical narratives rarely disappoint in supplying these 
hermeneutical perquisites. Indeed, in discussing what he calls “actual” alle-
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gory, Northrop Frye, as we have seen, argues that “A writer is being alle-
gorical whenever it is clear that he is saying ‘by this I also (allos) mean that.’ 
If this is done continuously, we may say, cautiously, that what he is writing 
‘is’ an allegory” (90). In this description of allegory the writer him or herself 
fulfills the role of the locksmith, providing the key to the door separating the 
literal and the figurative somewhere and somehow in the work itself. Usu-
ally, when the reader is reading strong allegories, his or her ability to pass 
from the literal to the figurative also provides him or her with access to the 
“doctor,” that figure who can make us whole and healthy again if only we will 
allow ourselves to be healed.
 This description of the interpretive path characteristic of conventional 
allegory would work as well if applied to the literal level of The Metamor-
phosis: through the intervention of the locksmith, Gregor will be able to see 
the doctor. This prospect is what gives Gregor hope and enables him to feel 
the potential to be drawn, by the grace of the doctor, “once more into the 
human circle.” But when the voices on the other side of his door become 
silent, Gregor proves incapable of waiting, and so he decides to try to release 
himself. The act would have been much cleaner and far less painful, however, 
had the locksmith been on hand. Without hands of his own, Gregor must 
use his mouth to turn the key, but he has no teeth and must therefore rely 
on the brute strength of his jaws, with whose help “he did manage to set 
the key in motion, heedless of the fact that he was undoubtedly damaging 
them somewhere, since a brown fluid issued from his mouth, flowed over 
the key and dripped on the floor” (80). When he finally bullies the lock into 
yielding, Gregor feels greatly relieved and says to himself: “So I didn’t need 
the locksmith” (81).
 Reading one of Kafka’s narratives leaves one with a similar feeling. We 
suspect that there must be someone, somewhere, who holds the interpre-
tive key, but that figure never materializes. Nevertheless, readers always 
seem determined to force their way through the literal narrative and into 
the figurative realm; however, the process is invariably messy, imprecise, 
and even excruciating, just as it is for Gregor. Ultimately, once we have 
reached the other side of interpretation we are faced with the realization 
that our mere presence there will neither clearly diagnose nor cure our ills. 
In Kafka, it seems, we should hold out no hope for either the locksmith or 
the doctor. Is this deliberate, a kind of bait and switch? Gregor, for his part, 
thinks they must have come, for he wonders, some days after the reality 
of his metamorphosis has set in, “under what pretext the doctor and the 
locksmith had been got rid of that first morning” (93). In fact, we really 
have no evidence that they were ever actually called. And with Kafka more 
generally we must at least entertain the possibility that the predicament on 
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the literal level is as real as Gregor’s while the solace of the allegorical is 
perpetually chimerical.
 But what makes it so difficult to settle the question of whether The Meta-
morphosis is an allegory or not? Why do we have critics who argue ada-
mantly on both sides of the issue? The explanation for the persistence of 
the disagreement, and hence the answer to these questions, lies in the fact 
that we tend to use the term “allegory” rather too rigidly. At the heart of the 
problem with allegory has been our collective inability to see it other than in 
absolute and conventional terms—something either is or is not an allegory. 
When we read what I call strong allegory, such dogmatism poses few prob-
lems because we are finding what we expect to find from allegory: a trope 
that is some phenomenon transformed into a narrative.
 What, then, happens in The Metamorphosis? At the story level, the nar-
rative looks as if it is (or should be) an allegory. The entities and the events 
in Kafka’s narrative are strikingly allusive. We have, first of all, the behind-
the-scenes transformation of a human into an insect, an act of dehumaniza-
tion cum personification that invites allegorical interpretation; Gregor, from 
the very beginning of the story, is an insect that (who?) possesses a human 
consciousness, though he slowly loses the human capacity for speech. In 
addition to Gregor, we find in the narrative a number of other figures who, 
ontologically speaking, offer allegorical possibilities; these include not only 
the doctor and the locksmith but also the father (and the family unit more 
generally), as well as the representative from the world of work. Though 
perhaps somewhat less obviously hospitable to allegory than those of some 
examples of strong allegory (especially Christian allegory), the events of 
Kafka’s narrative also have considerable allegorical potential. The result of 
the transformation (Gregor’s new state of being) itself proves to be the cata-
lyst for nearly all allegorical readings of the story, but we also see Gregor 
striving to hold on to something slipping from his grasp, we witness the 
process of deterioration, and of course we encounter conflict between family 
members, particularly between father and son.8
 So, if we have events and entities that seem to lead us toward allegorical 
interpretation, why have we not satisfactorily resolved the issue of whether 
the work is an allegory or not? And why, even among those who agree that 
The Metamorphosis is an allegory, is there so much difference of opinion 
concerning what the story actually allegorizes? Why, in other words, can we 
not more clearly identify the phenomenon that Kafka intended to transform 
 8. This list of allegorical pointers should also, of course, include the concept of meta-
morphosis itself. For an enlightening discussion of the history of the relationship between this 
allegory and this concept, see Bruce Clarke’s chapter “Metamorphic Allegory” in his Allegories 
of Writing: The Subject of Metamorphosis.
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through and in his narrative? The answer is not to be found in a new alle-
gorical interpretation that will supplant all the others but rather in a more 
general account of why Kafka would be drawn to weak rather than strong 
allegory. I believe, in fact, that on some level Kafka intended his works to be 
weak allegories, and with what follows I hope to show convincingly why this 
is so.
 The Metamorphosis evokes allegory through its juxtaposition of the 
mimetic and the synthetic, the figurative and the literal. More specifically, 
as noted above, the tale evokes allegory through the precipitating event of 
Gregor’s transformation, and through the presence of the numerous, highly 
allusive figures and relationships among these figures (father–son, indi-
vidual–family, employee–employer, previous self–transformed self, etc.). 
But it withholds commitment to allegory by refusing to render a precise and 
coherent phenomenon from the interplay among the precipitating event and 
these various allusive figures and relationships. I suspect that the fact that 
Kafka has given us a weak allegory has two related explanations. The first 
explanation breaks no new ground and has been offered by others before. 
Kafka in all likelihood intended to be ambiguous, and a narrative that simul-
taneously invites and frustrates allegorical interpretations that are condi-
tioned on the expectation of strong allegory suits his desires well.
 When one looks both at this particular narrative and at the entirety of 
Kafka’s corpus, one could make a good case that his overarching aim was 
to convey a pervasive and disquieting feeling or sense of indeterminacy 
about fundamental issues of, to invoke a Heideggerian phrase, being in 
the (modern, technobureaucratic) world. As Peter Rabinowitz has argued, 
“authors often attempt to communicate ambiguity itself,” and, in the case of 
The Trial, “Kafka was consciously trying to confuse” (36). This strikes me as 
a perfectly reasonable assertion and as good a theory about what Kafka was 
trying to do through his fiction (including The Metamorphosis in addition 
to The Trial) as any other, provided we add that Kafka’s ambiguity is directed 
toward larger ends: capturing something of the irrational, frustrating, angst-
filled, and even unknowable features of modern existence. If this is the case, 
then we would hardly expect for him to have constructed strong allegories, 
which, by their very nature, tend to resolve ambiguity rather than to cul-
tivate it. Seen in this light, the oscillation between figuration and mimeti-
cism in Gregor’s story that at first can be quite disorienting and even disqui-
eting actually turns out to serve Kafka’s rhetorical purposes quite effectively, 
because such seemingly irresolvable inconsistencies seemed to permeate 
Kafka’s life and mind. Why wouldn’t he seek to convey this general sense 
of angst and discomfort through his narratives? To expect Kafka’s autho-
rial guidance through the text and toward a strong allegorical interpretation 
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would be to impose on him a demand that he never set out to satisfy, and, 
by all indications, one that he was constitutionally incapable of satisfying.9 
More than perhaps any other author, Kafka managed to turn ambiguity, 
ambivalence, and confusion—traits that emerge thanks to the weakness of 
his allegories—into a narrative strength.
 The second explanation for Kafka’s preference for weak over strong alle-
gory relies on what I call the naturalist hypothesis. Given his abiding interest 
in the realistic approach to fiction championed by the naturalist movement, 
one would not expect Kafka to write a text whose primary or exclusive rhe-
torical purpose was figurative or allegorical. The Metamorphosis emerges 
from two competing drives, one allusive and one mimetic. This combination 
produces significant but not necessarily unwelcomed uncertainty for the 
reader regarding what phenomenon Kafka might have wanted to transform 
through his narrative, as this phenomenon holds the key to understanding 
how all of the disparate elements of the narrative might work together. We 
find enough allusive potential in this novel to encourage us to look seriously 
at the possibility of strong allegory, and to find it, we need to identify that 
phenomenon.
 Most of Kafka’s readers who pursue an allegorical reading focus on the 
concept of Gregor-as-vermin. What does the idea of vermin represent, and 
how does it reflect Kafka’s figurative intentions? We do have ample biograph-
ical evidence that the image and idea of the subhuman were common for 
Kafka. As Reiner Stach illustrates, “The image of a person degraded into an 
animal had been familiar to him for some time, probably since his child-
hood. His father, who liked to pepper his speech with profanities, employed 
this device on a regular basis. Their clumsy cook was a ‘beast,’ the consump-
tive shop-boy a ‘sick dog,’ the son making a mess at the table a ‘big pig.’” 
(192). So, Stach continues, “Kafka had likened animal imagery to the idea of 
horrendous degradation from an early age. As a keenly observant child, he 
must have concluded that it was a curse to be an animal” (193). With what 
we know about Kafka’s difficult relationship with his father and about his 
general disposition toward self-degradation, one could easily join Stach and 
others in “the realization that the animal metaphor—specifically, the image 
of the lowliest animal  .  .  . was central to his existence” (195). If this is so, 
then Kafka might have sought to transform his own sense of self through his 
narrative, thus providing the phenomenon that controls the narrative and 
making of Gregor a stand-in for Kafka himself. This hypothesis can then be 
 9. Every biographer of Kafka, and nearly every critic of his work, agrees on this basic 
point: Kafka was conflicted in his personal relations, frustrated professionally, and troubled 
emotionally. Kafka was confused and congenitally ambivalent. We might, therefore, reasonably 
expect to see these states of being reflected in his work.
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extended in various ways as the interpreter tries to account for Gregor’s rela-
tionship with his job and his family and for the progress of Gregor’s devolu-
tion over the course of the narrative.
 This hypothesis, however, is not the only plausible one, and Kafka seems 
to have intentionally given us other viable interpretive options, the presence 
of which keeps the interpretive feedback loop from overamplifying the alle-
gorical. Readers’ intense focus on the identity of Gregor makes it difficult 
to see the importance of the idea of transformation itself. In other words, 
readers of The Metamorphosis cannot be absolutely sure that the ontology of 
the vermin that Gregor becomes should control our interpretive efforts. The 
phenomenon that Kafka meant to transform through his narrative might not 
be a debased sense of self, but the transformation of a human into some (any) 
utterly alien state. The story’s title certainly supports this hypothesis, though 
the text itself provides no definitive confirmation and Kafka himself seems at 
points to be so distracted by the prospect of describing the physical minutiae 
of what it might be like to become a vermin that he cannot devote all of his 
energies to developing the significance of that “thing.” Moreover, a number 
of Kafka’s narratives—including “A Report to an Academy” (in which an 
ape becomes essentially human), “A Dream” (in which a man inhabits his 
dead self), and The Trial (in which K.’s arrest changes his life in ways that are 
almost as profound as the changes Gregor experiences, though not quite so 
spectacular)—pursue a similar line. It might then be that the idea of radical 
metamorphosis itself is at least as central to our interpretive concerns as is 
the struggle to figure out what the idea of the vermin that Gregor becomes 
represents.
 I detect in The Metamorphosis a desire on Kafka’s part to experiment with 
the character that he has created, to see what happens when a being is forced 
to adapt to a situation that is almost inconceivably strange. The opening 
of the narrative in particular reveals an author who apparently relishes the 
imaginative challenge of describing a man who awakes to find himself so 
profoundly metamorphosed. How would he move? What would he want 
or be able to eat? How would he respond emotionally? In this intellectual 
respect, Kafka shares some narrative tendencies with the naturalists, and 
with Émile Zola in particular. In his preface to Thérèse Raquin, a novel that 
chronicles the ill-fated adulterous affair between the eponymous heroine and 
her lover, Laurent, Zola claims that his goal is to study “temperaments” not 
“characters”; in other words, he wants to emphasize what today we might 
call the biological imperative, treating people as, to a large extent, slaves 
to their animalistic natures, as beings “without free will, drawn into each 
action of their lives by the inexorable laws of their physical nature” (22). His 
two main characters, Zola continues, “are human animals, nothing more. I 
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have endeavored to follow these animals through the devious working of 
their passions, the compulsions of their instincts, and the mental unbalance 
resulting from a nervous crisis” (22). Zola claims that he wanted to bring 
his two temperamental types together and more or less “observe” what hap-
pened: “I simply applied to two living bodies the analytical method that 
surgeons apply to corpses” (23). Such pronouncements situate Zola clearly 
in the scientific approach to literature advocated by the naturalists, and they 
also prove applicable to The Metamorphosis.
 While Kafka’s case certainly differs from Zola’s in its specifics, the general 
approach that Zola describes in his preface likely captures at least a part of 
Kafka’s intention as well. Kafka’s text certainly validates the claim that he 
wanted to use art to effect a transformation that reality could not produce 
(human to insect) and to explore and document how the human would react 
and adapt to this radical change of state. If readers pursue this possibility, 
then the question of what the insect represents recedes in importance rela-
tive to the issue of the metamorphosis itself.
 This naturalistic hypothesis is bolstered by evidence that the origins of 
Zola’s theory of literature also had an impact on Kafka. According to Martin 
Greenberg, Klaus Wagenbach’s biography of Kafka’s early years detects “the 
influence of natural science in Kafka’s exact, exhaustive notation of detail—
thanks to an admired teacher of natural history who was a convinced Dar-
winist, the sixteen-year-old, otherwise without scientific inclination, read 
Darwin and Haeckel and came under the influence of scientific naturalism” 
(36). Wilhelm Emrich, in his literary critical biography of Kafka, traces this 
influence as well, ultimately positing that, “Improbable as it may sound, 
Franz Kafka’s earliest writing can best be understood as stemming from 
naturalism rather than from expressionism. . . . For the early Franz Kafka, it 
is above all a matter of ‘description’ that records, and of exact reproduction 
of everything that exists, precisely as it is for that ‘consistent naturalist’ Arno 
Holz, for Émile Zola, and others” (26–27).
 Kafka wrote The Metamorphosis at the end of 1912, when he was twenty-
nine years old. While we cannot place this novel with his “earliest” writings, 
traces of his naturalistic tendencies certainly remain. The attention to detail 
and the vivid, precise descriptions are indeed hallmarks of this text. The 
premise of the novel is utterly fantastical and highly allusive, but the nar-
rative execution hews closely to the mimetic. Such hybridity certainly con-
tributes to the enigmatic nature of the text and to its hermeneutic allure; it 
also helps to explain why we can best classify it as a weak allegory: Kafka was 
never fully committed to a text that tilted too heavily toward the thematic 
or allegorical realm. If Kafka at times seems distracted from the symbolic 
aspects of his work by the mechanics of what it would be like to undergo the 
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kind of transformation that Gregor endures, it is because he was interested 
in both of these aspects of the narrative.
 These competing interests manifest themselves most clearly in the fun-
damental uncertainty about what phenomenon Kafka intended to trans-
form through his narrative—a dehumanized sense of self or the reality of 
undergoing a radical transformation—and that uncertainty helps to produce 
a weak allegory. Yet evidence of Kafka’s competing narrative desires runs 
even deeper, all the way down into the most intimate of narrative categories: 
voice. A careful investigation of this concept as it relates to The Metamor-
phosis will make the case for weak allegory even stronger.
 In Coco the Carrot the textual phenomenon that weakens the allegory is 
a character; in The Metamorphosis it is Kafka’s combination of the mimetic 
and the figural, a combination that keeps many readers guessing about his 
ultimate rhetorical aim. If the author’s intention is not explicitly stated (as 
it often is in allegories), then for a narrative to be a strong allegory readers 
need to be able to agree on the intentions of an implied author, and Kafka’s 
narrative technique consistently frustrates this possibility. In many instances, 
allegory obviates the need to imply an author because the author makes his 
or her intention clear, either through his or her own voice or through the 
voice of a narrator to whom readers grant textual authority. If we do not have 
a “received” author (the opposite of an implied or inferred author), then we 
need to imply one, and we need to do it collectively if we are going to be able 
to say that we are reading an allegory.
 Although there is considerable debate concerning the concept of the 
implied author (definitional debate, debate about the utility of the term for 
narrative study, and even debate about the very existence of such a thing), I 
contend that we need this concept in order to talk productively about alle-
gory.10 Allegory provides a good example of a text that rewards what we call 
an intentional reading, a reading, in other words, that focuses on uncovering 
the intended meaning of the author. Absent some explicit statement from the 
actual author concerning his or her intentions, the best we can do with an 
intentional reading is to imply a viable author, a construct certainly related 
to the real author—and one who might in fact share the real author’s world-
view and mindset—though not necessarily identical to that real author.
 Kafka’s discourse frustrates our ability to imply a coherent author in 
 10. For a recent and helpful treatment of the debate about the idea of the implied author, 
see Phelan’s Living to Tell about It: A Rhetoric and Ethics of Character Narration. In an attempt 
to “provide a coherent and widely applicable redefinition of the concept,” Phelan proposes that 
“the implied author is a streamlined version of the real author, an actual or purported subset 
of the real author’s capacities, traits, attitudes, beliefs, values, and other properties that play an 
active role in the construction of the particular text” (45).
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several ways. First, and most obviously, Kafka does not tell us that he has 
written an allegory. Nor does he tell us how we should interpret the narra-
tive, or even whether the narrative is something that we should interpret. 
Compare this lack of authorial direction with what we receive at the conclu-
sion of the first part of The Pilgrim’s Progress:
Now Reader, I have told my Dream to thee;
See if thou canst interpret it to me;
Or to thy self, or Neighbour: but take heed
Of mis-interpreting: for that, instead
Of doing good, will but thy self abuse:
By mis-interpreting, evil insues. (Bunyan 164)
Or even more tellingly, consider the end of the morality play Everyman, 
where we receive specific instruction regarding how to understand the work:
This morall men may have in mynde.
Ye herers, take it of worth, olde and yonge,
And forsake Pryde, for he deceyveth you in the ende;
And remembre Beaute, Fyve Wyttes, Strength, & Dy[s]crecyon,
They all at the last do Everyman forsake,
Save his Good Dedes there dothe he take.
But be-ware; and they be small,
Before God he hath no helpe at all.
None excuse may be there for Every-man.
Alas, how shall he do than?
For, after dethe, amendes may no man make,
For than mercy and pyte doth hym forsake.
If his rekenynge be not clere whan he doth come,
God wyll saye: ‘Ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum!’
And he that hath his accounte hole and sounde,
Hye in heven he shall be crounde.
Unto whiche place God brynge vs all thyder,
That we may lyue body and soule togyder. (297)
We receive no such guidance as we make our way through The Metamor-
phosis, nor through any of Kafka’s narratives for that matter, and this relative 
lack of guidance makes it difficult for readers to feel confident that they have 
access to the authorial audience, even as certain elements in the narrative(s) 
imply strongly that such an audience does exist.
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 In addition to the lack of authorial direction, Kafka’s narrative, despite 
the presence of the fantastical element—namely, Gregor—that tempts us 
toward an allegorical interpretation, adheres very closely to the conventions 
of realistic or mimetic fiction. As one critic has put it,
[Kafka’s] narrative point of view is . . . one that promises, perhaps falsely, 
that the reader is entering an ordered realm of discourse in which mean-
ing is generated according to well-known models. One of Kafka’s favorite 
strategies is to exploit this kind of narration that, after a century of realist 
writers, had come to be codified as a form of discourse that guarantees the 
truth and stability of the represented world at the same time that it seems 
to offer a transparency through which the absent narrator promises to 
make present an absent but anticipated otherness. (Thiher 37)
The apparent incongruity between Kafka’s fantastic story and his realistic 
representation of it has long fascinated readers, and it is partly this incon-
gruity that explains why The Metamorphosis is a weak allegory.
 The kind of mimetic fiction to which Thiher refers here is characterized 
by a narrative structure that employs a complex discourse—usually voiced 
through a complex narrator—in order to present a fictional world that is 
itself complex enough to be self-sufficient, one, in other words, that nei-
ther requires nor solicits an allegorical interpretation. Yet Kafka pairs this 
kind of realistic discourse with Gregor, a figure who clearly has no place 
in a mimetic narrative. While a figure such as Gregor—one that unmistak-
ably invokes the history of personification allegory, albeit in a somewhat 
perverted form (Gregor is dehumanized before he personifies)—tempts us 
toward an allegorical interpretation of the entire narrative, the narrative 
itself tends to undermine that hermeneutic effort.11 In Allegory and Vio-
lence Gordon Teskey argues that such an adversarial relationship between 
personification and narrative has a long history, that in fact there was a 
“neoclassical assumption  .  .  .  that allegory should have as little to do with 
narrative as possible. In Johnson’s allegories, for example,” Teskey explains, 
“the thought represented by a series of personified abstractions is carefully 
worked out so that only the most rudimentary narrative is required to link 
 11. Kafka’s version of personification baffles many readers largely because it does not fall 
into either of the two major kinds of personification that we tend to associate with allegory. 
Howard Schless identifies these two varieties as 1) starting with a human aspect and then mak-
ing a person or an animal out of it and 2) taking actual historical figures and making them 
“representative of a vice or virtue, [making] them, in fact, a symbol, an embodiment, of a hu-
man pattern of behavior” (131). Dante pioneered this second variety. 
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the elements of the series together. It seems, then, that in allegory narrative 
and personification are inversely prominent” (23). Although Teskey does 
not explain precisely what he means by “narrative,” I suspect that, in this 
context, it coincides fairly closely with “discourse,” and, as he sees it, a strong 
allegory will compel its discourse to toe the line of its author’s intentions: 
“The more powerful the allegory, the more openly violent the moments in 
which the materials of narrative are shown being actively subdued for the 
purpose of raising a structure of meaning” (23).12 In The Metamorphosis, 
however, Kafka’s narrative discourse attains the position of power, subduing 
any definitive “structure of meaning” by refusing to grant authority to any 
particular interpretation, partly because it cloaks itself in a mimetic illusion.
 This odd tension between the figural and the mimetic in The Metamor-
phosis is in evidence from the very start of the story. Readers, for the most 
part, are a relatively accommodating bunch. We accept Gregor’s highly unre-
alistic transformation, but in order to do so we want to see it as symbolic 
or allegorical, as an element, in other words, of a recognizable “structure of 
meaning.” Yet Kafka refuses to make evident for us what that meaning might 
be and, through his discourse, he presents obstacles to our reading Gregor 
himself as an allegorical element by allowing Gregor’s “personal issues” to 
remain a central focus. This is a problem because Gregor will not accept 
his own transformation and, because so much of the narrative discourse is 
focused through Gregor, readers are constantly held back from exploring 
the larger significance of the metamorphosis. Instead of thinking about what 
Gregor represents, we must contemplate—with him—what he will do, given 
his perplexing situation:
His immediate intention was to get up quietly without being disturbed, to 
put on his clothes and above all eat his breakfast, and only then to consider 
what else was to be done, since in bed, he was well aware, his meditations 
would come to no sensible conclusion. He remembered that often enough 
in bed he felt small aches and pains, probably caused by awkward pos-
tures, which had proved purely imaginary once he got up, and he looked 
forward eagerly to seeing this morning’s delusions gradually fall away. That 
the change in his voice was nothing but the precursor of a severe chill, a 
standing ailment of commercial travelers, he had not the least possible 
doubt. (71)
 12. Yet this raises an important question: is realism—as it manifests itself at the level of 
discourse—simply incompatible with allegory? Not necessarily, I think. In fact, much of George 
Orwell’s fiction draws on the same realist tradition, yet we have no trouble calling Animal Farm, 
for example, an allegory. We can do this because the story told in this novel so closely matches 
a historical narrative. This is not the case with Kafka’s story, obviously. 
Weak Allegory   •  67
This focus on the effects of the transformation rather than on its significance 
complicates the reader’s desire to participate in that other kind of transfor-
mation—the allegorical one.
 Further contributing to the allegorical weakness of The Metamorphosis 
is the narrative’s tone, or more precisely the difficulty we readers have in 
deciding what the tone actually is. As Frederick Crews shows in an essay in 
the New York Review of Books, a combination of editorial decisions by Max 
Brod (Kafka’s literary executor) and world events during the first half of the 
twentieth century, when critics first began to take note of Kafka, encour-
aged readings that “[emphasized] solemn themes and prophetic insight” (4). 
While later critics have demonstrated a lighter side to Kafka, noting a more 
ludic quality in the writer who “seems to have relished the role of trickster” 
(4), we are still, to a large extent, influenced by the more somber version of 
Kafka. As a result, we are left with a schizoid vision of the author, something 
that is reflected in and reinforced by the tone of his works.13 Writing about 
the experience of reading Kafka generally, the French critic Michel Dentan 
has argued that “On voudrait reconnaître une intention de l’auteur, mais le 
texte reste parfaitement ambigu; et le lecteur engage sa propre responsabilité 
dans la manière dont il perçoit le ton des récits” [One would like to uncover 
an authorial intention, but the text remains completely ambiguous; and the 
reader takes on the responsibility himself for the way in which he perceives 
the tone of the narratives] (9, my translation). Dentan explores specifically 
how Kafka’s ambiguous narratives raise the question of when Kafka is being 
serious and when he is being humorous, but it also helps to explain why we 
have trouble determining whether he intends to be allegorical or not. Not 
surprisingly, most of the allegorical readings of The Metamorphosis either 
downplay or overlook the humor that Dentan finds in it.
 Kafka’s manipulation of narrative perspective largely explains the diffi-
culty we have in identifying a tone and also goes a long way toward explaining 
the weakness of his allegory. Kafka employs a third-person narrator in The 
Metamorphosis, but Gregor’s perspective tends to dominate the narrative. 
Indeed, some critics—most notably Friedrich Beissner—have gone so far 
as to claim that Kafka’s narrator always relates only Gregor’s point of view. 
Dentan and others have clearly shown that this is not so, but we can agree, 
I think, that until his death, Gregor serves as the guiding consciousness for 
the reader. Nevertheless, the story is not completely his, and even this slight 
indeterminacy concerning perspective complicates the issue of allegory. The 
inconclusiveness that we do experience in reading this narrative results pri-
 13. This undoubtedly contributes to our difficulty in fashioning a satisfactory implied au-
thor as well—more on this below.
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marily from Kafka’s use of the erlebte Rede technique, which we also know as 
style indirect libre or free indirect discourse. Clayton Koelb points out in his 
work on Kafka that this is a form of third-person narrative that “is not neces-
sarily a very far step from the first-person narrative” because “its perspective 
is normally limited to the point of view of a single character” (“Kafka Imag-
ines” 347). Even if the distance between first- and third-person narration in 
free indirect discourse is small, however, that gap can be a significant one to 
overcome as one attempts to understand what an allegorical story ultimately 
means.
 Thus, perspective in The Metamorphosis presents us with two serious 
problems. First, since we are so close to Gregor’s perspective for most of the 
narrative, we have little advantage over him in understanding the significance 
of his predicament. We understand that Gregor’s willingness and capacity to 
make sense of his situation are limited, but like tourists who intuit that their 
guide might not be the sharpest or most knowledgeable person for that posi-
tion, we do not have any alternative sources of information or insight readily 
available. I am not proposing that one needs a third-person omniscient nar-
rator who clearly and authoritatively speaks for the author in order to have 
an implied author, nor am I saying that one needs such a narrator in order 
to have an allegory; indeed, many allegories are first-person narratives (viz. 
Piers Plowman and The Pilgrim’s Progress). In these first-person accounts 
the narrator has achieved some kind of critical distance (usually because 
the events narrated are ostensibly a dream) and thus is able to reflect on the 
significance of the happenings in such a way as to present them as a kind 
of heterodiegetic first-person narrator. This distance allows the first-person 
narrator to make sense of things in a way that Gregor—for whom we are told 
on the first page that “It was no dream” (67)—is not.
 Like Gregor, then, we are frustrated and, in a way, trapped. And this raises 
the second problem with perspective: our narrator does not provide much 
help. Even at the points in the text when we sense that the narrator might 
provide us with a perspective or a voice that differs from Gregor’s, we still 
receive little interpretive guidance. One passage from The Metamorphosis that 
has historically been one of the most carefully dissected and analyzed brings 
these issues to the fore precisely because it forces us to consider the issues of 
voice and perspective in Kafka’s discourse. This passage occurs near the end 
of the novella and it describes an important event in the story. After Gregor’s 
transformation his family has taken in three boarders in order to help defray 
some of their expenses and to compensate for the loss of Gregor’s salary. 
One evening Gregor’s sister—Grete—begins playing the violin in the kitchen 
and the boarders express a desire to listen to the music. To accommodate 
this, Gregor’s father moves her music stand into the living area so that Grete 
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can resume her playing in closer proximity to the three men. Gregor is also 
intrigued, however, and despite being “covered with dust” and trailing “fluff 
and hair and remnants of food,” he crawls out of his room and inches his way 
into the living room (120). “To be sure,” Kafka writes,
no one was aware of him. The family was entirely absorbed in the violin-
playing; the lodgers, however, who first of all had stationed themselves, 
hands in pockets, much too close behind the music stand so that they 
could all have read the music, which must have bothered his sister, had 
soon retreated to the window, half-whispering with downbent heads, and 
stayed there while his father turned an anxious eye on them. Indeed, they 
were making it more than obvious that they had been disappointed in their 
expectation of hearing good or enjoyable violin-playing, that they had had 
more than enough of the performance and only out of courtesy suffered a 
continued disturbance of their peace. From the way they all kept blowing 
the smoke of their cigars high in the air through nose and mouth one could 
divine their irritation. And yet Gregor’s sister was playing so beautifully. 
Her face leaned sideways, intently and sadly her eyes followed the notes of 
music. Gregor crawled a little farther forward and lowered his head to the 
ground so that it might be possible for his eyes to meet hers. Was he an 
animal that music had such an effect upon him? He felt as if the way were 
opening before him to the unknown nourishment he craved. (120–21)
Even if we agree that the narrative is focalized through Gregor, or that it 
is Gregor’s perspective that dominates, we are still left with questions con-
cerning voice. Think about the claim that Gregor’s sister was playing so 
beautifully. Whose voice is this? Does it matter? I cannot answer the first 
question definitively, but, as for the second, I would argue that it does matter, 
because inconclusive passages such as this one make it difficult to identify 
either the tone or the values of the narrator. And without a firm grounding in 
these areas we cannot really be sure of how the narrator feels about Gregor, 
his plight, and his family. Booth claims that “Our sense of the implied author 
includes not only the extractable meanings but also the moral and emo-
tional content of each bit of action and suffering of all of the characters. It 
includes, in short, the intuited apprehension of a complete artistic whole; 
the chief value to which this implied author is committed, regardless of what 
party his creator belongs to in real life, is that which is expressed by the total 
form” (Rhetoric of Fiction 74). In this story, we do not know the chief value 
to which even the narrator is committed, and this makes it a matter of pure 
guesswork to decide to what values the textual authority is committed; this 
thwarts our attempts to imply an author. James Phelan has argued that voice 
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is a “synthesis of style, tone, and values” (“Editor’s” 2). In identifying alle-
gory, tone and values are particularly critical, and they go a long way toward 
allowing us to form some image of an implied author. But in The Metamor-
phosis a determinative voice is difficult to identify.
 Kafka’s decisions bearing on the narrative’s discourse produce critical 
uncertainty on the reader’s part. We know that Gregor’s point of view domi-
nates, but we are equally aware of the countervailing presence of the nar-
rator. At times it is impossible to say unequivocally whose voice we hear 
and what values are inflected by that voice.14 In the passage cited above, 
if Gregor is (solely) responsible for the positive evaluation of his sister’s 
musical performance, then we can—and probably should—interpret this as 
just another example of the vermin deluding himself, as further evidence of 
his inability to deal with his bizarre reality. If, on the other hand, the voice 
is that of the narrator, then Gregor comes out looking far better; ironically, 
he—the beast—would be the only one truly possessing a refined aesthetic 
taste, and the others, in comparison, would seem shallow and coarse. Given 
the indeterminacy of Kafka’s discourse, both readings are plausible. Such 
indeterminacy does not preclude the possibility of allegory, of course, but it 
does alter the degree of allegoricalness; it contributes to this narrative being 
a weak rather than a strong allegory.
 Thus, what readers often expect from Kafka, and what we get in works 
that are strong allegories, is a narrative discourse that helps us to configure 
the story elements in such a way as to make clear what it is the author has 
transformed into his narrative. This happens in historical allegories (Animal 
Farm) and in what Frye calls “actual” allegories, but it does not in The Meta-
morphosis. There is no implied author whose views are clearly discernible 
or whose views are consistent with all that transpires in the narrative itself. 
Such a figure is required in this case because, although we do have a story 
that has allegorical potential, the pieces of that story (the events and entities) 
do not add up to anything that resembles a pre-existing historical narrative, 
nor do we have an “authoritarian” voice guiding us toward the significance 
 14. This hermeneutical challenge pervades Kafka’s fiction. In his discussion of The Trial 
Philip Weinstein makes a claim that buttresses my argument vis-à-vis The Metamorphosis. 
According to Weinstein, “there are two ways of misreading the opening sentence of The Trial. 
The first is to believe one is reading third-person realism and thus to trust the narrative voice 
(someone did in fact traduce Joseph K., and we will in time find out who and why). The second 
is to believe one is reading first-personal modernism and thus to distrust the narrative voice (he 
says he was traduced but we suspect he lies, and will in time discover why). Both ways produce 
cogent interpretations. Both likewise miss the intrinsic instability of that voice’s reference, its 
bid for readerly trust joined with its betrayal of such trust—a bid and a betrayal inseparable 
from the text’s peculiar deployment of the subject in space/time. One finishes the book exactly 
as one began, in confusion” (136).
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of the narrative. In short, readers struggle to determine the specific phenom-
enon that has been transformed. As a result, we are left more or less on our 
own, per Kafka’s design and due to his penchant for narratives that are both 
and simultaneously allusive and naturalistic, to make sense of something 
that needs interpretation. Strong allegories, I would argue, do not leave us on 
our own like this, waiting for a locksmith and a doctor who might or might 
not have been summoned.
 Many readers, of course, actually prefer to go it alone and enjoy the 
process of breaking through a text in the same way that Gregor forces his 
way through his locked door. Many of these readers are the same ones who 
harbor such animosity for strong allegory, and many of them constitute a 
group of critics who actually prize allegory, but do so on their own terms, 
terms that we might call poststructuralist. Although they do not use the ter-
minology that I have adopted, many poststructuralist critics who work with 
allegory seem to start from the premise that weak allegories—those defined 
by indeterminacy, incompleteness, and distraction—are paradigmatic of 
this trope, the rule rather than a variation on the historical norm of the 
strong allegorical narrative. Walter Benjamin and Paul de Man in particular 
renewed interest in allegory by recasting it in terms that would be more 
appealing to a twentieth-century audience and that do echo what I have said 
about weak allegory.15
 As I mentioned in the introduction, poststructuralist critics—led by de 
Man—recognize the centrality of narrative to allegory. De Man sees in all 
language a “tendency toward narrative,” and he conceives of allegory as a 
trope within the realm of language. Thus, allegory participates in this “ten-
dency.” The connection between allegory and narrative is more accidental 
or coincidental for de Man than I think it really is, but the connection itself 
remains significant, and it plays two important roles in de Man’s conception 
of allegory. First, it allows de Man to focus on allegory as a particular use of 
language, a rhetorical trope. Second, it allows him to emphasize what he sees 
as allegory’s crucial temporal dimension. Together, these moves define the 
poststructuralist approach to allegory.
 De Man treats allegory as a trope within a text, focusing on what he calls 
the “allegorical sign.” Like any sign, the allegorical sign, according to de Man, 
comprises both a signifier and a signified, and, as we would expect from one 
of his critical persuasion, de Man argues that the connection between these 
two components is neither necessary nor completely harmonious. Thus, 
de Man argues in Blindness and Insight that “The relationship between the 
 15. Benjamin’s signal contribution to the theorizing of allegory comes in the chapter “Al-
legory and Trauerspiel” in The Origin of German Tragic Drama.
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allegorical sign and its meaning (signifié) is not decreed by dogma; in the 
instances we have seen in Rousseau and in Wordsworth, this is not at all the 
case. We have, instead, a relationship between signs in which the reference 
to their respective meanings has become of secondary importance” (207).
 Essentially, for de Man, allegory becomes a trope designating herme-
neutic failure as is made evident in his well-known claim in Allegories of 
Reading that “allegorical narratives tell the story of the failure to read” (205). 
As Jim Hansen points out in “Formalism and its Malcontents”: “In [de Man’s] 
writing, allegory marks out the space of the failure of referential meaning, 
the space in which, as he explains, representation ‘does not stand in the ser-
vice of something that can be represented’” (665). Equally illustrative is de 
Man’s claim in Blindness and Insight that in allegory, as well as in irony, “the 
relationship between sign and meaning is discontinuous, involving an extra-
neous principle that determines the point and the manner at and in which 
the relationship is articulated. In both cases, the sign points to something 
that differs from its literal meaning and has for its function the thematiza-
tion of this difference” (209). Allegory, for de Man, stands as testament to 
the unbridgeability of this difference separating signifier and signified, or 
meaning.
 According to Hansen, “For de Man, allegory gradually became the key 
rhetorical figure in a particularly relentless strain of deconstruction” (665). 
I would argue in addition that allegory becomes a symbol (not, we should 
note, an allegory) for signification in the vernacular of deconstructive criti-
cism: a sign points only to some other sign, not to some extralinguistic signi-
fied with which it has some fixed relationship. Freed of these representational 
restraints, allegory becomes the ideal structuralist and poststructuralist sig-
nifying structure,16 and it is no surprise that de Man would prefer it to the 
idea of symbol, which, he claims, “postulates the possibility of an identity or 
identification” between signifier and signified (207). As Hansen argues, for 
de Man, “in opposition to the symbol, allegory consciously points to its own 
temporality and, in so doing, embarrasses its own claims to truth” (672).
 One can easily see how the indeterminacy and the lack of closure that 
I ascribe to weak allegory resonates with the approach to allegory adopted 
by de Man and like-minded twentieth-century critics influenced by post-
 16. According to Joel Fineman, “we can see why, for contemporary structuralism, allegory 
would be the figure of speech par excellence. No other figure so readily lays itself out on the grid 
constructed out of the hypothesized intersection of paradigmatic synchrony and syntagmatic 
diachrony, which is to say that no other figure so immediately instances the definition of lin-
guistic structure which was developed by Jakobson out of Saussure and the Russian Formalists, 
and that has since been applied to all the so-called ‘sciences of man,’ from anthropology (Lévi-
Strauss) to semiotics (Barthes) to psychoanalysis (Lacan)” (32).
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structuralism and deconstruction. These critics locate markers of allegory 
(allegorical signs, to use de Man’s language) and then explore the signifi-
cance—and the failure of significance—of these signs within the larger 
work of literature. This leads to what Roland Barthes would call a “read-
erly” approach to allegory and, as a result, to some fascinating examples 
of strong readings of weak allegories.17 I call this kind of reading a strong 
reading because even a deconstructive approach—with notions of indeter-
minacy and multivalence fully baked in—to a text that seems allegorical 
tends to close the interpretive loop in such a way as to amplify the allegori-
calness of the text beyond the author’s probable intention. What follows is 
a description of one such reading of The Metamorphosis and an analysis of 
that attempt that will show how and why the weak allegorical designation for 
Kafka’s novel is preferable to a strong reading that views allegory through a 
poststructuralist lens.
 In The Commentators’ Despair: The Interpretation of Kafka’s “Metamor-
phosis,” Stanley Corngold argues that there are two primary modes of inter-
preting this enigmatic text. The first such reading Corngold calls “symbolic,” 
and it is characterized by a belief that “Gregor Samsa remains an intact moral 
personality,” but that he is also “homeless,” an “outcast social man,” and one 
whose “life is empty of meaningful work, friendship, sexual love, family loy-
alty” (33). “In sum the symbolic reading asserts,” according to Corngold: 
“1. the continuity of the empirical personality of Gregor Samsa with the 
monstrous vermin; 2. the meaningfulness of the metamorphosis in terms of 
intentions and effects taken from ordinary experience; 3. the deficiency and 
remediableness [through death] of the experience with which The Metamor-
phosis is correlated; 4. the prescriptive and prophetic bearing of the work, 
hinted at in Gregor’s and the family’s end” (34). In short, we might sur-
mise that Gregor, according to this interpretation, functions as a symbol 
for alienated, modern humankind, and that his metamorphosis underscores 
and exacerbates that sense of isolation.
 The allegorical reading, on the other hand, Corngold offers, “opposes 
the symbolic reading in every detail. It takes literally the metamorphosis, 
the radical disjunction separating Gregor Samsa from the vermin. It con-
siders the work as literally constituting an uncanny, unsettled existence” 
(35). Essentially, this variety of allegorical reading takes the same kind of 
ontological tack favored by de Man (and Benjamin before him): “Mainly 
because this reading stresses the absolute interval between Gregor Samsa 
and his new situation—his unbeing—it can be called allegorical according 
to Walter Benjamin’s definition of allegory as the nonpresence—that is to say 
 17. Barthes lays out his distinction between readerly and writerly texts in S/Z.
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the nonexperienceable character—of what is signified” (35).18 Corngold has 
apparently accepted the deconstructive approach to allegory as the defini-
tive one and is thereby able to call The Metamorphosis an allegory because 
it represents the disjunction between human existence and the absence of 
human existence.19 What finally distinguishes what Corngold calls the sym-
bolic interpretation from the allegorical one is the willingness of the latter to 
take seriously (and literally) the existential rift that Gregor experiences.
 Corngold believes that The Metamorphosis is really about language and 
Kafka’s ambivalent and ambiguous relationship with it. At the outset of this 
short novel, Corngold points out, Kafka literalizes a metaphor (Gregor is—
literally—vermin), and in so doing he betrays his problematic relationship 
with symbolic language; Kafka, Corngold asserts, was neither good nor com-
fortable with metaphors, so instead of using them in his writing he trans-
forms them into literality. Gregor, then, suffers from problems that produce 
some of the same symptoms that plague the author who conceived him. “The 
negativity of the vermin has to be seen as rooted,” Corngold explains,
in an absolute sense, in the literary enterprise itself, as coming to light in 
the perspective which the act of writing offers of itself. Here the activity of 
writing appears only autonomous enough to demand the loss of happiness 
and the renunciation of life. But of its own accord it has no power to res-
titute these sacrifices in a finer key. Over Kafka’s writing stands a constant 
sign of negativity and incompleteness. (26)
In this sense, we can say that Gregor embodies the angst and alienation 
that Kafka supposedly experienced, but we cannot say—or at least Corn-
gold would strongly resist saying—that Gregor “stands for” Kafka. It is an 
 18. This comes very close to what de Man says about allegory’s ontological component: for 
de Man, as for many critics committed to deconstruction, the step between hermeneutics and 
ontology is a small one, and this is made clear by de Man’s ideas regarding allegory. Indeed, we 
see in Blindness and Insight how easily de Man moves from the hermeneutic to the ontological: 
“Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory desig-
nates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia and the 
desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference. In so doing, 
it prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self, which is now fully, though 
painfully, recognized as a non-self ” (207). Here, de Man seems to make analogous the relation-
ships signifier–signified and being–nonbeing, thereby closing the circle of hermeneutics and 
ontology. 
 19. It is perhaps worth quibbling here. Is it really correct to say that Gregor-as-vermin is 
an “unbeing” or a “nonpresence”? This does not seem quite right to me, especially since death 
seems to provide a clear opposition to existence. De Man appears to be on firmer ground when, 
in Blindness and Insight, he reads one of Wordsworth’s Lucy poems as an allegory because it 
plays with the difference between life and death (223–25).
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analogy of condition, of alienation from life that springs from a “distortion 
of ordinary language” (27), that most interests Corngold:
It is this dwelling outside the house of life, “Schriftstellersein,” the negative 
condition of writing as such, which is named in The Metamorphosis; but it 
cannot name itself directly, in a language that designates things that exist, 
or in the figures that suggest the relations between things constituting the 
common imagination of life. Instead, in The Metamorphosis Kafka utters 
a word for a being unacceptable to man (ungeheuer) and unacceptable to 
God (ungeziefer), a word unsuited either to intimate speech or to prayer. 
This word evokes a distortion without visual identity of self-awareness—
engenders, for a hero, a pure sign. The creature of The Metamorphosis is 
not a self speaking or keeping silent but language itself (parole)—a word 
broken loose from the context of language (langage), fallen into a void the 
meaning of which it cannot signify, near others who cannot understand 
it. (27)
Thus, Gregor-as-vermin, at least in Corngold’s reading, functions as a sign 
that points to language, and indeed to a conception of language that sounds 
strikingly similar to that held by deconstructionists.
 Yet Corngold seems to sense that an allegorical analysis cannot end with 
the identification of what the critic calls an allegorical sign. Thus, he asks the 
question that must be asked: “What, then, is allegorized in The Metamor-
phosis? What intention finds its correlative in the metamorphosis of a man 
into an Ungeziefer, an unbeing?” (35).20 Even if we can overlook the fact that 
vermin, while not human, are a kind of being, albeit an odious one, we are 
hard-pressed to buy completely into Corngold’s answer. “It [the correlative-
seeking intention] is,” he contends, “first of all, Kafka’s intention to exist as 
literature, to write fiction; for this intention to write—to paraphrase Collin-
gwood—is realized only insofar as it both lives in the historical process and 
knows itself as so living. In this story writing reflects itself, in the mode of 
allegory, as metamorphosis, literality, death, play, and reduction—the whole 
in a negative and embattled form” (35).
 Corngold’s argument here essentially runs as follows: Kafka was intensely 
committed to his writing, but as he wrote he “came to realize more and more 
sharply the impoverishment, reduction, and shortcoming which writing 
entails” (35). Writing, therefore, is antithetical to life, and so the writer 
 20. Corngold deserves credit for asking this question. De Man, on the other hand, never 
broaches the topic of what the works he interprets are allegories of. Instead, he is content to 
operate more locally, on the level of the signifier within a text. Traditionally, though, when we 
talk about allegory, we want to know, like Corngold, what the entire work allegorizes.
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experiences a kind of death. For the committed Kafka, there is no alterna-
tive; he must, as a writer, constantly endure this “radical estrangement from 
life” (36). What Corngold calls Kafka’s recognition of “the root separateness 
of literature and life—indeed the antithetical character of literature and life 
conceived as Bildung, as an extensive totality of experience,” is reflected in 
“the vermin’s [Gregor’s] gradual reduction and impoverishment, his loss of 
eyesight and loss of locomotion” (36–37).
 If Corngold’s claim was that Gregor functions as a substitute for Kafka 
himself and thus enacts an allegory of Kafka’s tortured existence, then we 
might be persuaded to follow his line of reasoning, even if there is no com-
pelling textual evidence to support such an autobiographical approach 
(Gregor, after all, is no writer), and even if we are not completely convinced 
that writing did have the kind of deathly implications for Kafka that Corn-
gold supposes it did. Perhaps because of these issues, Corngold does not 
make this claim. Instead, he puts forward an argument that sounds, today, 
like a parody of deconstructive criticism: “The sorrow belongs to the being 
who is literature, who is engaged in an exemplary way in the passage from 
particularity to generality and as a consequence must suffer death after death 
without hope of a goal. The emblem of literature in its desire for generality 
and its condemnation to particularity is its literality, the literal being the 
allegory of the literary” (36). Although it is difficult to say with certainty 
what Corngold intends by this, he seems to be making the claim that both 
the vermin and Kafka lead literary lives and are therefore condemned to 
lead lives that are only literal, lives, in other words, that provide no means of 
escape from the text and no hope of transcendence or meaningfulness. Kafka 
leads such a life by choice; he ties himself to the literary and the literal by 
being a writer. Gregor suffers such a life because, according to Corngold, he 
is a character in a work of literature who is constantly denied access to the 
symbolic:
The constitution of tragic, allegorical consciousness in The Metamorphosis 
includes the representation of symbolic consciousness. This occurs when-
ever the vermin erroneously asserts his identity with Gregor Samsa and 
tries to restore his old situation within the family and again whenever his 
reflections appear to justify the metamorphosis as punishment. That the 
symbolic mode is a seduction and an error emerges through the vermin’s 
attempts to speak in metaphorical language. Kafka’s aversion to the meta-
phor is constant, but in the few places in The Metamorphosis where this 
language occurs, the reader patently finds himself inside an inauthentic 
consciousness. . . . It cannot be this creature’s fate to know a symbolic unity 
with his world. (37)
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Thus, Gregor and Kafka resemble each other because each feels alienated 
from his respective world, mired in a literary existence that impoverishes 
and reduces his being. While all of this might have some truth behind it, 
the grounds for Corngold’s comparison are quite weak and depend entirely 
on the peculiarly deconstructive notion of allegory, one that inextricably 
ties it to linguistic failure, alienation, and meaninglessness. This is signaled, 
according to Corngold, by Kafka’s “aversion to metaphor” and by what Corn-
gold claims is the fact that “the vermin’s attempt to come to terms with his 
experience through metaphor inspires derision” (37).21
 For readers less under the thrall of deconstruction and its single-minded 
focus on linguistic indeterminacy and failure, however, Corngold has not 
provided enough evidence to prove that it was Kafka’s intention to allegorize 
his own desire to “exist as literature,” even if we can understand what this 
desire would be and can grant that it is plausible that Kafka experienced it 
(neither of which is a given). Rather than demonstrating that The Metamor-
phosis is an allegory of this sort, Corngold has rather imposed an interpreta-
tion on it that transforms it into a symbol for deconstruction. It is not my 
intention here to discredit entirely Corngold’s reading of Kafka, but rather to 
claim that his reading does not justify calling the narrative a strong allegory. 
Like de Man, Corngold believes that the presence of an “allegorical signifier” 
(or the perceived predominance of allegorical signifiers over symbolic signi-
fiers) within a text justifies applying the term allegory to the work as a whole. 
The mere presence of such signifiers, however, even if we do agree that they 
are “allegorical,” seems to me to be insufficient evidence of strong allegory 
more generally. And when Corngold attempts to make the leap from sign 
to text, he must rely too heavily on inference, on questionable conclusions 
about Kafka’s psyche, and on arguments that he does not adequately support 
with textual evidence. In short, Corngold has produced a very strong alle-
gorical reading of a weak allegory.
 If Kafka’s text were a strong allegory, then an interpretation of it would 
not allow for as much readerly latitude as Corngold takes. Nor would it allow 
for competing and even contradictory allegorical interpretations. But in the 
case of The Metamorphosis, such alternative readings do exist. In addition 
to Corngold’s claim that Kafka’s text is the transformation of the author’s 
intention to “exist as literature,” we have Honig’s claim that the narrative rep-
resents the transformation of the problem of the individual’s identity relative 
to others (Gregor “has no vital mission; he has cut himself off from society” 
[68]), the commonly expressed opposite view that this tale is an allegory 
 21. Although Corngold does not cite de Man in this section of his explication of The Meta-
morphosis, he does credit de Man’s “The Rhetoric of Temporality” when he discusses allegory 
earlier in the essay, and his conception of allegory clearly owes much to de Man.
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of modern society’s dehumanizing effect on the individual, and the claim 
that the story is yet another allegory of the Freudian Oedipal conflict. The 
number of varying allegorical interpretations of The Metamorphosis attests 
to the presence of allegory in this narrative and also stands as compelling 
evidence that the narrative itself cannot be called a strong allegory.
 The weakness of Kafka’s allegory, and the number of strong readings that 
this weakness has engendered, have together resulted in an interesting back-
lash against an interpretive approach to Kafka more generally. Benjamin first 
outlined this anti-interpretive approach in his essays on Kafka (collected 
in the volume titled Illuminations), but others came later to champion the 
cause. In a review of one such approach (K., by Roberto Calasso), Robert 
Alter makes the case against interpreting Kafka succinctly: “To interpret 
Kafka’s fiction is to coerce it into a framework of stable meaning—sliding 
down the slippery slope toward allegory—that the work itself seems devised 
to unsettle” (31). Although Alter’s language betrays an abiding dislike for 
allegory (one is at pains to interpret “the slippery slope toward allegory” 
positively), his claim bolsters the case for calling Kafka’s work weak allegory. 
Many of Kafka’s narratives—certainly The Metamorphosis among them—
lead the reader down a path toward allegory, marking the way with textual 
phenomena that appear tantalizingly allusive and figural, but then never 
allow for the kind of closure or determinacy that strong allegories invariably 
deliver. Thus, interpretations of his work tend to seem forced and a little 
messy. We should not be surprised that some would prefer not to follow that 
interpretive path at all.
 All of this points, finally, to the conclusion that many readers remain 
uncomfortable with the kind of confusion and ambiguity that Kafka and his 
works beget. Some would argue that effecting such confusion in the reader 
is Kafka’s aim and, perhaps, a part of his genius, but I see this confusion 
as stemming from a misunderstanding of Kafka’s rhetorical purpose. This 
purpose, as I argued above, was simultaneously mimetic and figural, and the 
category of weak allegory gives us the perspective and the tools we need to 
understand and appreciate Kafka’s rare achievement.
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i  have  heretofore focused my attention on entire works of fiction—whether 
novels or short stories or parables—that we can label one kind of allegory 
or another (strong or weak), but allegory does not always and only manifest 
itself as a complete, self-contained narrative. Indeed, I contend that some of 
our problems in dealing with allegory, and some of our resistance to it, stems 
from our general insistence on applying the conventional designation “alle-
gory” or “allegorical” only to entire works. As Honig claims, “The form of 
an allegory must also be the form of the medium (prose or poetry, drama or 
novel) conveying it. But in whatever medium, it is a form that characterizes 
the allegory as a totally achieved literary creation” (14). I resist the idea that 
allegory must be “a totally achieved literary creation” (though this is possible, 
as in the case of the strong and weak allegories I discussed in the preceding 
chapters) and submit instead that especially in modern and contemporary 
narrative fiction, allegory is more often than not an important aspect of other 
such creations. Recognizing this fact will allow us to see allegory as a com-
plex feature of literature and will allow us to make better sense of certain 
modern texts that have proved especially challenging to interpretation.
 Moving toward a rhetorically inflected approach to allegory can help us 
make sense of a variety of narratives that make use of allegory in some way 
but that do not produce the same kind of allegorical effect that more tra-
ditional allegorical narratives do. We commonly find allegory present in a 
work of fiction, for example, as a narrative embedded in but marked off from 
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the primary narrative.1 Such embedded narratives—which might take the 
form of dreams, stories related by characters or narrators, or speeches—raise 
important issues about our treatment of allegory, the most germane of which 
is whether the presence of such an embedded allegory necessarily makes 
the primary, host narrative allegorical. Honig broaches this question early 
in Dark Conceit when he wonders “whether in [Shakespeare’s] Coriolanus 
Menenius’ famous body-versus-belly speech is an allegory or in any sense 
allegorical” (10). Honig decides that the speech is allegorical primarily for 
two reasons: because it appeals to an “ideal” concerning the operation of 
government,2 and because it “functions as a trope on at least two levels of 
meaning. The anatomical analogy makes of a civil insurrection and a physi-
ological disorder one and the same thing” (10–11). Thus, Honig declares the 
speech to be allegorical; however, he resists calling it an allegory because he 
reserves that term for “the full-length, inclusively figurative work [i.e., Shake-
speare’s play] and [for] the literary type which comprises such works” (11).
 Honig treats the allegorical speech in Coriolanus as if he were adopting 
the kind of rhetorical approach I am advocating. Immediately after stipu-
lating that his work will focus only on the genre of full-length allegorical 
narratives, he notes that “Menenius’ speech shows how an allegorical trope 
extends itself and, further, how it serves as a guiding motif in a longer work” 
(11). This speech, he continues, “[exerts] a . . . pressure of figurative prede-
termination” in the context of the entire play (12). But this is all that Honig 
has to say on the subject of this embedded allegory, and I believe the concept 
deserves fuller treatment. In examining other examples of embedded allego-
ries we will see that a rhetorical approach can help to explain that “pressure 
of figurative predetermination” in the cases where such pressure does exert 
itself, but it will also allow us to recognize that not all embedded allegories 
do function within the primary narrative in the way that Honig’s claims 
imply that they do.
 When we shift our discussion from allegory as narrative to allegory in 
narrative, we must look at allegory in a very different way; embedded allego-
ries are themselves textual phenomena, part of the feedback loop of interpre-
tation. My aim in this chapter is to document the various kinds of embedded 
allegories and to explore the range of rhetorical impact that each produces, 
both on the reader and within the context of the primary narratives in which 
 1. In Gérard Genette’s terms, such an embedded narrative would be a metanarrative (“a 
narrative within the narrative”) that constitutes a metadiegesis (“the universe of this second 
narrative”) (228). As I find Genette’s use of “meta” to be somewhat misleading, however, I will 
simply use the term “embedded” in the discussion to follow.
 2. This concept of an “ideal” is central to Honig’s understanding of allegory. Indeed, he 
characterizes the allegorical genre as one that “refers to many different works that engage an 
ideal encompassing the problematic nature of human existence” (14).
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they are framed. I identify three varieties of embedded allegories. For the 
first two, I fall back on the grammatical terms “independent” and “depen-
dent” as classificatory aids. As with clauses in a sentence, independent and 
dependent here distinguish elements that can and cannot exist alone. Thus, 
an independent embedded allegory is conceivable as a separate narrative, one 
that could exist autonomously, while a dependent embedded allegory cannot 
function without the structure in which it is embedded. I call the third type 
of embedded allegory “interdependent,” a designation that refers to an inter-
textual figural narrative, one that an author borrows from another author and 
embeds in his or her own story. These embedded allegories are changed and 
often reinvigorated in their new narrative surroundings, but they also remain 
tied to—and to some extent defined by—their original context.3
 There is some overlap between what I am calling embedded allegories 
and the phenomenon that has come to be called mise-en-abyme, a term 
generally credited to André Gide that derives from ancient heraldry and 
that refers, in literature, to the instances in which some smaller part of a 
larger work reflects that larger work. Lucien Dällenbach, whose The Mirror 
in the Text stands as the most comprehensive work on this topic, defines 
mise-en-abyme as “any aspect enclosed within a work that shows a similarity 
with the work that contains it” (8, emphasis in original).4 In the examples 
of embedded allegories below, we will find instances that meet the criteria 
necessary to be labeled en abyme; this will be most apparent in my sections 
on independent and dependent embedded allegories.
 Despite the affinities between several of my categories and examples of 
embedded allegory and mise-en-abyme, I do not want to adopt this term—
which, as McHale notes, “is not a very felicitous [one]” (189)—for my work 
on allegory because it describes what seems to me to be considered a largely 
monolithic narrative phenomenon. The term mise-en-abyme, in other 
words, does not currently allow for different kinds of embedded narratives, 
or at least for the different kinds of embedded narratives that I have identi-
fied. Dällenbach does devote a short chapter to different types of mise-en- 
abyme (chapter 8, “The Emergence of Types”), but I do not find his categories 
 3. For the most complete general discussion of the concept of embedded narratives, see 
William Nelles’s Frameworks: Narrative Levels and Embedded Narrative. Nelles’s work is very 
helpful from a descriptive standpoint.
 4. Other critics have modified this definition. Moshe Ron, for example, claims that “Any 
diegetic segment which resembles the work where it occurs, is said to be placed en abyme” 
(436). Brian McHale identifies two criteria that characterize the phenomenon: “First, there must 
be a demonstratable relation of analogy . . . between the part en abyme and the whole, or some 
substantial aspect of the whole. . . . [And] the part en abyme must be inset one or more levels 
‘down’ or ‘in’ the primary world” (190). Whatever the specific definition, critics are in general 
agreement that the embedded piece must somehow reflect or mirror the larger narrative in 
which it is placed.
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conducive to the sort of rhetorical analysis to which I am committed because 
his categories depend on “the degree of analogy between the ‘mise-en-abyme’ 
and the object it reflects [typically the larger narrative]” (110, emphasis in 
original). I have found, on the other hand, that I need to subdivide the con-
cept of embedded allegory according to the nature of its relationship to the 
embedding narrative. This method of distinguishing types of embedded nar-
ratives better enables me to describe the rhetorical impact of the different 
types of embedded allegorical narratives that I have identified.
 A rhetorical approach to the phenomenon of narrative embedding—a 
broad category that would include both mise-en-abyme and embedded alle-
gory—might add an important dimension to our understanding of this nar-
ratological category. The adjectives “dependent,” “independent,” and “inter-
dependent” that I employ below might ultimately prove not just to be helpful 
in analyzing embedded allegories but also to be relevant and useful in the 
future theorizing about mise-en-abyme. At the same time, I do recognize 
that the work that has been done on this phenomenon can augment my own 
theoretical enterprise, and I will indicate below the various points at which 
I see my ideas intersecting with those that have been put forth in the service 
of developing a theory of mise-en-abyme.5
Independent Embedded Allegory: Achebe and Kafka
As Edwin Honig rightly claims, an allegorical tale that has been embedded 
in a larger narrative tends to exert an appreciable hermeneutic force on both 
the reader and the text; this is what he calls the “pressure of prefigurative 
determination.” There might be a natural tendency on the part of readers to 
be influenced by this pressure because it facilitates a complementary rela-
tionship between the embedded narrative and the primary narrative. Such 
a relationship undoubtedly has a certain hermeneutic appeal, the appeal 
of finding the meaning of the entire narrative packaged neatly in a met-
onymic allegorical interlude. This is an expectation, I suspect, that has been 
reinforced—if not fostered—by the way in which critics have tended to talk 
about mise-en-abyme. Dällenbach proclaims, for example, that “its essential 
property is that it brings out the meaning and form of the work” (8),6 and 
two of the three “dimensions of modeling” that McHale identifies take us in a 
similar direction—toward using the embedded narrative as a way of making 
 5. I am grateful to Brian McHale, who initially pointed out the convergence of my theory 
of embedded allegories with the idea of mise-en-abyme.
 6. Ron lists this claim as one of his “Nine Problems in the Theory of Mise-en-Abyme” and 
asks some penetrating questions regarding it, including, “what if it fails [to do so]?” (419).
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sense of the larger text. We can see the lure of this approach by examining the 
effect produced by such an embedded narrative in two well-known novels, 
Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart and Franz Kafka’s The Trial.
■
Achebe’s novel focuses on an Igbo man named Okonkwo whose per-
sonal story intersects with the beginning of European colonial expansion 
into Africa and, more specifically in this case, Nigeria. In Achebe’s narra-
tive, Okonkwo’s personal trajectory is downward. He begins as a respected 
member of his village and the surrounding region, a man whose “fame 
rested on solid personal achievements” (3). As the novel progresses, how-
ever, Okonkwo struggles with some personal demons (issues with his dead 
father and with a son of whom he does not entirely approve) as well as with 
the changes occurring within his tribe and his culture as the twentieth cen-
tury draws near. At the midpoint of the story Okonkwo inadvertently shoots 
and kills a fellow clan member and, as punishment, accepts exile for a period 
of seven years from his village. He relocates, with his family, to his mother’s 
village to serve out his sentence.
 When Okonkwo finally returns to his own village, he recognizes that both 
it and his position in it have changed during his seven-year absence. Person-
ally, he has lost his place as one of the traditional “nine masked spirits who 
administered justice in the clan” and the respect that would have allowed 
him “to lead his warlike clan against the new religion, which, he was told, 
had gained ground” (171). That new religion, of course, explains the changes 
in the village itself; the Christian missionaries have made inroads, attracted 
followers (including Okonkwo’s son), and brought with them a government 
and their own system of justice. Okonkwo is eventually arrested and impris-
oned for his part in destroying a Christian church. His detainment and his 
treatment at the hands of the interlopers serve to increase his anger and, after 
his release, he exacts his revenge by killing a messenger who has come on 
behalf of the white men to break up a meeting of the clan. When the district 
commissioner arrives with a small group of his men to arrest Okonkwo, we 
learn that he (Okonkwo) has committed suicide by hanging himself.
 Okonkwo is generally seen as a tragic figure, a good—though certainly 
not perfect—man who proves incapable of dealing effectively with his 
changing situation. In this regard, he also seems to represent the Igbo society 
more generally. As Arlene Elder argues, even more than being an inter-
esting individual character, Okonkwo has a “larger symbolic function in the 
novel as representative of the suicidal fragmentation of Igbo society” (64). 
This fragmentation and its potentially devastating results are thematically 
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central to Achebe’s novel. Summing up the problem as the narrative draws 
to a close, Okonkwo’s friend Obierika laments the insidiousness of the white 
man’s presence among the Igbo as he rebuts Okonkwo’s argument in favor 
of fighting: “How do you think we can fight when our own brothers have 
turned against us? The white man is very clever. He came quietly and peace-
ably with his religion. We were amused at his foolishness and allowed him 
to stay. Now he has won our brothers, and our clan can no longer act like 
one. He has put a knife on the things that held us together and we have fallen 
apart” (176). Since no clear consensus on how—or even whether—to combat 
the colonizers emerges from the clan members, Okonkwo decides to act 
individually if necessary, a decision that leads to his tragic ending.
 As is the case with most good tragedies, a certain amount of ambiguity 
survives the narrative’s end, even if the protagonist does not. Could the out-
come have been different for Okonkwo and his people? How could the Igbo 
have prevented the fragmentation of their society that seems to have opened 
the door to the missionaries? Given the presence of these white men, how 
could the native peoples most effectively resist them? Achebe offers no clear 
answers to any of these questions, and from that silence springs the ambi-
guity. Yet perhaps because we are dealing with a text that involves political 
issues of colonialism by an African writer, readers tend to assume that Achebe 
must be trying to make some political point (it is difficult to imagine that he 
intended for Things Fall Apart to be “simply” the mimetic representation of 
the existence of one fictional character at a given historical moment); there-
fore, we look either to transcend the ambiguity through allegorical interpre-
tation (what is ambiguous on the literal level might clearly signify on the 
allegorical) or to weave the ambiguity into an allegorical interpretation, as 
some critics do with the weakly allegorical Kafka. If Achebe is trying to make 
some larger point, but has not overtly told us what that point is, then many 
readers will find themselves tempted to view the work as an allegory.
 One way to arrive at an (allegorical) interpretation of the entire narra-
tive is to extrapolate from one’s interpretation of an embedded narrative. In 
Things Fall Apart we find an independent embedded tale that has the poten-
tial to be revealing. Ekwefi, one of Okonkwo’s wives, relates the fable of “The 
Tortoise and the Birds” during an evening in which each of Okonkwo’s wives 
and their children tell folktales. In this tale, the birds are preparing to attend 
a feast in the sky during a time otherwise marked by famine. Tortoise, who 
has “not eaten a good meal for two moons” (96), notices the preparations 
and devises a way to get himself included. He convinces the skeptical but 
good-hearted birds that he has reformed from his days of cunning and mis-
chief, and they each give him a feather out of which he fashions two wings. 
Prior to the feast, Tortoise, who is obviously a skilled orator, is selected to be 
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the spokesman for the group, and he convinces the birds that custom dic-
tates that each of them take a new name for such a special occasion. Tortoise 
takes for himself the name All of you.
 When the group arrives at the feast, Tortoise asks the hosts for whom they 
have prepared the repast, and the reply is “For all of you” (98). Reminding 
the birds that this is his name, Tortoise eats first, leaving only the scraps that 
he has thrown on the floor for the others. The angry birds retaliate by repos-
sessing the feathers they had “lent” him, leaving Tortoise “in his hard shell 
full of blood and wine but without any wings to fly home” (99). Trying to 
figure a way out of his predicament, Tortoise asks the birds to take a message 
to his wife. Each predictably refuses until Parrot, “who had felt more angry 
than the others, suddenly changed his mind and agreed to take the message” 
(99). Tortoise wants Parrot to tell his wife to construct a landing pad of soft 
material from their house, but Parrot instead tells her to bring out all of their 
hard items, which she does. The list includes “hoes, machetes, spears, guns, 
and even [Tortoise’s] cannon” (99). Unable to discern from above the nature 
of his landing site, and trusting that Parrot has delivered the message he 
intended, Tortoise jumps. He survives, but shatters his shell, which is pieced 
back together by the neighborhood medicine man.
 The story is a traditional tale that purports to explain “why Tortoise’s 
shell is not smooth” (99). As such, this fable falls into the category of strong 
allegory; it transforms a phenomenon of the natural world (the appearance 
of the tortoise’s shell) into a highly figurative narrative for an explanatory 
purpose. This embedded allegorical story is also an independent one because 
it can stand on its own as a narrative, and indeed has its own history as a 
fable in African culture.
 But, as Barbara Harlow asserts, “In the context of Things Fall Apart, the 
traditional fable of the tortoise and the birds represents more than indig-
enous folk wisdom and its interpretation of the natural phenomena of the 
village world” (74). 
 According to Harlow, Achebe’s novel is
an analysis of the colonial moment in African, Nigerian, and Igbo history 
in which the traditional folktale of the tortoise and the birds is recoded as 
an allegory of resistance. In such an allegory, Tortoise represents colonial 
power. The birds, who are his victims, signify the colonized population that 
remains subject to manipulation until it learns to command the weapons 
the colonizers have used against it: words, machetes, spears, and a can-
non. The folk wisdom of the animal fable reveals a political message: both 
rhetoric and armed struggle are crucial to an oppressed people’s organized 
resistance to domination. (75)
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Although Harlow’s allegorical interpretation does not work in every detail,7 
her general claim that the meaning of the embedded narrative changes when 
it is viewed in relation to a primary narrative seems to me to be a valid one.8 
This change itself, however, is less interesting—after all, arguing that context 
can affect interpretation is not exactly a radical claim—than the fact that 
the allegorical status of the embedded narrative produces such a strong rhe-
torical impact; the embedded allegory in Achebe’s novel can determine the 
interpretation of the entire narrative.
 This effect in Things Fall Apart is so pronounced because Achebe has 
clearly set off the allegorical tale from the main story. The action of Achebe’s 
primary narrative is interrupted, the fable is presented entirely and without 
comment regarding its potential connection to that primary narrative, 
and the primary narrative resumes following a clearly marked end to the 
embedded story. The lack of any exegetical commentary from author, nar-
rator, or character that would tie the “why story” to the novel’s primary nar-
rative ensures that neither the ontology nor the meaning of the embedded 
narrative has changed simply as a result of its inclusion in the larger work.
 That is not to say, however, that Harlow is unjustified in claiming that the 
tale of the tortoise and the birds does take on new meaning in the context 
of Achebe’s novel. Nor is it to deny that Achebe seems to invite a partic-
ular (re)interpretation simply by including this particular fable, as opposed 
to some other. The agonistic relationship between the characters and the 
theme of retribution or revenge for a group that has been wronged both have 
 7. I say that the interpretation is not entirely convincing because it works only in the most 
general sense. One can accept, perhaps, that the tortoise and the birds might represent, respec-
tively, colonizer and colonized. And Harlow’s belief that “the birds’ refusal to provide [the tor-
toise with the help he needs to get back down], once they understand the conditions it entails, 
is . . . a radical critique of the continued cultural and economic dependency fostered by Europe’s 
‘underdevelopment’ of Africa” (78) seems plausible enough if we accept that the tortoise and the 
birds do in fact stand for Europe and Africa. Harlow’s claim that the birds use rhetoric against 
Tortoise, on the other hand, strikes me as dubious. Parrot does deceive Tortoise’s wife, but that 
requires no clever use of words, and certainly nothing approximating the rhetorical acumen 
that Tortoise demonstrates. Similarly, the claim that this fable somehow demonstrates that the 
birds have engaged in and embraced “armed struggle” as a means of resistance is not borne 
out by the embedded narrative itself. The birds never actually possess or employ the weapons 
mentioned; in fact, it is the Tortoise’s own wife who chooses to bring out the machetes, spears, 
guns, and so forth. Moreover, Ekwefi’s commentary at the end of the story points only to its 
explanatory powers—its ability to explain why the tortoise has a shell that is not smooth—and 
not to any lesson concerning the power dynamic that obtains between Tortoise and the birds, 
although we should note that this embedded allegory precedes the arrival of the missionaries 
in Achebe’s narrative.
 8. Jacques Derrida makes a similar claim regarding Kafka’s “Before the Law” parable, 
which I will discuss below. Outside the primary narrative of The Trial, Derrida states, the em-
bedded narrative becomes “another institution” (140).
embedded Allegory   •  87
obvious connections to a novel about colonial Africa. Nevertheless, the act 
of recoding the fable is left to the reader, and Harlow has recoded this par-
ticular one in order to make the embedded narrative complement what she 
believes Achebe is “really” trying to express through the primary narrative.
 In order to sustain a reading that makes the embedded allegory comple-
ment the primary narrative, Harlow must assume that both of these narra-
tives bear the mark of the author and are meant to work together to convey 
his rhetorical purpose. Despite the fact that the embedded narrative is char-
acterized by what Genette calls external focalization (the narrator simply 
re-presents the story that Ekwefi tells), Harlow refocuses it through what 
she imagines to be the point of view of the author.9 The assumption that 
the point of view must ultimately be the author’s is what we might call the 
assumption of an implied, fixed focalization, and it of course rests on certain 
assumptions about the implied author. If this assumption is plausible, then 
the embedded narrative can be made to stand in a synecdochical relation-
ship to the narrative in which it is embedded, thereby allowing the reader to 
obviate at least some of the latter’s ambiguity.
 In this regard, the embedded narrative that has been transformed from 
a fable that explains why the tortoise’s shell has the texture it has into an 
allegory about how best to resist colonial rule allows Harlow to transform 
the primary narrative from one that deals primarily with why Okonkwo falls 
into one that, like the embedded narrative, is about how to resist. For Harlow, 
in short, the embedded narrative has assumed the role of the master nar-
rative. In a claim that indicates the extent to which her allegorical reading 
of the embedded narrative has colored her interpretation of the primary 
narrative, Harlow states that “The final incidents of Okonkwo’s life and the 
resistant history of the other villagers reenact the fable of the tortoise and 
the birds” (78). In order to make this analogy work, however, Harlow has 
to claim that Okonkwo’s suicide at the end of Things Fall Apart “causes the 
people of Umuofia to debate their strategies of resistance to the colonizers’ 
increasing influence” (78). But we cannot validate this claim with any direct 
textual support. Indeed, Okonkwo’s suicide could be seen as a response to 
what he assumes is the clan’s decision not to resist. After he murders the 
 9. This might help to explain Harlow’s inaccurate claim that Okonkwo “dismisses the 
parrot’s story, which demands the overthrow both of inherited paradigms and of the colonial 
system, as a tale told by women” (76). In fact, there is no mention of Okonkwo’s reaction to 
this story, though it is true that he is dismissive of “women’s stories” generally. Harlow believes, 
however, that for Achebe, “Okonkwo’s personal failure represents the inadequacy of recalcitrant 
traditionalism in responding to the exigencies of the present or elaborating a vision of the fu-
ture” (76). If this is so, then Okonkwo’s rejection of the story as Harlow has allegorized it would 
make sense. There is, however, no textual basis for this assertion.
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messenger, Okonkwo, the narrator tells us, “knew that Umuofia would not 
go to war. He knew because they had let the other messengers escape. They 
had broken into tumult instead of action. He discerned fright in that tumult” 
(203). Although war is obviously not the only means of resistance, there 
is, Harlow’s claim notwithstanding, no mention of a discussion of possible 
alternatives in what remains of the narrative.
 When we draw on a case such as this one to reconsider allegory, we can 
see the utility of using the narrative and rhetorical frameworks that I have 
been advocating. As a textual phenomenon, an embedded allegorical narra-
tive strongly inclines readers toward allegorical interpretation more gener-
ally. In the case of Things Fall Apart, the allegorized interpretation of the 
embedded narrative can be extended to the primary narrative and can liter-
ally determine one’s interpretation of the entire text. To read the embedded 
fable as Barbara Harlow does also seems to be in keeping with the “Jameso-
nian” approach to narratives written from the perspective of the colonized. 
It can be difficult for readers to imagine that Achebe does not have some 
broader political aims in writing this novel, so when we combine our knowl-
edge of the historical context of the novel and its author with an allegorical 
fable such as the story of the tortoise and the birds, we wind up with signifi-
cant positive feedback for an allegorical interpretation. Ultimately, Achebe’s 
presentation of the fable allows for, perhaps even encourages—even if it 
does not completely validate—the recoding of the story in the manner that 
Harlow has chosen.10
 My own sense is that Harlow has granted the embedded allegory too 
much “prefigurative determination,” to go back to the phrase that Honig 
used in his discussion of Shakespeare. While the fable of the tortoise and 
the birds certainly alerts readers to allegorical potential, the other sources 
of “feedback” do not, in my opinion, fully justify Harlow’s strong figurative 
reading. Achebe himself and his narrative style are the two elements that 
most mitigate the allegorical potential introduced by the fable. Achebe does 
not actually advocate for anything in this novel, and his detached style of 
 10. Julian N. Wasserman’s essay “The Sphinx and the Rough Beast: Linguistic Struggle in 
Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart” indirectly opens up a second path to arrive at a similar alle-
gorical reading. Wasserman does not spend much time on the tale of the tortoise and the birds, 
but he does offer it as an example of the kind of “folk oratory” that characterizes Achebe’s novel 
(81). According to Wasserman, “linguistic etiquette among the Ibo, as with most oral cultures, 
is characterized by a verbal strategy of indirection rather than directness in speech. . . . Within 
Ibo speech, objects are not only called by names other than their own but subject matter is often 
introduced by seemingly irrelevant material” (80). If we accept this anthropological claim about 
the context from which the author of the novel emerged, then we might deduce that Achebe’s 
use of the tale is an indirect way of making the very point that Harlow claims for him; however, 
I am not inclined in this direction.
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narration conveys to me a mimeticism that contrasts sharply with an alle-
gorical novel. The embedded fable seems to me more likely to be a repre-
sentation of the kinds of stories that the Igbo people tell, and the contexts 
in which they tell them, than a figurative pronouncement from the author 
about how to resist colonial rule.
 At the same time, the fact that Harlow can see the relevance of this fable 
to the general political situation that obtained at the turn of the twentieth 
century in Nigeria can hardly be a coincidence. I suspect that Achebe does 
want his readers to see armed conflict and subterfuge as options, and thus 
to have the fable resonate with those readers—as it surely would have with 
Okonkwo, if he were inclined to listen to the stories that women told—but I 
am not convinced that Achebe’s purpose was to advocate a particular mode 
of resistance, and I do not find Things Fall Apart to be allegorical, despite the 
presence of an embedded allegorical narrative.
 My primary point here is that the kind of extension or extrapolation 
exhibited in the Harlow interpretation of the fable and its relationship to the 
narrative in which we encounter it might be a “natural” reaction of readers 
long accustomed to making this hermeneutic move. In fact, I contend that 
we have been conditioned to make such moves by our repeated exposure to 
texts that invite them and by the kind of interpretive work that has emerged 
from the study of mise-en-abyme. From Homer and the Homeric simile to 
the most thoroughly postmodern narratives, we repeatedly encounter texts 
in which extended metaphors, parables, fables, dreams, and the like, are 
unmistakably meant or are made to be representative of the larger, primary 
narrative, or both. As the example of Things Fall Apart illustrates, we are not 
always meant to make this interpretive move. Another of Kafka’s texts, on the 
other hand, will present us with an example of an embedded narrative that 
does speak for the larger narrative.
■
We encounter another well-known example of an embedded allegorical nar-
rative in Kafka’s The Trial, but before getting to the import of that embedded 
allegory we need to analyze the novel as a whole. This is a work, of course, 
with a famously disquieting first line: “Someone must have been telling lies 
about Joseph K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested 
one fine morning” (1). And the remainder of the narrative revolves around 
K.’s attempts to uncover why he has been arrested—even though his “arrest” 
does not stop him from going about his daily activities—and to navigate the 
bizarre and obscure legal system of the unnamed jurisdiction in which he 
lives. Of course, things do not end happily for K.; and as for the readers, we 
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are left in an interpretive predicament similar to the one we experience while 
reading The Metamorphosis.
 Like much of Kafka’s work, The Trial is an enigmatic novel, highly allu-
sive and inviting of thematic readings. As a result, Ingeborg Henel has 
claimed, “The question has repeatedly been raised whether we are dealing, in 
Kafka’s works, with allegories, with symbols, or with a special kind of myth” 
(40). While critics have yet to agree on a definitive answer to Henel’s ques-
tion, the fact that she lists the three possibilities that she does tells us much 
about Kafka’s reception. The three terms “allegory,” “symbol,” and “myth” all 
point to narratives that are highly figurative and intensely thematic. My own 
reading locates The Trial in the realm of weak allegory, one of those works 
that transform some phenomenon “poorly” or distractedly, or with some or 
much irrelevance and indeterminacy, into a narrative structure. As we saw 
in my chapter on weak allegory, such narratives evoke allegory while at the 
same time withholding commitment to it and undermining confidence in it.
 A quick glance at a cross section of Kafka criticism leaves little room 
for doubt that his novels and stories do indeed evoke some kind of allegory. 
Critics such as Henel have long noted a quality in Kafka’s works that draws 
us toward an allegorical reading, or something approximating it. Henel her-
self concludes that “Kafka is far less a realist, a surrealist, or a purveyor of 
mere absurdities than he is an allegorist or symbolist” (40). Edwin Muir—an 
influential figure in introducing Kafka to English-speaking readers through 
his translations—claims that Kafka’s evocation of allegory springs naturally 
from the kind of thinker he was. In Muir’s mind, Kafka was a “profound reli-
gious thinker” whose thoughts manifested themselves “in concrete images” 
(33). These allusive images, then, form the basis of his fiction. Thus, Muir 
contends that the author’s “semiallegorical stories are really the most simple 
and unaffected expression that could be found for his genius; not in the least 
a form of mystification, though to many people they must read somewhat 
like that. Given Kafka’s special kind of imagination and complete honesty in 
following it, something like this was inevitable, and there is no help for it” 
(34). Muir’s term “semiallegorical” might well convey the same phenomenon 
that I am trying to get at with “weak allegory.” Kafka’s concrete images tempt 
readers into a game of trying to figure out what, in the context of an entire 
narrative, they represent. What, in other words, is the big idea that Kafka 
wants to transform through his narrative? The fact that many (perhaps even 
most) readers find something allegorical in Kafka’s works combined with the 
lack of a definitive answer to the question of what his works are allegories 
of provides strong empirical evidence in support of the designation weak 
allegorist.
 When we turn to The Trial as a specific example, we see broad agreement 
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that this novel is on some level and to some degree allegorical. Heinz Politzer 
contends that “The novel is a parable” and that Kafka intended it to be “a 
simile of human existence” (173). It is fitting, therefore, that Politzer under-
stands Joseph K. as “an Everyman” (165). Kafka, according to Politzer, “has 
given him [K.] only as many of his own individual characteristics as were 
necessary to prevent the figure from dissolving into the mist of abstraction” 
(165). Likewise, Charles Osborne finds this novel to be “a huge, exhausting 
and tragic parable of the human condition . . . which can have only one out-
come” (76).11 Though they are both obviously correct in asserting that we all 
die, even if our deaths do not play out in the same ignominious way that K.’s 
does, Politzer and Osborne must share a rather gloomy outlook regarding 
the human condition if they want to maintain that K.’s experience is a repre-
sentative one.
 Other critics, however, offer some resistance to the idea that Kafka is fun-
damentally an allegorist, and this resistance bolsters my claim that Kafka’s 
narratives, including The Trial, present us not with strong allegories, but 
weak ones. Disagreement on the matter of whether what we are reading is 
an allegory or not reinforces the notion that a work has allegorical aspects 
but lacks the strength necessary to consolidate critical opinion. Ronald Gray 
gives voice to the allegorical skeptics in his critical biography, Franz Kafka:
The universal applicability some readers find [in The Trial] was not put 
there by Kafka. That most men undergo a trial is not a sufficiently close 
parallel to justify seeing in his novel a parable of the human condition. On 
the other hand, the false trial to which many submit at one time or another, 
substituting imagined guilt for real guilt, supplies enough affinities to give 
this novel a telling power. The rest of us do know what this trial of K.’s is; 
what is required is that we should not confuse it with a more generally 
significant one. (125)
 11. Osborne and Politzer take a very general approach in their interpretations, a fact that 
that I believe bolsters my claim that The Trial is a weak allegory. Arguing that this novel is a 
“parable of the human condition” makes the phenomenon transformed (the human condition) 
a very large one indeed. The fact that we cannot be more precise in identifying what it is that 
Kafka allegorizes indicates to me a certain weakness in the allegory itself. Osborne notes, inter-
estingly, that “Whether one understands [the phenomenon at the center of Kafka’s novel] as the 
gnawing away of a fatal disease, or as neurosis worsening into self-destructive psychosis, or as 
man struggling with his original sin, its poetic and emotional meaning is unaffected. What it 
says may well be conveyed in different ways by different words, but meaning lies beyond words, 
and the meaning of Kafka’s profound and gloomy creation is irrefutable” (76). I am not as sure 
as Osborne is that Kafka’s narrative produces such an obvious meaning, although it might do 
so if we could be certain that the author meant to transform the effects of a fatal disease, the 
deterioration of a neurotic man, or the modern effects of original sin into a fictional narrative. 
If we could do this irrefutably, then we would have a strong allegory.
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Kurt Fickert in Kafka’s Doubles likewise stands firm against the allegorical 
tide, but he also understands the temptation to allow it to sweep one away: 
“Equating guilt with a fall from grace or establishing it as the measure of 
man’s distance from God,” Fickert remarks, on the possibility of reading The 
Trial in the same way that we read Everyman or The Pilgrim’s Progress, “the 
interpreter of The Trial is free to conclude that Kafka is close to presenting 
an allegory about the sinful state of man, according to which Josef K. is an 
everyman and a pilgrim in search of grace” (56). But he also acknowledges 
other possibilities, recognizing that “Because of the novel’s open symbolism 
there are occasions for insisting, as does Osborne, on the viewpoint that 
Kafka has transcribed a nightmare or has written a case history about a 
victim of dementia praecox or tuberculosis” (59). Like Gray, Fickert pushes 
back against these allegorical approaches and argues for a tack that would 
work well with my conception of weak allegory: “In fact,” he concludes, 
“The Trial deserves to be read for what it suggests rather than for what it 
means . . .” (59). What it suggests, I would add, is allegory, but what exactly 
Kafka transforms through his narrative—what it “means”—remains some-
what obscure.
 But why does The Trial suggest allegory, and why do so many critics want 
to call it a parable? Unlike The Metamorphosis this narrative does not involve 
an insect with human consciousness, the kind of personification that usu-
ally functions as a clear marker of allegory. And why do so many critics see 
Joseph K. as a modern incarnation of Everyman? After all, despite Politzer’s 
claim that K. comes perilously close to “dissolving into the mist of abstrac-
tion” (165), he often looks surprisingly like a character whose mimetic quali-
ties predominate.12
 To answer some of the questions the novel raises about allegory, we can 
start with the plot, for The Trial’s plot contains elements that make the nar-
rative as a whole seem conducive to an allegorical interpretation. These ele-
ments include an arrest, an impending trial, a struggle with bureaucracy, 
and a death. In addition to being central components of the plot of Kafka’s 
novel, these elements also tend to appear with some frequency in what H. 
Porter Abbott calls masterplots, which he defines as “recurrent skeletal sto-
ries, belonging to cultures and individuals[,] that play a powerful role in 
questions of identity, values, and the understanding of life” (192). From 
the perspective of plot, then, The Trial appears to be a strong candidate to 
 12. For example, K. has a real job; he has particular relationships with women; we know 
exactly how old he is (thirty at the time of his arrest, thirty-one at the time of his death). We do 
not, it is true, have much in the way of detail regarding K.’s physical appearance, but this could 
be as much due to the fact that K. is the focalizer of the narrative as to any allegorical lack of 
specificity on Kafka’s part.
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be called “an allegory” because the events of the narrative correspond to a 
familiar, cultural, extradiegetic narrative.
 When we move beyond the rudimentary elements of the plot, however, 
and examine the progression of that plot, the case for calling The Trial a 
strong allegory becomes less convincing. Unlike Everyman, Kafka’s narrative 
does not develop in such a way as to reveal the phenomenon that the author 
seeks to transform through his narrative. In The Transformations of Allegory, 
Gay Clifford argues that the concept of the Law in The Trial is a symbol and 
that “K.’s involvement in the process of law” is an allegory (12). I contend, on 
the other hand, that the concept of the Law makes it seem as if K.’s involve-
ment with it should produce a strong allegory, but that it finally fails to do so. 
K.’s “arrest,” his subsequent appearances before the “court,” and his meetings 
with legal counsel do follow the general trajectory of an individual’s experi-
ence with the law, but, as we have seen in the varying interpretations of the 
text, we have no consensus that this experience is what Kafka intended to 
transform into an allegory.
 The allegorical difficulty with The Trial is exacerbated by issues of char-
acter. It is never entirely clear who K. is supposed to be or to represent, and 
this makes it difficult to derive a satisfactory secondary narrative from the 
literal one that Kafka has provided. Abbott argues that “A masterplot comes 
equipped with [character] types” (45). This is indeed often the case with 
what I call strong allegories, but not so for weak ones. K., for example, does 
not seem to fit any particular type. Nor, as I argued above, does he seem to 
be something like an “Everyman”; he is too idiosyncratic—with his distin-
guishing sexual “issues” and slightly abrasive personality—to be a character 
that readers are likely to accept as a symbol for all of Western society. On 
the other hand, if we take K. to be a representation of the author himself 
(which would at least partly explain and justify the idiosyncrasies), then we 
are left with a kind of psychological (persecution) narrative that falls short 
of “allegory” in the way that we usually think of that term.
 In The Trial we confront a novel that suggests allegory but frustrates alle-
goresis. We have allegorical images, to use Frye’s terminology, but they never 
coalesce into a coherent narrative that makes clear what has been trans-
formed. One can, I think, legitimately claim that Kafka’s protagonist finds his 
experience with the law confusing and frustrating and that he finds life in a 
bureau-technocratic society perplexing, senseless, and dehumanizing. Simi-
larly, we might legitimately make the same claims about our lived reality. The 
simple fact of that correspondence, however, does not make Kafka’s narrative 
a strong allegory. At the end of The Trial we are left, just as we are at the end 
of The Metamorphosis, with a weak allegory, and this weakness can be trou-
bling to readers precisely because we want to know with some certainty what 
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phenomenon Kafka intends to transform through his figural narrative. Just 
as we often use narratives to make sense of our worlds and our lives, so too 
do we use narratives—often the secondary phenomena transformed through 
allegory—to make sense of other narratives.
 This issue of the use of narratives to comment on other narratives brings 
me to what I consider to be the piece of textual evidence in Kafka’s novel that 
does the most to convince other readers that this work is a strong allegory—
a famous short parable known as “Before the Law” embedded in the novel. 
The “Before the Law” section of The Trial has all the trappings of traditional 
allegory: it is narrative, and its use of concepts such as the Law and tradition-
ally symbolic images such as doorways and doorkeepers make it obviously 
suggestive of meanings beyond the literal.13 Furthermore, the allegorical 
passage is followed by interpretive commentary that seeks to resolve the 
strangeness and ambiguity of the embedded narrative.14 The narrative itself 
is simple and in keeping, thematically, with the primary narrative of Kafka’s 
novel: a man seeks admittance to the Law, but a doorkeeper informs him 
that he cannot enter “at this moment” (213). The man, hoping eventually 
to gain access to the Law, waits for years, occasionally trying to bribe the 
doorkeeper, but in vain. Finally, as death closes in, the man asks the door-
keeper why no one else, during all the time he has been waiting, has tried 
to gain entry to the Law. The doorkeeper responds, chillingly: “No one but 
you could gain admittance through this door, since this door was intended 
for you. I am now going to shut it” (214–15). Following the story, K. and the 
priest who relates the parable-like tale engage in a discussion concerning its 
ultimate meaning.
 Not surprisingly, given his own difficulties negotiating the labyrinthine 
legal system that has forced him to defend himself against unspecified 
charges, K.’s initial response is to believe that the man has been deceived 
by the doorkeeper. The priest, on the other hand, offers an academically 
informed history of the various interpretations of “commentators,” a history 
of often contradictory readings that stand in stark contrast to K.’s “hasty” 
judgment. The end result of the priest’s lengthy exegetical survey is K.’s confu-
sion and exasperation: “He was too tired to survey all the conclusions arising 
 13. Prior to the novel’s appearance—which occurred only after Kafka’s death—the author 
extracted “Before the Law” and published it separately as a piece of short fiction in the collec-
tion titled A Country Doctor.
 14. In The Transformations of Allegory, Gay Clifford suggests that a certain sense of strange-
ness is central to allegory. The strangeness of allegories often “derives not from exoticism, but 
from the fact that they are so neutral, so indefinite, and yet immediately suggest that they mean 
something important” (2). I find this an apt description of the feeling one gets from reading the 
“Before the Law” section of The Trial.
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from the story, and the trains of thought into which it was leading him were 
unfamiliar. . . . The simple story had lost its clear outline, he wanted to put it 
out of his mind . . .” (220–21).
 In this case, the embedded narrative has a clear connection to the larger 
narrative of the novel; indeed, the two story-worlds present some striking 
similarities, including, most obviously, a protagonist struggling to gain 
access to—or at least some understanding of—a vague and confusing entity 
called the Law. The strong connection between the two narratives has made 
this a very common example in works on mise-en-abyme. A second, no less 
important similarity is an ultimate sense of indeterminacy, a failure to find 
conclusive meaning in a narrative that invites us to search for it at every turn. 
In the case of The Trial and its embedded allegory, therefore, the embedded 
allegory has a complementary relationship with the primary narrative; the 
diegesis of the embedded narrative synecdochically represents the main die-
gesis.15 This is the type of relationship that Edwin Honig examines in Dark 
Conceit, and he finds such embedded allegories significant primarily because 
they demonstrate how “an allegorical trope extends itself and, further, how 
it serves as a guiding motif in a longer work” (11). In terms of their effect 
on the primary narrative, Honig finds, as we have seen, that the embedded 
allegories “exert a . . . pressure of figurative predetermination” (12). In other 
words, the message carried in a part of the narrative corresponds with the 
meaning of the entire narrative.
 How do we explain, on narratological grounds, this correspondence? 
There are several contributing factors. First, as I have already indicated, the 
two diegeses share the same thematic content—the inaccessibility of the 
Law. Second, the essential plot structure of the two narratives is similar: a 
relatively benighted man seeking something (access, knowledge, redemp-
tion) is frustrated by an impenetrable and inscrutable “system” and dies with 
his desire unfulfilled.16 Third, and I think this might be the most crucial 
point, the primary narrative and the embedded allegorical narrative are 
both filtered through the same third-person heterodiegetic narrator. And 
although the story of the man from the country and his struggle to cross the 
threshold of the Law is related by the priest, Kafka’s narrator provides only 
the direct speech of this figure, denying the reader any access to his thoughts. 
 15. Heinz Politzer has argued that “the parable serves as a symbolic master plan for the 
novel as such. The initial situation of the novel is repeated here; this time it is couched in the 
form of an intellectual exercise, rather than as a part of the plot. K. loses out both here and 
there” (180).
 16. The two plots are not, however, identical. One significant difference is that K. is forced 
to confront the Law because of his arrest, while the allegorical protagonist’s motivation is unex-
plained.
96  •   Chapter 3
As a result, the focalization remains fixed and internal. The reader, in other 
words, is still closely aligned with K. and has access only to his thoughts and 
feelings. We know, for example, that K. is tired by the end of his exegetical 
discussion with the priest and that “he wanted to put [the story] out of his 
mind” (emphasis added). As far as the priest is concerned, we never know 
with any certainty what he is thinking, only what he says.
 The closest we come to the priest’s internal consciousness is the nar-
rator’s claim that the priest, in allowing K. to stop talking and thinking 
about the allegorical story, has shown “great delicacy of feeling . . . although 
undoubtedly he did not agree with” K.’s decision to do so (221). (The original 
German tells us that the priest “mit seiner eigenen Meinung gewiß nicht 
übereinstimmte” [188].) The “undoubtedly” (gewiß) here indicates the sup-
positional quality of the claim; given the circumstances and what the Priest 
has already said, the narrator seems to be saying, one can only assume that 
he would disagree with K. in this instance. Ironically, a word that is meant 
to convey certainty functions, in this case, as a means for marking a guess 
or supposition. More importantly, however, it maintains the integrity of the 
internal focalization that characterizes Kafka’s text and that contributes to 
the complementary relationship that obtains between the primary and the 
embedded narratives.
 The importance of maintaining the internal focalization of the narra-
tive becomes even more evident when we learn, at the end of the chapter in 
which we find the allegorical embedded narrative, that the priest is actually 
the prison chaplain (Gefängniskaplan), a fact whose significance is implicitly 
underscored by his own interpretation: “‘That means I belong to the Court,’ 
said the priest” (222). Both K. and the reader might logically assume that the 
priest, as a part of the legal system to which K. is trying to gain access, pos-
sesses potentially helpful information, information that, if he does indeed 
have it, he withholds. This puts the priest in the role of the doorkeeper, which 
gives added significance to the final—as in last, not definitive—interpreta-
tion of the allegory that he puts before K. The priest claims, ultimately, that 
the doorkeeper may be “incomparably greater than anyone at large in the 
world. The man is only seeking the Law, the doorkeeper is already attached 
to it. It is the Law that has placed him at his post; to doubt his dignity is to 
doubt the Law itself ” (220).
 Honig’s approach of treating the embedded narrative as a synecdoche for 
the primary narrative works relatively well with Kafka, and with The Trial 
in particular, because the embedded allegorical narrative potentially bears 
out Honig’s claim that Kafka is putting on trial, figuratively speaking, the 
reality experienced by his heroes. “[It] is this world that is on trial,” Honig 
writes, “with its superstitious worship of bureaucracy and its inert irratio-
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nality which the hero attempts to understand; but its nature is inexorably to 
defeat him just when he is about to receive some revelation that would have 
done him no good even if he had succeeded in receiving it” (162). Such an 
interpretation is certainly plausible both for the “Before the Law” section of 
The Trial and for the novel as a whole.
 But as we have seen, there are other, contrariwise, interpretations of both 
the novel and the parable. Ingeborg Henel, for example, shares the view that 
the parable rightly determines how one should read the novel, but she arrives 
at a dramatically different interpretation of both. She rejects outright Honig’s 
claim that Kafka’s novel has something to say about his “world,” arguing 
instead that
Kafka is . . . far removed from a critique of his age or his society. After Josef 
K., at his first interrogation, has concluded his speech of accusation against 
the court, the Examining Magistrate points out to him that he has, with his 
speeches, deprived himself of the advantage of a first examination: Instead 
of exploring his inner self, he has criticized the external world. K.’s accusing 
words constitute, then, not a valid criticism of the authorities, but a cover-
up of his own guilt. . . . (49)
In Henel’s reading, this novel—and, indeed, all of Kafka’s work—emerges 
from the author’s attempts to deal with his personal feelings of guilt, and 
readers who fail to recognize this, Henel argues, will miss the point of his 
fiction entirely:
In contrast to most confessional novels, Kafka’s works are neither the apo-
logia of the hero nor that of the author, but rather a judgment on himself. 
This demands a new attitude from the reader. He must not naively identify 
with the hero, as Josef K. identifies with the man from the country; for then 
he falls into the further error of Josef K. (into which in fact many readers 
and critics repeatedly do fall) of indicating the negativity, absurdity, and 
devilishness of the world, instead of “endorsing the world” and carrying 
out the judgment on oneself, as Kafka insists. (54)
 To say, however, that Kafka “insists” on such a reading surely over-
states the case. Granted, Henel supports her claim with reference to some 
relevant passages from Kafka’s diaries and from his other works of fiction, 
but the “Before the Law” parable stands as her primary piece of evidence; 
this “legend,” she contends, “becomes the key to the novel” (54), and so 
her reading of the parable will determine her reading of the narrative writ 
large. Her explication of the novel and the parable’s significance in it is in 
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many ways a brilliant one, but its brilliance does not make it determinant. 
We would be well advised to keep in mind Henel’s comments regarding 
the presentation of the parable through the priest as we consider her own 
exegeses of it: “As in the Bible, Kafka has the exposition follow the parable. 
But his explanations do not have the same status as Jesus’ interpretations of 
his parables: They are mere learned exegeses, and thus lacking in authority, 
ambiguous, and even contradictory. Hence they must be understood, not as 
absolutely valid statements, but rather as experimental attempts to lead the 
listener, through assertion and counter-assertion, to an independent judg-
ment” (41–42).
 The parable itself, because it is a weak allegory and thus inherently inde-
terminate, naturally produces readings that might themselves be ambiguous 
and even contradictory. This is the case not only in the text, as the priest 
relates different interpretations of the legend, but also outside of the text, 
as different critics of Kafka’s novel arrive at different conclusions about the 
meaning of the parable. As I proposed in my earlier discussion of The Meta-
morphosis, I doubt that Kafka wanted to provide us with an interpretive 
“key”; the entire trajectory of the novel tends toward confusion and ambi-
guity. The net effect of Kafka’s embedding in The Trial a weak allegory that 
shares so many structural and thematic similarities with the larger narrative 
is to encourage readers to see it as a kind of synecdoche for the novel as a 
whole, and thus to read the novel as an allegory. Like the embedded allegory, 
the embedding allegory turns out to be a weak one, and this is, I suspect, as 
Kafka intended it.
 In cases such as this one the presence of an (obvious) independent alle-
gorical narrative—even if it is a weak one—as a textual phenomenon within 
the primary narrative seems to function as an interpretive clue pointing 
the reader toward the conclusion that the entire work must be allegorical, 
and that its deeper meaning must be related to the allegorical meaning con-
veyed through the embedded narrative; this is precisely the dynamic that, 
according to critics who focus on the mise-en-abyme, often obtains when 
the larger narrative is “reflected” in the embedded narrative. Henel takes this 
one step further, proposing that we can use Kafka’s parables as a kind of key 
to deciphering his corpus as a whole. “On the basis of his short parables,” 
she argues, and these parables of course include “Before the Law,” “which 
at least stylistically present no puzzles, it should thus be easier to gain an 
understanding of the images of Kafka’s world” (40). The temptation to see 
the relationship between an embedded allegory and its host narrative in this 
light is indeed strong, but even if we follow this interpretive path, we end up 
at a point of profound uncertainty regarding the meaning of Kafka’s parable 
and the text in which he has embedded it.
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 Recalling Peter Rabinowitz’s claim in Before Reading that Kafka might 
well have been “consciously trying to confuse” in The Trial can help us to rec-
ognize the use-value of an embedded weak allegory for his purposes. Weak 
allegory holds out the general promise of significant meaning but withholds 
commitment to any particular interpretation, and this state of affairs suits 
Kafka perfectly. As Kafka’s perceptive biographer Reiner Stach attests, “Kafka 
points, but if we follow his finger with our gaze, a veil descends on the spot. 
His court [in The Trial] has a visible surface; what we see only refers to things 
that are both essential and unimaginable: ‘the supreme judges,’ ‘the law.’ The 
less we know, the more we speculate” (474). This combination of things both 
essential and unimaginable is characteristic of weak allegory, and the specu-
lation that the combination engenders speaks to its power.
 It is precisely this speculation without the promise of resolution that Kafka 
sought to wring from his readers, and that seems to have characterized his own 
state of mind throughout much of his life. “The more striking the semiotic 
phenomenon,” Stach continues, “the greater the obscurity that lurks behind 
it. Every detail says, ‘I mean something, but I am not saying what’” (475). This 
statement applies not only to details such as “the law” and “the judges,” but 
also to the textual phenomenon of the embedded allegory. The presence of 
this weak allegory incites heightened speculation from both the protagonist 
and the reader, but neither can solve the riddle that it presents. Kafka uses the 
embedded allegory as a means of allowing the reader to identify with the char-
acter’s hermeneutic plight, if not his legal one. Indeed, Kafka pushes us toward 
such identification by using the embedded narrative to put his protagonist 
in the position of the reader trying to make sense of an enigmatic text. Ulti-
mately, this rhetorical situation helps to underline Kafka’s primary rhetorical 
purpose—the creation of a text laden with “significant” semiotic and textual 
phenomena that refuses to yield any final, determinative meaning.
Dependent Embedded Allegory: Barth
At the other end of the rhetorical continuum I would place dependent 
embedded allegories. These I will classify as essentially mundane allegories 
situated within a larger narrative. I use the term “mundane” to connote a 
nontranscendent quality to these embedded allegories. In other words, 
unlike the other embedded allegories we have analyzed thus far, a dependent 
embedded allegory confines itself to the story-world of its host narrative; 
that is the sense in which it is mundane.
 This distinction offers another opportunity to point out the overlap 
between my conception of embedded allegories and some of the theoretical 
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work that has been done on mise-en-abyme. In his essay “En Abyme” Brian 
McHale makes a signal contribution to this area of study by pointing out the 
“cognitive potential of mise-en-abyme” (191), and he identifies “three dimen-
sions of modeling by mise-en-abyme,” each of which can contribute to the 
reader’s understanding of some entity (191). McHale analyzes “cases where 
mise-en-abyme yields knowledge of the text itself by modeling its form”; 
“cases where mise-en-abyme yields knowledge of how the reader engages 
with the text—in other words, where it models the reading process”; and 
cases where mise-en-abyme can yield knowledge of the extratextual world, 
serving to model or map that world cognitively” (191). While I would not 
want to delimit what my different conceptions of embedded allegory have 
the potential to do for readers, I do see some potential correspondence 
between McHale’s cognitive functions and my types of embedded allegories; 
dependent embedded allegories are likely to contribute to textual under-
standing, while independent and interdependent embedded allegories might 
tend more toward the transcendent. To delve further into these and related 
issues, I turn to John Barth and his first novel, The End of the Road.
■
The End of the Road chronicles approximately six months in the life of Jacob 
Horner, a thirty-year-old former graduate student in English literature who 
takes a job teaching grammar and composition at a Maryland teachers col-
lege at the suggestion of his therapist, who believes that the structure of 
a regular job will benefit his patient. Jacob serves as both the protagonist 
and the narrator of his story, a story that focuses on his relationship with 
Joe Morgan—a teaching colleague—and Joe’s wife, Rennie. The plot’s climax 
involves Jacob’s adulterous affair with Rennie; a pregnancy and unresolved 
questions concerning paternity; and, finally, Rennie’s death following a 
botched abortion.
 The catalyst of the plot is Jacob’s mental condition, one that leaves him 
occasionally “immobilized” as the result of a paralyzing realization that “there 
is no reason to do anything” (323). When this knowledge weighs too heavily 
on Jacob, he literally shuts down, as happens for the first time at Baltimore’s 
Pennsylvania Station. On his twenty-eighth birthday, Jacob, who has just 
completed his oral exams but has yet to begin his master’s thesis, checks out 
of his university-owned room with his bags packed and his mind made up to 
“take a trip somewhere” (322). He credits “simple birthday despondency” for 
the desire to leave, recounting that, at that instant, “I had no self-convincing 
reason for continuing for a moment longer to do any of the things that I hap-
pened to be doing with myself as of seven o’clock in the evening of March 16, 
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1951” (322). As a result, Jacob inquires of the ticket agent the furthest destina-
tions—by bus—to which his twenty dollars will grant him access. Informed 
that his choices are Cincinnati, Crestline, Dayton, or Lima, Ohio, Jacob retires 
to a bench to “make up [his] mind” (323). “And it was there,” he relates, “that 
I simply ran out of motives, as a car runs out of gas” (323).
 After spending the night immobilized on the bench, Jacob is finally 
roused by a doctor who serendipitously happens by and who will become 
his therapist. The doctor, an unnamed African American, operates a “Remo-
bilization Farm” where he employs what we might generously call uncon-
ventional methods of treatment on paralytic patients. These unsanctioned 
methods, combined with the doctor’s race, force him to maintain a low 
profile and to relocate his clinic with some regularity. Nevertheless, Jacob 
becomes a regular patient, and he clearly has some confidence in the doctor’s 
motives and abilities, even if he is not always comfortable with or confident 
in the means he employs. The novel opens with Jacob the narrator writing 
from one of the Remobilization Farm’s dormitories, looking back on the 
Jacob Horner who took the doctor’s advice about two years earlier to find 
a career, “a lifework” (257). As the Farm and the teachers college were in 
the same town at the time of Jacob’s initial treatment, the doctor suggests 
applying there, but he directs Jacob not to teach literature—the focus of his 
graduate studies—because, as a discipline, it lacks discipline. “There must be 
a rigid discipline,” the doctor advises, “or else it will be merely an occupation, 
not an occupational therapy” (259). The doctor finally settles on grammar, 
but insists on prescriptive rather than descriptive grammar: “No descrip-
tion at all. No optional situations. Teach the rules. Teach the truth about 
grammar” (259).
 The doctor’s insistence on prescription over description is intended to 
minimize Jacob’s exposure to situations in which no clear choices exist; 
this pertains to what he calls “Informational Therapy,” which relies on the 
premise that knowledge of the world can, in some cases, mitigate the need 
to make choices. The doctor illustrates his point by asking Jacob to think 
about how many people Cleveland’s Municipal Stadium seats: “If you don’t 
simply know how many people can sit in the Cleveland Municipal Stadium,” 
he explains, “you have no real reason for choosing one number over another, 
assuming you can make a choice at all.  .  .  . But if you have some Knowl-
edge of the World you may be able to say, ‘Seventy-seven thousand, seven 
hundred,’ just like that. No choice is involved” (330). Armed with enough 
information, Jacob just might be able to avoid his spells of choice-induced 
immobility.
 Avoiding situations that require choices, however, will not, the doctor 
indicates, solve Jacob’s problem, for, he explains, the inability to choose “is 
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only theoretically inherent in situations, when there’s no chooser. Given a 
particular chooser, it’s unthinkable” (331). In other words, steering clear of 
certain situations might allow Jacob to reduce the frequency of his symp-
toms, but it will not cure him. As the doctor explains, regarding Jacob’s 
first bout of paralysis, “the fault lies not in the situation but in the fact that 
there was no chooser. Choosing is existence: to the extent that you don’t 
choose, you don’t exist” (331). In Jacob’s case, the doctor wants to simplify 
the patient’s life, to reduce the number and the complexity of choices so 
that one, such as Jacob, who struggles to make them can still function as an 
agent. The overarching term for the treatment that Jacob’s doctor prescribes 
is “Mythotherapy.”
 “Mythotherapy,” according to the doctor’s description of it, is a combi-
nation of existentialist philosophy and pragmatist utility. It is, he explains, 
“based on two assumptions: that human existence precedes human essence, 
if either of the two terms really signifies anything; and that a man is free not 
only to choose his own essence but to change it at will. Those are both good 
existentialist premises,” the doctor tells Jacob, “and whether they’re true or 
false is of no concern to us—they’re useful in your case” (336). These prem-
ises are potentially useful to Jacob because the doctor has used them as the 
foundations of his Mythotherapy, which is a way of living a “fictionalized” 
version of one’s own life. One who practices Mythotherapy adopts a role for 
him or herself and allocates supporting roles to those with whom he or she 
comes into contact. When Jacob became immobilized at the bus terminal, 
the doctor hypothesizes, he was simply “no character at all” (338). The solu-
tion, then, is to convince and enable the patient to adopt any number of dif-
ferent life-scripts and to don the mask appropriate to that script. Knowing 
who he is supposed to be in any given situation and knowing where the plot 
of any particular script leads will allow Jacob to act in any given circum-
stance and allow him to function in society as if he had a viable self. The 
doctor believes that with Mythotherapy as a way of managing his personal 
life and teaching grammar as a way of grounding his professional life Jacob 
should manage to function—more or less effectively—in the world.
 As we have already seen, Jacob’s doctor posits making choices as an 
ontological necessity (“Choosing is existence: to the extent that you don’t 
choose, you don’t exist” [331]); Jacob’s difficulty in making choices, there-
fore, threatens him, at least according to the doctor, not only with immo-
bility but with annihilation as well. But the issue of choices is only part of a 
larger existential conundrum for Jacob, one that is signaled by the opening 
line of the narrative: “In a sense, I am Jacob Horner” (255).
 Jacob’s decision to hedge his bets as to his identity works, then, on two 
readily apparent levels: it is in keeping with a “character” that is inconsistent 
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and wholly unable to commit to much of anything, and it is in keeping with 
certain prevailing twentieth-century notions of identity and selfhood, which 
manifest themselves in character and in (literary) characters. For the most 
part, however, very few make the leap from the idea that we do not have 
a stable, immutable, and persistent self to the claim that we do not exist. 
Rather, we have learned to accept that words such as “self ” and “identity” 
work better metaphorically than literally; we cannot say that they denomi-
nate some “thing” precisely and unerringly, but we can be relatively certain 
that we know what tenor we intend to conjure when we utter our own names 
as vehicles. The End of the Road, however, presents Jacob with problems that 
transcend those related to identification, going so far as to call into question 
his actual existence.
 Fittingly, Barth provides Jacob with a dream that functions as an 
embedded allegorical narrative to illustrate his existential dilemma. As Jacob 
describes it, he once “had a dream in which it became a matter of some 
importance to me to learn the weather prediction for the following day” 
(286). In order to find the forecast he tries newspapers, the radio, the tele-
phone company’s weather number, and even the weather bureau itself, but 
without success. Finally, he calls the chief meteorologist at home, only to 
learn that “There isn’t going to be any weather tomorrow” (287). The con-
cept of weather in this short anecdote corresponds to what Jacob calls his 
“moods,” and he uses the strange dream narrative to demonstrate a short-
coming in the commonly employed weather–moods analogy as well as to 
illustrate what he recognizes to be a personal oddity: “a day without weather 
is unthinkable, but for me at least there were frequently days without any 
mood at all” (287). On these days without moods, he tells us, “Jacob Horner, 
except in a meaningless metabolistic sense, ceased to exist, for I was without 
a personality. Like those microscopic specimens that biologists must dye in 
order to make them visible at all, I had to be colored with some mood or 
other if there was to be a recognizable self to me” (287). As an intellectual, 
Jacob admits to being aware of the fact that his “successive and discontin-
uous selves were linked to one another by the two unstable threads of body 
and memory,” of the fact that “in the nature of Western languages the word 
change presupposes something upon which the changes operate,” and of the 
fact that just as the “dye is not the specimen,” neither is the mood the self 
(287). These facts, however, hold no interest for him; on his “weatherless 
days” he feels bereft of self.
 In the context of the novel, Jacob’s subconscious has transformed the 
phenomenon of his intermittent sense of existence into a meteorological 
narrative. What, then, should we make of Jacob’s dream, which functions as 
a dependent embedded allegory? We should begin by noting that the dream 
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itself has all of the markings of strong allegory. Jacob’s own exegesis makes 
it clear that he reads the dream as the transformation of the idiosyncratic 
role of moods in his life into a narrative in which “weather” represents those 
moods. The dream seems strange to Jacob and to us because it presents us 
with a bizarre possibility: a day without weather. And while Jacob claims 
that he uses this dream to illustrate a shortcoming in the weather–moods 
analogy, his explanation and interpretation indicate that the dream of a 
weatherless day corresponds exactly to an occasional state of his existence: 
a day without moods. Furthermore, we have no evidence to suggest that we 
readers should not accept this interpretation, thus effectively eliminating the 
possibility that Barth’s narrator speaks in a voice that would oppose his own 
authorial one.
 Despite its strength, however, this embedded allegory remains entirely 
dependent on the narrative that houses it. In other words, the dream helps 
us to understand Jacob, but it is not applicable to anything beyond him; 
this embedded allegory is primarily a tool of characterization. Unlike the 
“Before the Law” section of The Trial or the story of the tortoise and the 
birds in Things Fall Apart, Jacob’s dream does not offer the possibility of 
transcendence, the prospect of being transported beyond the confines of the 
narrative into another realm. Moreover, unlike these other two embedded 
narratives, the allegorical nature of Jacob’s dream depends on its context. 
Certainly, the metaphor of being “weatherless” makes sense outside of The 
End of the Road, but the dream narrative relies on the particular character 
established in the embedding story for its full allegorical effect. Kafka’s “the 
man from the country,” by way of contrast, can be interpreted as standing in 
for K., but the designation is sufficiently vague to apply to anyone. Indeed, 
the priest who relates the parable to K. makes it clear that the story predates 
K.’s own existence, appearing in “the writings that preface the Law” (213). 
And, moreover, Kafka actually published the parable as an autonomous 
short story. Thus, any attempt to equate K. and the frustrated figure in the 
parable becomes an exercise in finding correspondences ex post facto, as it 
were. In Barth’s story, on the other hand, the person in Jacob’s dream is—and 
can only really be—Jacob.
 Even if we interpret Jacob as a figural rather than as a mimetic char-
acter, as a number of critics have, then the embedded allegorical dream still 
lacks the hermeneutic import of the independent embedded allegories cited 
above. One could argue, for example, that Jacob and Joe are so simplified as 
to be little more than one-dimensional stand-ins for certain ideas or phil-
osophical positions. Jacquelyn Kegley, in fact, finds that “Barth makes no 
attempt to delineate characters. . . . The central characters, in fact, have stock 
and symbolic names: Jacob Horner, who sat in the corner and mindlessly 
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pulled out plums, and Joe Morgan, whose name probably alludes to J.  P. 
Morgan, the tough, energetic American financier” (116). If Kegley is correct 
in her assertion,17 then we might see the weather dream as way of ensuring 
that Jacob Horner represents the idea that Barth intends. In works such as 
The Pilgrim’s Progress, Everyman, and the Psychomachia, traditional strong 
allegorical narratives, the characters bear the names of particular qualities, 
and the fates of these characters are invariably determined by the relative 
merits of the qualities that give them their names. Thus, in Prudentius’s Psy-
chomachia, virtuous qualities including Faith, Modesty, and Patience engage 
their respective nemeses Idolatry, Voluptuousness, and Anger on a field of 
battle and ultimately defeat them.
 The very names they bear serve to overdetermine these characters; they 
are what they are, and never anything more or less. Moreover, these char-
acters are, by definition and by nature, static. In a strong allegory, Faith 
cannot naturally or mimetically become something other, and Idolatry 
cannot recognize the error of her ways and gain a measure of redemption.18 
This overdetermination, therefore, results in a feeling that the characters 
are underdeveloped, at least in comparison to those who inhabit the more 
mimetic fiction to which readers have grown accustomed. When Prudentius 
describes Faith, for example, each of her various aspects serves as a way to 
elaborate her most salient trait; the progressive revelation of character does 
add to our knowledge of that character, but it does so primarily by adding 
depth to our understanding of that central trait rather than adding breadth 
and complexity by revealing the character’s multiple traits. Thus, we learn 
that Faith moves toward her battle with Idolatry in “careless rustic dress, 
with shoulders bare, / With flowing locks and naked arms exposed; / For in 
her sudden zeal for new conflicts, / She takes no thought of weapons or of 
shield, / But trusting her stout heart and unclad limbs, / She risks the hazards 
of a savage fray” (22–27). That Faith does not feel compelled to gird herself 
in the customary way for battle attests to her faith, to the confidence that lies 
in her “stout heart.” We do not learn what Faith as a “person” is like here, 
but we do learn something about that quality that she represents and that 
ultimately (over)determines her.
 As S. Georgia Nugent argues in Allegory and Poetics: The Structure and 
 17. Kegley does not speak for all readers when she claims that Barth’s characters in this 
novel are essentially allegorical. Indeed, Bernard J. Paris contends that “often characters seem 
unrealistic simply because we do not comprehend their motivations and personalities” (81), and 
that, when read carefully we can see that, in this novel at least, Barth’s “characters are brilliant 
mimetic portraits” (64).
 18. That is not to say that change is impossible in allegory; however, this kind of change, 
when it does occur, usually happens through divine or magical intervention.
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Imagery of Prudentius’ “Psychomachia,” the representations of these char-
acters “becomes largely a matter of securing univocality” (17). In order to 
guarantee the unambiguous nature of his characters and what they repre-
sent, “Prudentius loads attributes on his allegorical warriors with a heavy 
hand. He understands that, in the rhetorical economy of allegory, it is only 
by such an excess of apparently anomalous—and therefore telling—detail 
that one can certify meaning” (17). Ultimately, the overdetermination of 
character allows Prudentius to ensure that his figures clearly and faithfully 
convey what he intends them to convey: “The careful orchestration of each 
adjective and verb to harmonize in one monochromatic whole enables Pru-
dentius to transform a state of mind into a condition of the body” (17).
 Seen from this perspective, the reader might construe Jacob’s dream as 
providing one of those “anomalous” and “telling” details of the character’s 
true identity. Even so, Barth’s embedded allegory reinforces our under-
standing of a character but does not fundamentally shape how we interpret 
the entire narrative. Dependent embedded allegories such as this one operate 
as aspects of some textual phenomenon (character, in this case) rather than 
as independent textual phenomena.
Interdependent Embedded Allegory: Barth and Coetzee
To this point I have been working with discrete examples of embedded 
allegories in respective texts. Fictional narratives, however, might well con-
tain multiple instances or several kinds of embedded allegorical narratives. 
Barth’s The End of the Road, in fact, employs both dependent embedded 
allegories and what I am calling interdependent embedded allegories. Inter-
dependent embedded allegories are intertextual figural narratives, ones that 
an author borrows from another author or another narrative and embeds 
in his or her own story.19 Given Barth’s interest in embedded narratives and 
 19. In her excellent work The Language of Allegory, Maureen Quilligan identifies a similar 
phenomenon that she calls a “pretext,” which she defines as “the source that always stands out-
side the narrative . . . ; the pretext is the text that the narrative comments on by reenacting, as 
well as the claim the narrative makes to be a fiction not built upon another text. The pretext thus 
names that slippery relationship between the source of the work and the work itself ” (97–98). 
Quilligan’s insights are valuable and clearly relevant to my own ideas. I have not adopted her ter-
minology, however, for two reasons. First, the term “interdependent” works better in conjunc-
tion with the two related terms—independent and dependent—that I am also putting forward. 
Second, Quilligan understands the pretext as being a pretext for another allegory. I submit that 
interdependent embedded allegories can be found in texts that are not themselves allegorical. 
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with literary history,20 we should not be surprised to find such a textual phe-
nomenon in his own narratives. So, we return to The End of the Road.
■
Armed with the doctor’s advice, the occasionally moodless Jacob submits a 
letter of application to be an instructor at the Wicomico State Teachers Col-
lege, and, following an interview, he is hired. At the interview, Jacob meets 
the college’s history teacher, Joe Morgan,
a tall, bespectacled, athletic young man, terribly energetic, with whom one 
was so clearly expected to be charmed, he was so bright, busy, and obvi-
ously on his way up, that one had one’s hands full simply trying to be civil 
to him, and realized at once that the invidious comparisons to oneself that 
he could not for the life of him help inviting would prevent one’s ever being 
really tranquil about the fact of his existence, to say nothing of becoming 
his friend. (268)
Despite the pessimistic nature of his first impression of him, Jacob does 
become friendly with Joe and with Joe’s wife, Rennie, as well; the relation-
ship among these three is the primary concern of Barth’s novel and Jacob’s 
narrative.
 The friendship begins auspiciously, with Jacob deciding after their first 
social engagement that he would have to revise his first impression of Joe, 
attesting that “it was clear in a very short time that if I remained in Wic-
omico we would be friends” (284). The characteristics that immediately 
appeal to Jacob are Joe’s intelligence, his deliberative nature, his analytical 
acumen, and his ability to live by his philosophy. That philosophy rests on 
classic twentieth-century antifoundationalism and the concomitant recogni-
tion of relativism, and contingency. “In my ethics,” Joe explains, “the most a 
man can ever do is be right from his own point of view” (296). The closest 
that Joe comes to holding an absolute, as Jacob points out to him, is his 
belief that one must always take others and their ideas seriously (296). And, 
indeed, Joe does adhere to this prescription; he works tirelessly to articulate 
his own position on any matter and to understand that of his interlocutor; 
in this regard, he displays intellectual strength and energy reminiscent of 
Socrates, strength and energy that one must have if one is to lead the kind of 
“examined life” that both men advocate. As Joe explains,
 20. See, for example, his “Tales Within Tales Within Tales.”
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the more sophisticated your ethics get, the stronger you have to be to stay 
afloat. And when you say good-by to objective values, you really have to 
flex your muscles and keep your eyes open, because you’re on your own. 
It takes energy: not just personal energy, but cultural energy, or you’re lost. 
Energy’s what makes the difference between American pragmatism and 
French existentialism—where else but in America could you have a cheer-
ful nihilism, for God’s sake? (298)
 Joe applies his philosophy not only to his own life, but to his marriage as 
well, and this results in an interpersonal dynamic that looks strange from the 
outside. “I’m not a man who needs to be married under any circumstances,” 
Joe explains to Jacob, “—in fact, under a lot of circumstances I couldn’t 
tolerate being married—and one of my conditions for preserving any rela-
tionship at all, but particularly a marriage relationship, would be that the 
parties involved be able to take each other seriously” (296). For Joe, taking 
people seriously entails both being able to “respect” them and “not making 
allowances” for them (296); he must be able to consider them his equals in 
all respects. Toward this end, Joe can justify having “popped [Rennie] one 
on the jaw” when she acted in such a way as to threaten his ability to take 
her seriously (297). His hitting her is, in his mind, a demonstration of his 
respect for her (treating her as an equal rather than as “merely” a woman) 
and his way of showing her that she has acted in way that he would interpret 
as being beneath her. The result of Joe’s application of his philosophy to his 
marriage is a wife who, as Jacob remarks, seems to be his own creation, a 
modern version of Pygmalion’s Galatea (283). Despite his professed belief 
that he can only ultimately be right from his own point of view, and that 
other points of view are potentially no less valid than his own, Joe proves 
unwilling to take seriously anyone who does not share his general perspec-
tive, anyone, in other words, who does not reason through things as he does. 
One would not necessarily have to arrive at the same conclusions, but the 
process itself is nonnegotiable. Recognizing this, Rennie felt compelled, early 
in her relationship with Joe, to effect radical changes in herself in order to 
meet his standards: “I think I completely erased myself,” she explains to Jake, 
“. . . right down to nothing, so I could start over. . . . I’d rather be a lousy Joe 
Morgan than a first-rate Rennie MacMahon” (311–12).
 Jacob, like most readers, I imagine, has some difficulty embracing Joe’s 
approach to his marriage, even if he can appreciate, in theory, the fact that 
Joe strives to live a life consistent with his principles and refuses to accept 
the intellectual laziness of others. As the novel progresses, Jacob becomes 
increasingly skeptical of Joe’s applied philosophy and Joe’s unrelenting seri-
ousness about it. As a result, Jacob begins to take Joe less and less seriously, 
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finally finding something “silly” about such a dogmatic adherence to a phi-
losophy—even if it is based on tenable principles—that leaves no room for 
irony or whimsy and that countenances no truck with social convention. 
Both Joe and Rennie recognize Jacob’s growing skepticism, and Rennie in 
particular finds it threatening: “What scares me,” she admits, “is that any-
body could grant all of Joe’s premises—our premises—understand them and 
grant them and then laugh at us” (314). Although she assumes that Joe is 
strong enough to withstand the threat that Jacob represents, she is scared by 
the prospect that someone could be astute enough to understand what she 
and Joe are doing and ultimately not take it—and them—seriously.
 Rennie’s fears ultimately manifest themselves in an embedded allegory, 
one that becomes central to our understanding of the novel from this point 
forward. Because Joe spends much of his free time working on his disserta-
tion (he teaches at the teachers college as an ABD [All But Dissertation]), 
he suggests that Rennie offer Jacob horseback riding lessons on her parents’ 
nearby land. During one of their rides, Rennie relates that she has either 
dreamed or imagined while daydreaming, “that for the last few weeks Joe 
had become friendly with the Devil, and was having fun arguing with him 
and playing tennis with him, to test his own strength” (317). Jacob obvi-
ously corresponds to the Devil in what Jacob rather patronizingly calls Ren-
nie’s “pretty conceit” (317), and Rennie has already made it clear that, even 
though she recognizes that Jacob will find it “ridiculous,” “[she] think[s] of 
Joe as [she’d] think of God. Even when he makes a mistake, his reasons for 
doing what he did are clearer and sharper than anybody else’s” (312).
 Rennie’s dream clearly alludes to a previous cultural narrative—the 
struggle between ultimate good and ultimate evil—and so its resonance and 
its rhetorical impact depend on the reader’s familiarity with that previous 
story. Yet while Kafka and Achebe put forth the “Before the Law” parable 
and the story of the tortoise and the birds, respectively, as autonomous nar-
ratives simply nested in the primary narrative, Barth has woven the story of 
the battle between God and Satan—a story that is well known to a Christian 
audience—into the host narrative in such a way that it does not function 
as a “story within a story.” Instead, the prior Manichaean narrative—which 
might not be allegorical at all, depending on one’s theological inclinations—
has been rewritten in terms of the embedding narrative; the character-pairs 
Joe–God and Jacob–Satan have been overtly conflated, and both the setting 
and the plot of the story have been altered to suit the purposes of the embed-
ding narrative. This act of narrative integration does not efface the preexisting 
narrative, but rather brings it into a state of interdependence with its host.
 We should note that—as was the case with The Trial—the basic struc-
ture and the primary figures of this embedded allegory are similar to what 
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we find in the primary narrative. In both cases, a figure who is an invited 
interloper—the Devil or Jacob21—has a destabilizing effect on Rennie and 
Joe’s relationship even as the actual existence of that figure is called into 
doubt.22 Would we be justified then in accepting Rennie’s characterization 
of the roles played by the various figures? And if so, would this embedded 
allegory have the same force as those that we have examined in the Achebe 
and Kafka texts? Or is its effect more localized, as we saw with the dependent 
embedded allegories?
 The amount of hermeneutic force that interdependent allegories carry 
depends on how readers see them squaring with the implied author’s per-
spective. These embedded narratives can produce a strong allegorical effect 
even as they lack the mystical or transcendent appeal of the independent 
embedded allegories if they can be made to resonate with the values or aims 
of the implied author. Thus, Barth’s interdependent embedded narrative has 
the potential to produce readings such as Kegley’s, readings in which the 
characters appear one-dimensional and flat. Such interpretations indicate 
that Kegley and the numerous other critics who read Barth’s novel in this 
way have succumbed to the same temptation that we saw in the case of Bar-
bara Harlow’s interpretation of Things Fall Apart. Kegley, for example, argues 
that The End of the Road is essentially a novel about order versus chaos, and 
that Barth has constructed one-dimensional thematic characters to play out 
this battle. I, on the other hand, find Kegley to be too willing to allow Ren-
nie’s “pretty conceit” to stand for the larger narrative.
 In Kegley’s defense, there is considerable pressure to adopt just such a 
reading; indeed, the doctor’s “prescription” for Jacob is precisely to view the 
world in similarly clear-cut binary terms and to simplify his own sense of 
self, to become something akin to what E. M. Forster has called a “flat” char-
acter (68), a character, in other words, who is unburdened by complexity 
or ambiguity and who never surprises because he or she always follows a 
predictable script. The true import of the novel for me lies in the fact that 
it shows finally and clearly that this “black and white” approach to life, or 
 21. In the embedded allegory, Joe invites or conjures the Devil in order to test his strength, 
and one has a sense that Joe might have done the same with Jacob, whom he does perceive as a 
worthy intellectual challenge. And it is the case that Joe and Rennie are more eager to develop 
a relationship with Jacob than he is; he admits, in fact, to having no other friends and to being 
generally disinclined to maintain close relationships with other people. Thus, he does play the 
role of an interloper, but he has also been prodded, enticed, and encouraged to do so.
 22. Although I do not have the space to examine it in detail here, the question of Jacob’s 
particular existence—and what it means to exist more generally—is a central theme in this 
work. This is reflected not only in Jacob’s bout of immobilization and the doctor’s counsel about 
“choosing,” but also, as I mentioned earlier, in the enigmatic opening line of the narrative: “In a 
sense, I am Jacob Horner” (255).
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to interpretation, or to other people, or to ourselves, cannot be maintained 
without doing violence to those entities. The progression of the novel, with 
all its revelations and its complications, both produces and reveals cracks in 
such a mind-set. No matter how much someone might want them to be, no 
matter how hard someone tries to make them so, “things” just are not that 
simple. The allure of a straightforward and strong key to the relationships 
among the characters in the novel (such as the one that Rennie provides and 
that Jacob will later adopt) and to the narrative more generally seems clear, 
but, at the end of the road, we will realize, just as characters in Barth’s novel 
must realize, that the pursuit of this key has led us to a dead end.
 Still, Barth’s interdependent embedded allegory and its direct allusion to 
the biblical figures certainly raises our awareness of allegorical potential. As 
Stephen Barney declares, if an allusion such as this one “is extensive, espe-
cially if it resides in the whole plot of the text, it tends towards allegory. The 
correspondence of the presented text to the old, authoritative text encour-
ages the reader to look for a tertium quid, a principle of interpretation to 
which the correspondence points. Since the literary monuments—the Bible, 
Virgil, Ovid—have submitted to allegorical interpretations of their own, the 
tertium quid may not be far to seek. The fact that the antique text has been 
criticized makes it a fit support for allegory” (16–17, emphasis in original). 
An allusive embedded narrative such as the one we find in The End of the 
Road, then, can be read as a signal of allegorical intent and can result in the 
reader moving toward allegoresis.
 Barth has in a sense encouraged this move by having his narrator pick up 
and extend Rennie’s interdependent embedded allegory, effectively allowing 
the allusion to “[reside] in the whole plot of the text” (Barney 16). Late in the 
narrative, after Rennie has had an affair with him, Jacob actively adopts the 
satanic role that Rennie has envisioned for him. Having learned of the affair, 
Joe perversely sends the repentant Rennie back to Jacob’s apartment so that 
she can have sex with him again, ostensibly to decide exactly what she thinks 
about adultery, about Jacob, and about her marriage. Surely at least partly to 
spite Joe, Jacob does take Rennie to bed, but he contends that
I was able to do so only because, for better or worse, enough of my alert-
ness was gone to permit me to dramatize the situation as part of a romantic 
contest between symbols. Joe was The Reason, or Being (I was using Ren-
nie’s cosmos); I was The Unreason, or Not-Being; and the two of us were 
fighting without quarter for possession of Rennie, like God and Satan 
for the soul of Man. This pretty ontological Manichaeism would certainly 
stand no close examination, but it had the triple virtue of excusing me from 
having to assign to Rennie any essence more specific than The Human 
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Personality, further allowing me to fornicate with a Mephistophelean rel-
ish, and finally making it possible for me not to question my motives, 
since what I was doing was of the essence of my essence. Does one look for 
introspection from Satan? (377)
This “pretty ontological Manichaeism” clearly recalls Rennie’s “pretty con-
ceit” that casts Jacob as Devil and Joe as God (317). Moreover, the fact that 
Jacob—Barth’s autodiegetic narrator (a first-person narrator who is also the 
protagonist of the story)—picks up the conceit gives it more force than it has 
coming from one of the more minor characters. This force derives from the 
tendency of most readers to seek out an authoritative voice in and for the 
narrative. Susan Lanser has argued—and I think convincingly—that “Voices 
with the greatest mimetic authority . . . are more likely to be equated with, 
or to coconstruct, implied authorship; voices carrying both diegetic and 
mimetic authority will have the edge” (156). As a character who both domi-
nates the story-world (mimetic authority) and has control of the narrative 
(diegetic authority), Jacob fits the description of an authoritative voice, one 
that might echo the sentiments of the implied author.
 We would be well advised, however, to take seriously Jacob’s warning 
that this extended conceit “would certainly stand no close examination,” 
because such scrutiny will reveal the rhetorical limitations of this kind of 
embedded allegorical narrative. In this case, the good–evil opposition that 
the embedded narrative fleshes out seems overly simplistic, a fact that even 
Jacob recognizes. Jacob’s most egregious act of bad faith is to convince him-
self—or to allow himself to be convinced by his therapist—that life demands 
such incessant reductionism. Relying on a structuralist linguistic metaphor 
to explain Rennie’s confusion about whether she loves him or abhors him, 
Jacob reasons that getting on in the world requires us to distort reality in 
ways that enable us to avoid becoming bogged down by what appear to be 
irresolvable conundrums:
I’m sure, as a matter of fact, that what Rennie felt was actually neither 
ambivalent nor even complex; it was both single and simple, like all feel-
ings, but like all feelings it was also completely particular and individual, 
and so the trouble started only when she attempted to label it with a com-
mon noun such as love or abhorrence. Things can be signified by common 
nouns only if one ignores the differences between them; but it is precisely 
these differences, when deeply felt, that make the nouns inadequate and 
lead the layman (but not the connoisseur) to believe that he has a paradox 
on his hands, an ambivalence, when actually it is merely a matter of x’s 
being part horse and part grammar book, and completely neither. Assign-
ing names to things is like assigning roles to people: it is necessarily a 
embedded Allegory   •  113
distortion, but it is a necessary distortion if one would get on with the plot, 
and to the connoisseur it’s good clean fun. (389)23
For the second time, but in a different context, we hear Jacob making an 
implicit Aristotelian argument that plot should be our chief concern and, 
further, that the progression of a plot depends on one’s ability to distort 
reality through simplification, and ultimately claiming that such an activity 
can be both harmless and fun.
 Jacob is at least consistent on this score, if not others. Indeed, slightly 
earlier in his narrative he has an epiphany concerning his one real convic-
tion, and it is one that explains even if it does not ethically justify his rather 
cavalier attitude toward Rennie’s emotions. “Articulation!” he exclaims,
There, by Joe, was my absolute, if I could be said to have one. At any rate, it 
is the only thing I can think of about which I ever had, with any frequency 
at all, the feelings one usually has for one’s absolutes. To turn experience 
into speech—that is, to classify, to categorize, to conceptualize, to gram-
marize, to syntactify it—is always a betrayal of experience, a falsification 
of it; but only so betrayed can it be dealt with at all, and only in so dealing 
with it did I ever feel a man, alive, and kicking. It is therefore that, when I 
had cause to think about it at all, I responded to this precise falsification, 
this adroit, careful myth-making, with all the upsetting exhilaration of any 
artist at his work. When my mythoplastic razors were sharply honed, it was 
unparalleled sport to lay about with them, to have at reality. (367)
Despite the frustrating qualifier that immediately follows (“In other senses, 
of course, I don’t believe this at all” [367]), the reader of Barth’s novel must 
take Jacob’s confession about articulation seriously, because it helps us to 
understand his character and how he seeks to manipulate the world so as to 
make his way through it as painlessly as possible.
 When we take the long view of Barth’s novel and Jacob’s role in it, the 
interdependent embedded allegory that pits Jacob against Joe emerges as 
an example of the tendency of the characters in this work to falsify and to 
oversimplify. Thus, despite the reliance on the compelling narrative of good 
versus evil that the God–Satan narrative provides us, the interdependent 
embedded narrative that emerges from it has little power to transcend the 
confines of the narrative that houses it. Indeed, it seems almost laughable to 
equate such fallible and petty characters as Jacob and Joe with the monu-
 23. This idea of “getting on with the plot”—and what getting on with the plot requires one 
to do or not to do—will be echoed and expanded in Barth’s short story “Click.” See chapter 6, 
“The Presence of Allegory,” for a discussion of this story.
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mental figures of Satan and God. Jacob can only be a one-dimensional char-
acter—as Kegley argues he is—if we allow him to oversimplify himself and 
if we fail to recognize that things are far more complicated than he allows 
them to seem. Thus, Bernard J. Paris contends that “often characters seem 
unrealistic simply because we do not comprehend their motivations and per-
sonalities” (81), and that, when read carefully we can see that, in this novel 
at least, Barth’s “characters are brilliant mimetic portraits” (64). The apparent 
contradiction between Kegley’s and Paris’s interpretations of the characters 
can be explained by the amount of faith they put in the embedded allegory 
and by how seriously each takes Jacob as a reliable narrator, one who essen-
tially speaks for the implied Barth.
 If there is a general lesson to be drawn from this example of an interde-
pendent embedded allegory, it is that this kind of textual phenomenon can 
have a significant impact on how we interpret a work of narrative fiction. 
Like other textual phenomena, however, interdependent embedded allego-
ries are only a part of the feedback loop of interpretation, so readers should 
not blithely assume that they are a direct revelation of authorial intention or 
that they can be made to stand for the primary narrative. As is the case with 
Barth’s characters, they are often more complicated than they first appear. 
This fact will be made even more evident as we examine another case of 
interdependent embedded allegory from a different novelist.
■
J. M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello is another text that employs interdependent 
embedded allegory, but rather than following Barth’s lead and drawing on 
a foundational cultural–religious narrative, Coetzee weaves the weak alle-
gories of Franz Kafka into the fabric of his narrative. This tactic produces 
a different rhetorical effect from that which we see in Barth’s work because 
Coetzee’s use of narratives that are themselves allegorical amplifies the alle-
gorical quality of the embedding text. Given that the connection between the 
embedded narrative and the embedding narrative is so strong in interdepen-
dent embedded allegory, this amplification might even be greater than what 
we encounter with independent embedded narratives that are allegorical.
 My reading of Coetzee will reveal that the embedding of an allegorical 
narrative can function not only as a tool that an author might use to struc-
ture a reader’s response to or interpretation of the primary narrative, but also 
as a means of summoning or channeling the spirit of the embedded narrative 
or author. We see this effect to some extent in Kafka’s use of “Before the Law,” 
the feeling of which seems to dominate the close of The Trial. Both of these 
narratives, however, are Kafka’s creations, so the net effect is still entirely 
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Kafkaesque. In Elizabeth Costello, by way of contrast, Coetzee makes use of 
Kafka’s narratives and in so doing manages to engage with the spirit of those 
weak allegories—to capture, in other words, the essence of the Kafkaesque 
without merely emulating Kafka through Coetzee’s own weak allegory. Here, 
Coetzee seems to be exploring the possibility of using fictional narratives24 to 
perform what at least one version of literary criticism has historically tried 
to do: to sympathetically convey the essence of another author.25
 Coetzee divides his novel into eight “Lessons,” each of which issues from 
the mind or words of the eponymous protagonist, a sexagenarian author from 
Australia. A decorated and prolific novelist, Elizabeth Costello remains most 
famous for her 1969 novel The House on Eccles Street, a work in which she 
takes Marion Bloom—the wife of Leopold Bloom, hero of Joyce’s Ulysses—as 
her subject. When her own story—the one written by Coetzee—begins, the 
passing years have nudged Elizabeth past the tipping point that we all face 
somewhere in the middle of life and into physical decline.
 The novel opens with Elizabeth leaving her home in Australia for a 
trip to Pennsylvania, where she will receive a prize, deliver an acceptance 
speech/lecture at a college, and submit to the requisite media interviews. 
She is accompanied by her son John, a lecturer in physics and astronomy at 
a school in Massachusetts. “Elizabeth has become a little frail,” Coetzee’s nar-
rator reveals, and “without the help of her son she would not be undertaking 
this taxing trip across half the world” (2). John does worry about the toll that 
the trip will exact from his mother, recognizing that she does not have the 
physical strength or stamina that she did when she penned the work that 
made her famous. As he reflects on her condition and her prospects for sur-
viving the ordeal, we readers get the first of a number of allusions to Kafka: 
“He [her son] is here, with her, out of love. He cannot imagine her getting 
through this trial without him at her side. He stands by her because he is 
her son, her loving son. But he is also on the point of becoming—distasteful 
word—her trainer” (3). The use of the word “trial” to describe Elizabeth’s 
visit speaks both to the suffering that her public performance will no doubt 
 24. Coetzee has also approached Kafka in his literary criticism. See for example his collec-
tion of essays titled Stranger Shores.
 25. Coetzee practices in this novel something close to what Mark Edmundson has claimed 
should be the goal of all teachers of literature. “The standard for the kind of interpretation I have 
in mind is actually rather straightforward,” Edmundson explains. “When a teacher of literature 
admires an author enough to teach his work, then it stands to reason that the teacher’s initial 
objective ought to be framing a reading that the author would approve. The teacher, to begin 
with, represents the author: he analyzes the text sympathetically, he treats the words with care 
and caution and with due respect. He works hard with the students to develop a vision of what 
the world is and how to live that rises from the author’s work and that, ultimately, the author, 
were he present in the room, would endorse” (62). 
116  •   Chapter 3
cause her, but it also, of course, brings to mind the Kafka novel of the same 
name. The reader might never make this latter connection, however, if Coe-
tzee had not written an acceptance speech for his protagonist that makes the 
link more pronounced, a link that depends on the “distasteful word” that 
describes what John seems to feel is his role relative to his mother.
 John, Coetzee writes, “thinks of [his mother] as a seal, an old, tired seal. 
One more time she must heave herself up on to the tub, one more time show 
that she can balance the ball on her nose” (3),26 and he is her trainer. But in 
her acceptance speech Elizabeth alludes to another animal, the ape in Kafka’s 
short tale “A Report to an Academy.” Elizabeth uses this story to get at the 
theme of her talk (itself a kind of a report to an academy)—realism—and to 
make the point that sometime in the twentieth century something changed 
in the way we read literature; she sees Kafka as an exemplar of that change. 
“If you know the [Kafka] story,” she tells her audience, “you will remember 
that it is cast in the form of a monologue, a monologue by the ape. Within 
this form there is no means for either speaker or audience to be inspected 
by an outsider’s eye. For all we know, the speaker may not ‘really’ be an ape, 
may be simply a human being like ourselves deluded into thinking himself 
an ape, or a human being presenting himself, with heavy irony, for rhetorical 
purposes, as an ape . . .” (18). From this example, Elizabeth draws the broader 
conclusion that such undecidability or indecipherability now characterizes 
all of literature and our reading of it. The time of knowing for certain what 
something was or meant has passed, she asserts:
The word-mirror is broken, irreparably, it seems. About what is really 
going on in the lecture hall your guess is as good as mine: men and men, 
men and apes, apes and men, apes and apes. The lecture hall itself may be 
nothing but a zoo. The words on the page will no longer stand up and be 
counted, each proclaiming “I mean what I mean!” The dictionary that used 
to stand beside the Bible and the works of Shakespeare above the fireplace, 
where in pious Roman homes the household gods were kept, has become 
just one code book among many. (19)
And from hermeneutic contingency comes ontological contingency: “There 
used to be a time, we believe, when we could say who we were. Now we are 
just performers speaking our parts. The bottom has dropped out. . . . There 
is every reason, then, for me to feel less than certain about myself as I stand 
before you” (19).
 26. A few pages later, when John reflects on the insight with which his mother writes, he 
changes his assessment and thinks she resembles a cat more than the typically amiable seal (5).
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 This issue of belief and Elizabeth’s inconsistent relationship with it returns 
forcefully in the penultimate section—and final “Lesson”—of the novel. This 
chapter of the text is called “At the Gate,” and it is a striking example of 
an interdependent embedded allegory. With no contextualization from the 
narrator, the reader of this section finds him- or herself looking on as Eliza-
beth—sunburned and perspiring—alights from a bus in the middle of a busy 
town square. “Past the pavement tables, past the young folk, the wheels of 
the suitcase rattling over the cobbles, she makes her way to the gate where 
a uniformed man stands drowsily on guard, propped on the rifle he holds 
butt down before him” (193). When she asks the guard to open the gate for 
her (neither she nor the reader seems to understand why she senses that she 
should go through it), he informs her that she must first make a statement 
of what she believes. At this, we are told, “There is no more doubt in her 
mind about where she is, who she is. She is a petitioner before the gate. The 
journey that brought her here, to this country, to this town, that seemed to 
reach its end when the bus halted and the door opened on to the crowded 
square, was not the end of it all. Now commences a trial of a different kind” 
(194). The invocation of a trial at this point in the narrative calls our atten-
tion back to the opening chapter, in which Elizabeth’s son worries about her 
as she faces the professional ordeals that arise from her celebrity. If Kafka’s 
novel was a vague allusion at that juncture, it has now been fully embedded 
in her own story.
 Coetzee, in fact, explicitly prepared us for this embedding at an earlier 
point in the novel. When, following that first lecture on realism and Kafka, 
John asks his mother why she chose that as the topic for her acceptance 
speech, and in particular why she selected Kafka, of all writers, as an entrée 
into realism, Elizabeth replies that even though Kafka’s parable of the ape 
might not be realistic in any strict sense, it reveals a kind of foundational 
realism because “Kafka had time to wonder where and how his poor edu-
cated ape was going to find a mate. And what it was going to be like when he 
was left in the dark with the bewildered, half-tamed female that his keepers 
eventually produced for his use” (32). What is more, she continues, “Kafka’s 
ape is embedded in life. It is the embeddedness that is important, not the life 
itself. His ape is embedded as we are embedded, you in me, I in you. That 
ape is followed through to the end, to the bitter, unsayable end, whether or 
not there are traces left on the page. Kafka stays awake during the gaps when 
we are sleeping. That is where Kafka fits in” (32).
 Coetzee likely intends us to see the presence of the ape in Elizabeth’s life 
more directly than even she implies or perhaps recognizes here. The ape’s 
embeddedness is more than just a simile (“as we are embedded”), but rather 
a reality; in some ways Elizabeth has been transformed into the ape in this 
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story (the poor figure granted no privacy, whose base urges and flights of 
brilliance are both on full display), even as she, in theory, plays the role of 
Kafka (the figure in the panopticon who never sleeps) in her own novels. 
That we are meant to see Elizabeth in the role of the ape becomes apparent 
when, in a brilliant conclusion to the opening section of the novel, Coetzee 
subjects her, as she sleeps on her return flight to Australia, to the kind of 
ethically suspect and perhaps gratuitous gazing that John finds objectionable 
in the most committed realistic fiction but that she seems to value in Kafka:
She lies slumped in her seat. Her head is sideways, her mouth open. She is 
snoring faintly. Light flashes from the windows as they bank, the sun set-
ting brilliantly over southern California. He can see up her nostrils, into 
her mouth, down the back of her throat. And what he cannot see he can 
imagine: the gullet, pink and ugly, contracting as it swallows, like a python, 
drawing things down to the pear-shaped belly-sac. He draws away, tightens 
his own belt, sits up, facing forward. No, he tells himself, that is not where 
I come from, that is not it. (33–34)
The remainder of the novel is ostensibly organized around the kind of mono-
logues that Kafka’s ape delivers, but it is also infused with this kind of access 
to the normally hidden animal reality of the speaker. And like Kafka, Coe-
tzee follows his subject through to what would appear to be the bitter, unsay-
able end.
 In Elizabeth Costello that end begins, fittingly, with Coetzee embedding 
Kafka’s embedded allegory “Before the Law” in the allusively titled Lesson, 
“At the Gate.” Coetzee is not trying to be clever here, not trying to create 
just enough resemblance between his text and Kafka’s so that only the most 
astute readers will make the connection. Indeed, in case we have failed to 
pick up on the reference some fifteen pages into the chapter, Coetzee, using 
free indirect discourse to reveal Elizabeth’s reckoning of her own situation, 
brings his indebtedness to Kafka out into the open: “The wall, the gate, the 
sentry, are straight out of Kafka. So is the demand for a confession, so is the 
courtroom with the dozing bailiff and the panel of old men in their crows’ 
robes pretending to pay attention while she thrashes about in the toils of her 
own words. Kafka, only the superficies of Kafka; Kafka reduced and flattened 
to a parody” (209). So, there is never a question of somehow “not getting it”; 
the connections to Kafka are too strong to miss.
 Yet both Elizabeth and the reader need to figure out why—why Kafka, 
and why these pieces of Kafka’s work? “And why is it Kafka in particular that 
is trundled out for her?” muses Coetzee’s narrator for Elizabeth. “She is no 
devotee of Kafka. Most of the time she cannot read him without impatience. 
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As he veers between helplessness and lust, between rage and obsequiousness, 
she too often finds him, or at least his K. selves, simply childish. So why is 
the mise en scène into which she has been hurled so—she dislikes the word 
but there is no other—so Kafkaesque?” (209).27 The best response that Eliza-
beth can muster is irony: “One answer that occurs to her is that the show is 
put together this way because it is not her kind of show. You do not like the 
Kafkaesque, so let us rub your nose in it” (209). Clearly, Elizabeth sees this 
moment as the trial she must endure, as the test to which she must submit. 
And this test has two distinct facets.
 The first aspect of Elizabeth’s trial involves what she calls the “superficies 
of Kafka.” In other words, someone has recreated the situation and the set-
ting of The Trial and dropped her—unwittingly and unwillingly—into it. The 
resultant sense of confusion and disorientation leaves Elizabeth nonplussed, 
which does align her with a number of Kafka’s protagonists, especially his 
various K.’s. As a novelist herself, one who has read even if she has not par-
ticularly enjoyed Kafka, Elizabeth recognizes the similarities between her 
story-world and the one created by Kafka almost immediately. After her 
first unsuccessful attempt to pass through the gate, for example, Elizabeth 
inquires of the sentry who mans the guardhouse whether she might be per-
mitted to look through to the other side, “‘Just to see if it is worth all this 
trouble’” (195). The sentry accedes and escorts Elizabeth up to the gate itself: 
“Past the soldier leaning on his rifle he takes her, till they stand before the 
gate itself, massive enough to hold back an army. From a pouch at his belt 
he takes a key nearly as long as his forearm. Will this be the point where 
he tells her the gate is meant for her and her alone, and moreover that she 
is destined never to pass through? Should she remind him she knows the 
score?” (196). She knows the score. She knows, in other words, the various 
parts assigned to the various players in this little embedded sketch because 
she knows Kafka. Like the reader, Elizabeth herself feels the embedded nar-
rative—or, more accurately from her point of view, the narrative into which 
she has been embedded—exerting the prefigurative pressure that Honig 
identified, but this time the pressure is on her own situation. Acutely aware 
of her own situation and whence and from whom it derives, Elizabeth acts 
as the reader of her own narrative, and she interprets it largely through the 
lens of that other allegorical narrative.
 And in many ways she actually gets it wrong. Coetzee’s use of Kafka 
might appear parodic from her perspective, but from the reader’s it is quite 
 27. Elizabeth’s professed resistance to Kafka in this passage does not seem to square with 
her use of Kafka’s “Report” in the opening section of the book. On the other hand, this apparent 
contradiction is in keeping with what we’ve seen of her and her ambivalence about convictions. 
Just because she does not like Kafka does not mean that she cannot use him.
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serious. In some ways, the figures who occupy both texts (the sentries, 
judges, etc.) seem more credible—less reduced and flattened—in Coetzee’s 
novel than they do in Kafka’s. Indeed, whereas in Kafka’s text the demands 
and the demeanor of the “Examining Magistrate” and his fellow judges 
appear unpredictable, erratic, and inappropriate (witness the mildly por-
nographic book How Grete Was Plagued by Her Husband Hans that K. finds 
lying on the Magistrate’s table, for example [54]), the judges in Coetzee’s 
novel, though stern and largely humorless with Elizabeth, act relatively rea-
sonably. So, while the situation and the score seem uncanny (in the Freudian 
sense of the word, which emphasizes both repetition and helplessness) from 
Elizabeth’s point of view, the reader of Coetzee’s novel might interpret the 
effect of the embedding quite differently.
 This difference arises from the fact that Elizabeth is too willing to accept 
a one-to-one correspondence between her situation and Kafka’s weak alle-
gory. Despite the fact that she finds Kafka’s protagonists “childish,” she steps 
easily and willingly into the shoes of Joseph K. from The Trial. As a result, 
she interprets her own experience at the gate as if it were identical to K.’s 
experience before the law, and this allows her to play the role occupied by 
K., the role of the lone sane person trying to make sense of a world without 
logic. And, just as K. initially refuses to take seriously the fact of his arrest 
and all that it entails for him (42), so too does Elizabeth deny the validity or 
legitimacy of the situation in which she finds herself. When she fails to gain 
passage through “what is evidently her gate and hers alone,” she attributes 
this failure not to her inability to articulate to the judges what it is that she 
believes but rather to the vagaries of the court itself:
Astonishing that a court which sets itself up as an interrogatory of belief 
should refuse to pass her. They must have heard other writers before, other 
disbelieving believers or believing disbelievers. Writers are not lawyers, 
surely they must allow for that, allow for eccentricities of presentation. 
But of course this is not a court of law. Not even a court of logic. Her first 
impression was right: a court out of Kafka or Alice in Wonderland, a court 
of paradox. (223)
But this conclusion is too facile, and it reflects a desire on Elizabeth’s part to 
avoid the difficult, but ultimately quite reasonable, question that the judges 
put to her: what does she believe?
 This requirement clearly puts her at a loss: “What if I am not a believer?” 
she asks. She is speaking to a guard at this point, and his response, unlike 
the responses that K. receives, must strike the reader as eminently reason-
able: “The man shrugs. For the first time he looks directly at her. ‘We all 
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believe. We are not cattle. For each of us there is something we believe. Write 
it down, what you believe. Put it in the statement’” (194). Compared with 
those that K. receives regarding his situation, these instructions are blissfully 
clear, and they allow her to orient herself and to grasp the nature of her pre-
dicament. This is the point in the narrative, which I referenced earlier, when 
the narrator reveals Elizabeth’s newfound certainty regarding her situation: 
“There is no more doubt in her mind about where she is, who she is. She is a 
petitioner before the gate. The journey that brought her here, to this country, 
to this town, that seemed to reach its end when the bus halted and its door 
opened on to the crowded square, was not the end of it all. Now commences 
a trial of a different kind. Some act is required of her, some prescribed yet 
undefined affirmation, before she will be found good and can pass through” 
(194). She clearly has an understanding of her predicament, and such an 
understanding Joseph K. never achieves.
 Even though Elizabeth correctly picks up on the “score” of the narrative 
that has been embedded in her own story and recognizes the part assigned to 
her, the Kafka text does not exist within the confines of Elizabeth Costello as 
an independent embedded allegory. We recognize it, certainly, as a narrative 
that does exist autonomously elsewhere, but it is changed by the fact that it 
has become a part of and interdependent with Coetzee’s story.28 The most 
significant change results from Elizabeth’s failure to recognize that her “first 
impression,” that sense of the Kafkaesque, cannot serve as a final interpreta-
tion of her predicament. The epistemological uncertainties that the adjec-
tive Kafkaesque (particularly when it derives from The Trial as opposed to, 
say, The Metamorphosis) carries with it actually cover up—or perhaps allow 
Elizabeth to avoid—the more central problem for her: that abiding onto-
logical problem of who she is. Elizabeth focuses on the strangeness of her 
circumstances and inaccurately reads her judges as the same characters that 
we find in Kafka’s text, but she does not confront in a serious and satisfactory 
manner the question of what she believes.
 After an ill-fated attempt to placate the judges by claiming that because 
she is a writer of fiction she should be granted an exemption from the rule 
requiring one to have beliefs (195), Elizabeth decides to tell the judges a 
 28. It is worth reiterating a general distinction between the independent embedded allego-
ries and the interdependent embedded allegories that I have been discussing. In The Trial and 
in Things Fall Apart, the embedded allegorical narratives exist essentially as stories within, but 
distinct from, other stories. Connections between the embedded narratives and their hosts are 
exegetical in nature, and that exegesis may occur within the narrative or outside of it, by read-
ers. In the interdependent embedded allegorical narratives under discussion, characters from 
the host narrative occupy roles in the embedded narrative, thus complicating the relationship 
between the two.
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story, a narrative that she concedes “may sound allegorical” (217). The inspi-
ration for the story comes from her childhood in Australia, more precisely, a 
childhood spent in a rural area “of climatic extremes: of scorching droughts 
followed by torrential rains that swelled the rivers with the carcasses of 
drowned animals” (216). The story she tells from this childhood of extreme 
weather involves frogs that, during the dry season, “go underground, bur-
rowing further and further from the heat of the sun until each has created a 
little tomb for itself. And in those tombs they die, so to speak. Their heart-
beat slows, their breathing stops, they turn the color of mud” (216). Then, 
when the rains return and the moisture begins to penetrate to the depths 
of the frog “tombs,” “[i]n those coffins hearts begin to beat, limbs begin to 
twitch that for months have been lifeless. The dead awake. As the caked mud 
softens, the frogs begin to dig their way out, and soon their voices resound 
again in joyous exultation beneath the vault of the heavens” (216). Elizabeth 
offers this story as the answer to the question of what she believes: “I believe 
in those little frogs,” she says, noting that they—and the situation that they 
inhabit—are real, “the Dulgannon [river] and its mudflats are real, the frogs 
are real. They exist whether or not I tell you about them, whether or not I 
believe in them. . . . [It] is because of their indifference to me that I believe 
in them” (217). This is a strange response, and one cannot be sure that it is 
made entirely in good faith, whether it is born primarily of the advice to 
show passion, or whether it is simply a desperate attempt to sway the judges.
 Whatever the case, Elizabeth insists on a literal reading of her embedded 
narrative. “In my account,” she explains, “for whose many failings I beg your 
pardon, the life cycle of the frog may sound allegorical, but to the frogs 
themselves it is no allegory, it is the thing itself, the only thing” (217). Eliza-
beth’s desire to view this story from the perspective of the frogs, and there-
fore to downplay its allegorical potential, accords with her conception of art 
and her own literary production, which she views, in retrospect now as she 
seems to have reached the end of her professional (and possibly even actual) 
life, as defiantly and relentlessly mimetic. “Now that it is over and done with, 
that lifetime labour of writing, she is capable of casting a glance back over it 
that is cool enough, she believes, even cold enough, not to be deceived. Her 
books teach nothing, preach nothing; they merely spell out, as clearly as they 
can, how people lived in a certain time and place” (207). Such an approach 
to literature certainly runs counter to the kind of figuration required of alle-
gory, and it also explains why she can see the life cycle of the frogs as simply 
the life cycle of the frogs. For her, those frogs simply are; it is their literal 
existence in which she believes, in which she places her faith. For readers, 
though, and equally for those to whom she makes her appeal, her emphasis 
embedded Allegory   •  123
on the literal aspect of her embedded narrative makes far less sense than 
does the allegorical interpretation.
 Following her presentation of the story of the life cycle of the frogs, 
one of the judges asks a logical question, one that we might interpret as an 
opening for Elizabeth to acknowledge that her frog story has really been the 
transformation of the idea of the “spirit of life” into a figural narrative, thus 
resulting in an allegory: “You believe in life?” the judge asks (218). But Eliza-
beth does not take the bait, or the offer: “I believe,” she reiterates, “in what 
does not bother to believe in me” (218). The questioner cannot accept this, 
as revealed by the “little gesture of impatience” she makes while she offers 
her follow-up comment: “A stone does not believe in you. A bush. But you 
choose to tell us not about stones or bushes but about frogs, to which you 
attribute a life story that is, as you concede, highly allegorical. These Austra-
lian frogs of yours embody the spirit of life, which is what you as a storyteller 
believe in” (218–19). This amounts to putting words in the author’s mouth, 
for Elizabeth has said no such thing. She has admitted that the story she tells 
of the intrepid frogs “may sound allegorical,” but she quickly minimizes this 
allegorical potential by focusing so relentlessly on the reality of the frogs and 
their particular and peculiar lives. She resists the notion, imposed on her by 
the judge, that she really means to transform the phenomenon of the frog’s 
life into a figural narrative about the “spirit of [human] life.” Without this 
turn, the turn that defines the use of tropes, Elizabeth’s response seems sadly 
insufficient; it’s really no wonder that this statement fails in its objective.
 Coetzee might be using Elizabeth and her position—or perhaps her lack 
of a position is more apt here—to critique traditional notions of allegory. 
To recognize the story of the frogs as an allegory of the spirit of life is tan-
tamount in some ways to committing an act of violence (to use Gordon 
Teskey’s term) against the frogs. The experience of the frogs can only be vali-
dated if it can be anthropomorphized, or transformed into terms that have 
meaning for human beings. Elizabeth’s immediate context (finding herself in 
a Kafkaesque embedded allegory, in other words) and the task required of 
her appear to demand this kind of turn; literal belief in frogs will not suffice, 
so allegory must turn the trick. Elizabeth’s judges and the readers of Coe-
tzee’s novel all seem to expect this move, but Elizabeth stands firm against it.
 If we return to one of the earlier “Lessons” in the novel, we can gain a 
better understanding of Elizabeth’s intransigence on this point. Elizabeth 
makes it clear throughout the novel that she embodies what the philosopher 
Richard Rorty would call “liberal irony.” A liberal ironist, according to Rorty, 
is someone who recognizes the necessary contingency of his or her own 
beliefs and sense of self and who wants to guarantee that others are respected 
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and, above all, never humiliated.29 When Rorty refers to “others” we can 
be relatively certain that he means other humans, but Elizabeth seems to 
want even broader application of liberal humility, extending it to the realm 
of animals. In a section titled “The Philosophers and the Animals,” Eliza-
beth makes a strong and provocative argument in support of equating the 
fate of livestock animals to the treatment of the Jews at the hands of the 
Nazis; clearly, she is—at least in this section—a forceful advocate for animal 
rights, even animal equality, and she makes her case by attempting to decon-
struct the binary opposition that philosophers typically use to differentiate 
humans from animals: reasoning beings versus unreasoning creatures. “Both 
reason and seven decades of life experience,” Elizabeth contends, “tell me 
that reason is neither the being of the universe nor the being of God. On the 
contrary, reason looks to me suspiciously like the being of human thought. 
Reason is the being of a certain spectrum of human thinking. And if this is 
so, if that is what I believe, then why should I bow to reason this afternoon 
and content myself with embroidering on the discourse of the old philoso-
phers?” (67). Here, Elizabeth seems to emphasize the stark limits of reason 
and thereby rejects the line of thinking that suggests reason should be used 
as the basis for distinguishing between humans and animals.
 In the following section of Coetzee’s novel, a section titled “The Poets 
and the Animals,” Elizabeth extends her thinking to the artistic sphere, and 
she offers a certain kind of poetry as a means of transcending this problem of 
reason. Though we do not have access to her entire speech on this topic (this 
portion of the novel is again focalized through Elizabeth’s son, John, and 
he arrives late to her talk, so we hear only what he does), Elizabeth seems 
to be drawing a distinction between poems that use animals figuratively or 
allegorically and those that use them for what, to Elizabeth, are more noble 
ends. As John walks into the room where his mother is speaking, he hears 
her proclaim that “In that kind of poetry [the figural kind] . . . animals stand 
for human qualities: the lion for courage, the owl for wisdom, and so forth. 
Even in Rilke’s poem [she has apparently been discussing ‘The Panther’] the 
panther is there as a stand in for something else” (94–95). Given what we 
know of Elizabeth’s attitude toward animal rights, we can safely detect a note 
of ethical opprobrium in this description, a sense that the animals in this 
kind of poetry are simply being viewed through human eyes and used for 
human purposes.
 Moving on from Rilke, Elizabeth finds an alternative in two poems by 
Ted Hughes, “The Jaguar” and “Second Glance at a Jaguar.” In explicating 
 29. These notions permeate Rorty’s writings, but they are most forcefully put forward in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.
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these poems, Elizabeth arrives at an interpretation that foreshadows her 
frog story later in the novel. Hughes, Elizabeth argues, moves away from 
using the animal as a way to get at an idea and instead seeks to transmit in 
some direct way the experience of being the animal. “In these poems,” she 
explains,
we know the jaguar not from the way he seems but from the way he moves. 
The body is as the body moves, or as the currents of life move within it. 
The poems ask us to imagine our way into that way of moving, to inhabit 
that body.
 With Hughes it is a matter—I emphasize—not of inhabiting another 
mind but of inhabiting another body. That is the kind of poetry I bring to 
your attention today: poetry that does not try to find an idea in the animal, 
that is not about the animal, but is instead the record of an engagement 
with him.
 What is peculiar about poetic engagements of this kind is that, no 
matter with what intensity they take place, they remain a matter of com-
plete indifference to their objects. In this respect they are different from 
love poems, where your intention is to move your object. (95–96)
The parallels between Elizabeth’s reading of these poems and her own atti-
tude toward literature and toward animals—an attitude that we might call 
“sympathetic”—in the novel is both striking and telling. When she describes 
what she has tried to do in the book that made her famous, for example, she 
notes that
There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination. If you [she is speaking 
in “The Philosophers and the Animals” section here] want proof, consider 
the following. Some years ago I wrote a book called The House on Eccles 
Street. To write that book I had to think my way into the existence of Marion 
Bloom. Either I succeeded or I did not. If I did not, I cannot imagine why 
you invited me here today. In any event, the point is, Marion Bloom never 
existed. Marion Bloom was a figment of James Joyce’s imagination. If I can 
think my way into the existence of a being who has never existed, then I 
can think my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster, 
any being with whom I share the substrate of life. (80, emphasis in original)
When we hear Elizabeth speak about her own fiction in this way, we can 
perhaps understand better what she means when she professes to the judges 
in the “At the Gate” section that her role as an author amounts to being a 
“dictation secretary.” “I am a writer,” she insists, “and what I write is what I 
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hear. I am a secretary of the invisible, one of the many secretaries over the 
ages. That is my calling: dictation secretary. It is not for me to interrogate, to 
judge what is given me. I merely write down the words and then test them, 
test their soundness, to make sure I have heard right” (199).30 Transcribing, 
listening without judging, sympathizing with—these constitute Elizabeth’s 
authorial imperatives and they also describe her version of animal rights. 
As both an author and an animal rights proponent, Elizabeth wants either 
to allow us—in the case of her fiction—or to compel us—in the case of her 
support of animals—to “imagine our way” into another being’s existence.
 That Elizabeth makes such frequent use of Red Peter, the ape from Kaf-
ka’s “A Report to an Academy,” makes perfect sense, then, because from her 
vantage point the ape presents us with an opportunity to sympathize with 
this compelling hybrid creature. And Elizabeth does take this story, despite 
its fantastic premise, quite seriously, and literally. She even goes so far as to 
acknowledge that on occasion she “feels like” this ape. When she speaks to 
the gathering of philosophers she concedes that the story might have alle-
gorical possibilities—“an allegory of Kafka the Jew performing for Gentiles,” 
for example (62)—but, as she does with the frog story, she quickly abjures 
this figural tack. Speaking of her remark that she feels like Red Peter, she 
says quite simply that “It means what it says. I say what I mean” (62), and 
the implication is that she believes as well that Kafka has said what he meant 
and that Red Peter really is an ape who has been thoroughly cleaned up and 
well trained, and who has something to say.31
 Thus, Elizabeth implies strongly here that Kafka has done with Red 
Peter what Hughes has done with the jaguar and what she will do with the 
frogs, that is, construct narratives that facilitate the reader’s sympathy, our 
fellow feeling, for another animal. Indeed, she even casts Kafka in the same 
role that she fancies for herself, that of dictation secretary, when she argues 
that Red Peter “wrote” his own life history and that Kafka functioned as his 
“amanuensis” (70). Though it strikes many in her audience, and probably 
the readers of Coetzee’s novel as well, as somewhat incredible, Elizabeth sug-
gests—admittedly without any confirming evidence—that Kafka might have 
been influenced when he wrote his “A Report to an Academy” by the work 
of Wolfgang Köhler, a German psychologist who published a monograph in 
1917 in which he reveals the results of his largely unsuccessful attempts to 
 30. Elizabeth admits later on that the phrase “secretary of the invisible” originates not with 
her (or Coetzee) but with the Polish poet Czeslaw Milosz.
 31. Again, we cannot realistically prove that Elizabeth is mistaken in this reading of Kafka; 
however, the number of allegorical animal parables that appear in Kafka’s shorter works pro-
vides strong evidence to the contrary. Were “A Report to an Academy” an anomaly in Kafka’s 
oeuvre, then her literal interpretation would be more tenable.
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educate apes from the island of Tenerife (73). In making this assertion Eliza-
beth implies that Kafka might simply have imagined a different, more suc-
cessful, outcome to Köhler’s experiments and then—to borrow Elizabeth’s 
own words—to have devised a way “to think his way into the existence” of 
the product (Red Peter) of those experiments.
 Coetzee has embedded in this novel a narrative—“A Report to an 
Academy”—that most readers would recognize as a weak allegory but that 
his protagonist insists on reading literally. What are we to make of this, and 
what are we to make of that other embedded allegory, “Before the Law,” that 
Coetzee embeds? I have not found an easy and entirely convincing answer 
to this question. I do, on the other hand, feel relatively confident in claiming 
that Coetzee himself is doing something similar to what he has Elizabeth 
do and what Elizabeth claims that Kafka has done in his story of the ape. In 
other words, the embedded allegories in Elizabeth Costello do not function 
as interpretive heuristics; Coetzee does not seem to intend them to encapsu-
late the meaning of the novel as a whole. We might better understand these 
embedded narratives as a means of inhabiting another body, as a way of sym-
pathizing.
 On one level, Elizabeth bears some obvious resemblance to Red Peter, 
and not simply because she acknowledges her own sympathy toward this 
figure. Perhaps more significantly, she occupies the same position and plays 
a similar role in Coetzee’s narrative to those occupied and played by Red 
Peter in Kafka’s, at least in Elizabeth’s reading of Kafka. And if Kafka can 
be called Red Peter’s amanuensis, then the same holds for the relationship 
between Elizabeth and Coetzee; the author of Elizabeth Costello dictates the 
experience of Elizabeth Costello. Elizabeth Costello sums up the connec-
tion nicely: “Red Peter [unlike Wolfgang Köhler] was not an investigator 
of primate behaviour but a branded, wounded animal presenting himself 
as speaking testimony to a gathering of scholars. I am not a philosopher of 
mind but an animal exhibiting, yet not exhibiting, to a gathering of scholars, 
a wound, which I cover up under my clothes but touch on in every word I 
speak” (71). The wound to which she refers here is a reference to one of the 
wounds that Red Peter suffered as he was being captured. In Red Peter’s case, 
this wound also has some bearing on how he is perceived—as animal or 
human: “I read an article recently,” he explains in his story, “by one of the ten 
thousand windbags who vent themselves concerning me in the newspapers, 
saying: my ape nature is not yet quite under control; the proof being that 
when visitors come to see me, I have a predilection for taking down my trou-
sers to show them where the shot went in” (“A Report” 175). Elizabeth clearly 
ties herself to Red Peter by playing on the same issue of social decorum, and 
her explicit identification with Kafka’s ape helps to form a metonymic rather 
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than a metaphoric connection between the two narratives. So in this case, 
the embedded allegorical narrative is literalized by its relationship with the 
embedding narrative.
 On a second, higher-order level, we can understand Elizabeth as the 
vehicle through which Coetzee inhabits not Kafka himself, but rather Kafka’s 
corpus. Elizabeth argues, we should remember, that Ted Hughes has shown 
us through his jaguar poems not how to inhabit another mind but rather 
how to inhabit another body, and Coetzee’s persistent now-explicit-now-
allusive use of Kafka’s work (“A Report to an Academy,” “Before the Law,” 
The Trial, “An Imperial Message,” “A Hunger Artist”) gives readers the sense 
that he is inhabiting the body of Kafka’s work, if not quite the mind of its 
author. This novel stands as the “record of [Coetzee’s] engagement” with 
Kafka without being a discourse on what he thinks Kafka was trying to say 
or what he thinks Kafka meant. One might of course argue that when Eliza-
beth expounds on “A Report to an Academy” she expresses Coetzee’s sense 
of Kafka’s meaning, but to do so rests on the assumption of identity between 
the author and his character; such an assumption is always dangerous, and in 
the case of this novel in particular, in which the implied Coetzee often comes 
across as severely critical of his protagonist, that strategy lacks credibility. So, 
if we eschew the temptation to regard Elizabeth as Coetzee’s mouthpiece, we 
have, finally, a novel, Elizabeth Costello, in which the author, J. M. Coetzee, 
allows his protagonist, Elizabeth Costello, to take up residence in someone 
else’s body of work, and this is a corpus, Elizabeth claims, that was produced 
by the one man among all others who “is the most insecure in his humanity” 
(75). Perhaps rather than any grand ideas, it is this feeling that Elizabeth and 
Kafka share.
 Ultimately, I would suggest that Coetzee’s engagement with Kafka and 
his use of the interdependent embedded allegories also results in a feeling, 
a sympathetic connection between the contemporary South African nov-
elist and the early-twentieth-century Czech writer. By embedding Kafka’s 
weak allegories in a narrative that rests primarily on a mimetic foundation, 
and by embedding his protagonist—herself a self-styled author of realistic 
fiction—in these narratives whose origins are allegorical, Coetzee has pro-
duced an odd hybrid of a novel, one that demonstrates both continuity with 
and departure from the kind of mimetic fare that Elizabeth has produced 
during her career. The use of Kafka gives the work an allegorical feel, but the 
interdependence of these embedded allegorical narratives makes a straight-
forward allegorical interpretation nearly impossible to manufacture. Kafka’s 
weak allegories are weakened even further by their association with Coe-
tzee’s narrative, but they still lend a sense of the allegorical, a Kafkaesque 
feeling, to Elizabeth Costello.
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in The introduction I used Billy Collins’s poem “The Death of Allegory” 
to illustrate the fact that according to many literary types (critics, theorists, 
and authors) allegory as it was once practiced in the West—especially in 
the medieval period and during the Renaissance—no longer exists. Collins 
writes:
I am wondering what became of all those tall abstractions
that used to pose, robed and statuesque, in paintings
and parade about on the pages of the Renaissance
displaying their capital letters like license plates.
Instead, Collins contends, we now have a stable of “real”—or at least real-
istic—objects standing in their place:
Here on the table near the window is a vase of peonies
and next to it black binoculars and a money clip,
exactly the kind of thing we now prefer,
objects that sit quietly on a line in lower case,
themselves and nothing more, a wheelbarrow,
an empty mailbox, a razor blade resting in a glass ashtray. . . .
As I maintained in that introductory section, I think that Collins’s speaker 
is at least partially correct: those “great ideas on horseback / and the long-
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haired virtues in embroidered gowns” seldom get cast in starring roles any-
more, as the kind of fiction that once welcomed and depended on them 
drifts further and further toward the margins of literary consciousness.
 As is the case with much of his poetry, however, Collins has colored “The 
Death of Allegory” with a tinge of irony, a tinge that has two hues. First, 
even if the “tall abstractions” have left the working world of literature and 
migrated to a “Florida for tropes” for the early-bird specials, lots of golf, and 
the final slow fade, it does not follow that their lower-case replacements—the 
vase of peonies, the black binoculars and the money clip, the wheelbarrow, 
the empty mailbox, and the razor blade resting in a glass ashtray—represent, 
as Collins claims they do, “themselves and nothing more.” For example, the 
last supposedly merely self-referential item in his list (the razor blade in 
the ashtray) likely evokes in the reader of the poem images of drug use that 
belie the strict mimeticism that the speaker assigns to it. Though a razor 
blade is not an abstract concept in the same way that Valor and Chastity 
are, there is no reason that a razor blade could not be a leading figure in an 
allegorical transformation. The second ironic aspect of this poem, and the 
one that I want to focus on in this chapter, involves the intellectual tension 
produced by a narrative—and I do consider this poem to have a strong nar-
rative component—that is about something that has ostensibly died. Col-
lins’s treatment of allegory has the effect of reviving it, at least in the reader’s 
mind, even though the poem itself is not an allegory. This poem offers a clear 
example of what I want to call “thematic allegory.”
 The bulk of this chapter will be devoted to the explication of another nar-
rative work of fiction—Philip Roth’s American Pastoral—that has allegory as 
a prominent theme, but before I get to that novel, we need to consider the 
general and highly significant relationship that obtains between allegory and 
theme. To get at the nature of this relationship, we shall return to one of the 
basic tenets that supports my theorizing about allegory, namely that allegory 
depends on a narrative structure. If we accept this premise, then we will 
quickly realize that “theme” emerges as one of the most significant aspects 
of narrative for the study of allegory.
 As I argued in the introduction, allegory and narrative are closely linked, 
and this is especially true in the case of narratives that are (also) allego-
ries, such as those works that I addressed in my first two chapters. But, as I 
have tried to show, the connection between allegory and narrative runs even 
deeper than this kind of generic coincidence; all manifestations of allegory 
depend on a narrative structure.
 Even approaching the concept of allegory from the reader’s vantage 
point, rather than from the textual or authorial one, reveals the significant 
association of allegory with narrative. In The Political Unconscious, Fredric 
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Jameson argues that, as readers of literature, we might have a natural ten-
dency toward allegory. Jameson intends his opening chapter, “On Inter-
pretation,” as a defense of his Marxist-inspired allegorical approach to 
hermeneutics. More broadly, however, he lays the groundwork for a theory 
of interpretation that depends on a narrative-based conception of allegory. 
Building on the work of both Marxists and myth critics (especially Northrop 
Frye), Jameson argues that we are predisposed to see our world in terms of 
“master narratives.” These master narratives then serve as the framework 
through which we make sense of (interpret) the actual narratives that our 
culture produces. “The idea is,” Jameson explains, “that if interpretation in 
terms of . . . allegorical master narratives remains a constant temptation, this 
is because such master narratives have inscribed themselves in the texts as 
well as in our thinking about them; such allegorical narrative signifieds are 
a persistent dimension of literary and cultural texts precisely because they 
reflect a fundamental dimension of our collective thinking and our collective 
fantasies about history and reality” (34).
 Even a reader skeptical of Jameson’s claim that a collective political 
unconscious leaves evidence of itself in individual texts, which together form 
an uninterrupted historical-political master narrative (“the single great col-
lective story” of Marxist struggle, in Jameson’s take on things), might be 
convinced by his broader argument about the persistence of allegory and 
allegorical interpretation. In this regard, one of his most penetrating insights 
resides in his general claim about the centrality of the allegorical process 
to the hermeneutic endeavor. Equally illuminating from my perspective is 
his use of the term master narrative to describe what seems to be both the 
catalyst for and the product of the act of interpretation. As we have already 
seen, allegory has a narrative structure, and it seems, at least according to 
Jameson, as if readers have internalized this and recognize it as the natural 
state of affairs.
 Despite the generally recognized connection between allegory and nar-
rative, however, when we speak of allegory we tend to focus on the herme-
neutic issues of meaning and interpretation, often to the exclusion of any 
in-depth analysis of the narratives that carry those meanings. I hope to have 
begun to offer a corrective to this oversight, and this chapter will continue 
that project. Before I get to the meat of this chapter (Philip Roth’s American 
Pastoral), however, it might be instructive to try to understand why herme-
neutics has trumped narratology when it comes to allegory. Toward this end, 
we can return to Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism, which I discussed in 
chapter 1, “Strong Allegory.”
 The combination of Frye’s idea that all commentary is allegorical inter-
pretation and his claim that in actual allegory the poet has already provided 
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all of the commentary we need goes a long way toward explaining why 
readers often abjure allegory: “The commenting critic is often prejudiced 
against allegory without knowing the real reason,” Fry claims, “which is 
that continuous allegory prescribes the direction of his commentary, and 
so restricts its freedom” (90). For many readers, meaning is still the aim of 
interpretation; hence, these readers naturally shy away from anything that 
smacks of allegory because in allegory the author has often made his or her 
meaning clear, and an analysis of an allegory in this context might be seen 
as little more than a literary autopsy.
 Frye does offer a second possible explanation for the lack of narrato-
logical attention paid to allegory, but in order to get at it, we will need to 
understand some of the terms he employs in his definition of actual and 
continuous allegory. We should first note that Frye uses the term “image” 
very broadly; an image in the context of this work can mean not only the 
“replica of a visual object,” but also “symbol” and even “idea” (84). Further-
more, images often take on “thematic importance” in the context of a narra-
tive (85). For Frye, allegory depends primarily on establishing a relationship 
between a literary work’s “images” and the extraliterary concepts to which 
those images are meant to correspond. In actual allegory, that relationship is 
clear, (relatively) explicit, and stable.
 In terms of reading allegory, Frye cautions that “even continuous alle-
gory is still a structure of images, not of disguised ideas, and commentary 
has to proceed with it exactly as it does with all other literature, trying to see 
what precepts and examples are suggested by the imagery as a whole” (90). 
Frye is arguing, in other words, that reading allegory does not entail the 
identification of individual allegorical symbols, but rather the understanding 
of a larger “structure” that, in the case of allegory, points to some identifi-
able idea that exists outside of the text. The “structure of images,” in Frye’s 
anatomy, is the “form” of a work of literature, and that form, he says, “is the 
same whether it is studied as narrative or as meaning” (85). Frye contends 
that there is a general preference for the studying of meaning over narrative 
because of a “vague notion that the [former] method produces a simpler 
result, and may therefore be used as a commonsense corrective to the nig-
gling subtleties of textual studies” (85).1 Whether for this reason or for some 
other, Frye is correct when it comes to the reading of allegory. Even his own 
comments reveal more interest in examining allegory as meaning than as 
narrative, this despite his insistence that allegory must be approached as a 
 1. Frye’s terminology is somewhat idiosyncratic. He claims that a work of literature’s “nar-
rative is its rhythm or movement of words” (78), and in this sense “narrative” seems to mean 
something close to style. Nevertheless, his use of the term still draws an important distinction 
between structure and meaning, a distinction that I will explore in more detail below.
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structure, just like any other narrative.
 My contention is that the way in which allegory manifests itself in many 
modern and contemporary narratives necessitates our approaching allegory 
from a more structural or narratological starting point; this is because many 
of our hoarier ideas about allegory and meaning often do not apply easily to 
these more current works. Taking the Collins poem as just one example, we 
can all recognize the presence of allegory as a part of the narrative structure, 
but I doubt that anyone would want to read the work as an allegory. The 
poem is about allegory, but it is not one. As we enter this realm of “about-
ness,” we perforce enter as well the narratological realm of “theme.” Thus, I 
contend that Collins’s poem stands as an example of thematic allegory but 
not as an example of allegory proper.
 This raises the question of the relationship between allegory and theme 
in narratives that we do label allegories. Though we could certainly label 
“Soviet-style communism” a theme in Animal Farm, this move does not go 
far enough in capturing what happens in allegory. A narrative that we recog-
nize as an allegory is not simply “about” some phenomenon (in the way that 
The Iliad is about war, for example) but is a rewriting of that phenomenon. 
The concept of theme simply does not satisfactorily capture what transpires 
in an allegorical work.
 The reason for this failure lies in the fact that, as Gerald Prince argues, 
“a theme involves only general and abstract entities: ideas, thoughts, beliefs, 
and so on. When I speak of the theme of rain, the theme of Antigone, or the 
theme of Creon,” Prince explains, “I merely use a kind of shorthand to evoke 
certain philosophical, ideological, or moral views or concepts . . .” (Narrative 
5).2 When we speak of allegory, on the other hand, we do not use the object 
 2. As an aspect of narrative, theme poses a number of problems, primarily because of the 
looseness with which we often use the term. In his Narrative as Theme Prince illustrates the 
impressive variety of ways in which we understand and use the term “theme”:
. . . theme is both intra- and extra-textual, immanent and transcendent, what the work 
speaks about and what allows one to speak about the work; theme is to plot as mean-
ing is to form; theme is that which plot constitutes a temporal projection of; theme is 
what is made of a topic; theme is the main idea in a text, a central thread, a minimum 
generalization; theme is a highly abstract semantic category subsuming a set of motifs 
or minimal and concrete thematic units; theme is a frame, a macrostructure, a reality 
model, a system organizing knowledge about some phenomenon in the world; theme 
is what a text or part thereof is about; theme is a general thought unifying and sum-
marizing a series of sentences. . . . (2)
Prince does not try to sift through all of these uses and identify the one true meaning of 
“theme”; instead, he takes a pragmatic approach and “[sketches] some of the elements entering 
into theming, into (re)organizing and grasping a text in terms of theme, into reading it for or 
according to theme” (3).
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of the preposition “of ” (an allegory of ___) as shorthand for anything; it is 
specifically what it is, only transformed into a narrative. At times, of course, 
the phenomenon transformed into a narrative happens to be the kind of 
abstract entity, even “a philosophical, ideological, or moral view or concept,” 
that Prince describes as being characteristic of theme, but this occasional 
coincidence does not amount to identity.
 Moreover, even when the phenomenon transformed in allegory is some 
abstract idea (say, the salvation of the human soul), the relationship between 
the transformational narrative and the phenomenon transformed differs 
from the relationship between a nonallegorical narrative and its theme(s). 
Prince points out that “theme is distinctive, if not unique, because of its 
relation to textual surface structure: it does not consist of textual units, and 
it is different from them in kind; rather, theme is illustrated by any number 
of textual units (or by other macrostructural categories, such as plot, or by 
other themes), just as a general law or rule or precept is illustrated by an 
example” (5, emphasis in original). In the case of allegory, the “textual units” 
function as constitutive elements of the transformed phenomenon because 
that phenomenon has been rendered as a narrative; in other words, the alle-
gory—precisely because it is a narrative—consists of textual units rather 
than being illustrated by them. For example, the character “Envy” (a textual 
unit) in Langland’s Piers Plowman has a role, literally, in the transforma-
tion of the idea of salvation into a narrative, and so it is an element of that 
allegory, not just an illustration of a theme. There are of course still themes 
in strong allegories such as this one, but the allegory itself is something dif-
ferentiable from and superior to individual themes.
 In works such as Piers Plowman or Animal Farm one can draw the dis-
tinction between allegory and theme relatively clearly. The allegory is the 
narrative transformation of some phenomenon, and separate themes might 
exist within that narrative. Thus, Animal Farm allegorizes Soviet-style com-
munism while offering, say, “the corrupting influence of power” as a theme.3 
When we are dealing with what I have called weak allegories, the distinction 
becomes less obvious. If the phenomenon purportedly transformed cannot 
be identified with any real precision, then the textual units that would nor-
mally constitute an allegory do not work with such a concentrated purpose.
 3. Prince draws distinctions between “theme” and several other related concepts, includ-
ing one, “topic,” that also seems to bear some relation to allegory. According to Prince, the 
primary difference between a topic and a theme is that the former can refer to concrete entities 
whereas the latter refers to abstract ideas (5). If this is so, then we might legitimately say that the 
topic of Animal Farm is Soviet-style communism. Though true on one level, this will not suf-
fice because Prince’s definition of topic cannot account for the transformative aspect of Orwell’s 
novel. Only after we recognize the transformation can we identify the topic.
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 The standards for identifying a theme, I submit, are less rigorous than 
those for arguing for allegory because readers generally do not expect a 
theme to encompass all—or even most—of a narrative’s textual units. As 
Prince makes clear, a prominent theme, or one that can be successfully 
argued for, subsumes a greater rather than a lesser number of textual units 
(9), but even the strongest theme does not require the same kind of unity 
of purpose that we see in strong allegories. In a weak allegory, on the other 
hand, some textual units fail to fit in with the majority of the other units that 
comprise the narrativized phenomenon; think back to my chapter on weak 
allegory and the monkey in Coco the Carrot, for example. Such outlying 
textual units often tend to undermine the reader’s confidence in the implied 
author’s intentions, and this lack of certainty might turn us away from alle-
gory and toward theme.
 But what then distinguishes a work that has a particularly strong theme 
and one that we might want to call a weak allegory? Could we reasonably 
argue, in other words, that women’s equality is simply a theme in Coco 
the Carrot and that Kafka’s The Metamorphosis offers us a choice among a 
number of potentially strong themes, including the sense of alienation expe-
rienced by modern humans or the difficulties of the writer’s life? The short 
answer here is that we certainly could, and to do so would probably lower 
the standards in terms of the amount of textual evidence that we would need 
to produce in order to prove our hypothesis effectively. Yet in these partic-
ular examples I suspect that readers will always be pulled toward allegorical 
interpretations because of the respective narratives’ emphasis on figuration.4 
When we have narratives that rely so heavily on figuration and that have 
such a pronounced thematic component, we likely and reasonably incline 
toward reading these texts in a certain way; the term “weak allegory” helps 
to classify both the texts and the way we read them.
 Thus, the hermeneutic effect of strong figuration can mirror that pro-
duced by the presence of embedded allegories. It does not take much, it 
seems, to get many readers moving in the direction of allegorical interpreta-
tion, and once we start down that path, it can be difficult to change interpre-
tive directions. This is why it can be so hard not to read Kafka allegorically 
and why a title such as Philip Roth’s Everyman—an (intentional?) allusion 
to the medieval allegory of the same title—can catalyze allegorical inter-
pretations even if the narrative itself fails to validate such an effort. Even 
as Roth’s novella, for example, bears little resemblance to the late-fifteenth-
 4. In Kafka’s case, both the title of the story and the fact that Gregor undergoes a meta-
morphosis serve to nudge us even more forcefully toward allegory. For a historical overview of 
the tradition in which Kafka seems to be working, see Bruce Clarke’s Allegories of Writing: The 
Subject of Metamorphosis, especially the second chapter, “History of Metamorphic Allegory.”
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century allegorical mystery-morality play, the shared and highly figurative 
title ensures that it is, in the words of the critic James Wood, “haunted by its 
near-namesake,” if only “trivially” (28). Roth’s title guarantees the presence 
of allegory—whether it be a trivial or a profound presence—in his novella, 
but it does not guarantee that the novella will be an allegory. In examples 
such as this one, we have, I submit, allegory present as a potential theme.
 We see a similar phenomenon at play in the oeuvre of J. M. Coetzee, whose 
Elizabeth Costello served as one of my examples of embedded allegory but 
whose other narratives also play with allegory in interesting ways. As Derek 
Attridge notes, “It’s hardly surprising that one of the terms in the critical lex-
icon most frequently applied to Coetzee’s novels and novellas is allegory” (32). 
Attridge points to the “often enigmatic characters,” “the scrupulous avoidance 
of any sense of an authorial presence,” and “the frequently exiguous plots” of 
Coetzee’s fiction as markers that “encourage the reader to look for meanings 
beyond the literal, in a realm of significance which [a number of his novels] 
may be said to imply without ever directly naming” (32).
 While acknowledging the large body of critical ink devoted to allegorical 
interpretations of Coetzee’s work,5 Attridge wants to pursue a different path: 
“With the encouragement of the fiction itself,” he explains, “I want to ask 
what happens if we resist the allegorical reading that the novels seem half to 
solicit, half to problematize, and take them, as it were, at their word” (35). 
Attridge’s path of interpretive resistance has been blazed by Susan Sontag’s 
“Against Interpretation” and Donald Davidson’s “What Metaphors Mean.” 
Both of these essays, according to Attridge, eschew the notion that literary 
works of art intend to “say” something and are instead animated and moti-
vated “by the same impulse: for Sontag what is important about art-works, 
and for Davidson what is important about metaphors, is not what they mean 
but what they do” (37). Thus, Attridge turns a blind eye to the temptation to 
read allegorically and, recognizing that “we are dealing [in Coetzee’s work] 
with novels which, to a greater degree than most, concern themselves with 
the acts of writing and reading, including allegorical writing and reading,” 
decides to ask, as his primary research question, “how allegory is thematized 
in the fiction, and whether this staging of allegory as an issue provides any 
guidance in talking about Coetzee’s use of allegory” (33–34).
 Attridge, therefore, recognizes the presence of the idea of allegory in 
much of Coetzee’s fiction (his focus is on Waiting for the Barbarians and 
Life & Times of Michael K), but he responds to this presence with what he 
calls a literal reading, a reading that “occurs as an event, a living-through 
 5. Among these works are essays by Peter McDonald, David Atwell, and books by Atwell, 
Dominic Head, Teresa Dovey, and Sue Kossew.
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or performing of the text that responds simultaneously to what is said, the 
way in which it is said, and the inventiveness and singularity (if there is any) 
of the saying” (60). This kind of reading, which approximates the point I 
was trying to make about Coetzee’s use of embedded allegory in Elizabeth 
Costello, stands in contrast to readings that tend toward allegoresis because 
these, Attridge contends, “arise less . . . from the actual experience of works 
of literature than from the imperatives that drive literary commentary” (61). 
Attridge helps us to see that the presence of allegory as an idea in a narrative 
text does not necessarily mean that the author intends the entire narrative 
to be an allegory and, consequently, to be read only as such.
 The abstract idea of allegory fits Prince’s description of a theme quite 
well, and there is no reason that a narrative could not be about allegory on 
some level without actually being one. Indeed, I see a great deal of potential 
in allegory as a theme because the ways in which we think about allegory 
can reveal much about how we think about literature, aesthetics, culture, and 
meaning. And we can turn to Philip Roth to witness one author who appar-
ently shares this interest in the idea of allegory. Even more than is the case 
with Everyman, Roth’s American Pastoral is a narrative haunted by allegory, 
a haunting that makes allegory one of the novel’s central themes.
■
The first chapter of American Pastoral is a historically contextualized dis-
course on allegoresis and the problems of interpretation that inhere in this 
process of constructing allegories and allegorical figures. This early chapter 
is an intradiegetic narrative insofar as it serves as the prelude to the pri-
mary narrative that will follow it. As the novel opens, Roth’s narrator is 
reminiscing about his past, and in particular about a boy several years older 
than himself who had come to embody the hope of a community of immi-
grant Jewish families in New Jersey, a handsome and athletically gifted youth 
who had been transformed into a “household Apollo” by his working-class 
neighbors (4). This is the intradiegetic narrative, the story of how this figure 
comes to represent what he does, the story of how, in other words, he has 
been constructed and interpreted as a character by his community. The pri-
mary narrative that follows this early allegorical narrative, however, is essen-
tially a corrective one, one in which the narrator abandons the allegorized 
version of the protagonist for something more mimetic, something more 
real. Clearly, the relationship between the two narratives is problematic, but 
understanding the source of the problems and how they are handled can 
be enlightening with regard both to the novel itself and to allegory more 
generally.
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 At the center of Roth’s story is the novel’s Jewish protagonist, Seymour 
Irving Levov, a star athlete at a Newark high school whose Nordic good 
looks beget the nickname “the Swede.” Coming of age in the 1940s, the 
Swede becomes a mythic, if somewhat unlikely, hero figure for the local 
Jews, a population that typically “venerated academic achievement above 
all else” (3), including athletic exploits. In the context of the Second World 
War, however, the Swede’s physical gifts take on special significance. Nathan 
Zuckerman, Roth’s narrator for this and several other novels, notes that 
“through the Swede, the neighborhood entered into a fantasy about itself 
and about the world, the fantasy of sports fans everywhere: almost like Gen-
tiles (as they imagined Gentiles), our families could forget the way things 
actually work and make an athletic performance the repository of all their 
hopes. Primarily, they could forget the war” (3–4). Yet the Swede seems to 
offer more than the possibility of temporarily forgetting what is happening 
to American soldiers and to the European Jews; he also facilitates a more 
active fantasy. For this neighborhood, at this time, Zuckerman remarks, the 
Swede stands “as a symbol of hope,” as “the embodiment of the strength, the 
resolve, the emboldened valor that would prevail to return our high school’s 
servicemen home unscathed” (5).
 The Swede functions on two figurative levels here. First, he is clearly a 
symbol, someone who represents or stands for a multitude of abstract posi-
tive ideas (hope, strength, innocence, purity) at a time when a particular 
group needs him to do so. In the eyes of his community, the Swede coincides 
perfectly with what he purports—is even required—to represent: “there 
appeared to be not a drop of wit or irony to interfere with his golden gift for 
responsibility” (5). Second, the Swede is also part of a complex of allegories. 
Once the Swede’s symbolic qualities find their way into a narrative structure, 
even a hypothetical one such as the safe return of local soldiers or the ulti-
mate defeat of the Nazis, his nature becomes allegorical. As an allegorical 
figure, the Swede plays the leading role in several public narratives, even if 
he remains unaware of his own significance.
 The Swede’s first allegorical role is as the protagonist of several war-
related scenarios. As Zuckerman notes, “The elevation of Swede Levov into 
the household Apollo of the Weequahic Jews can best be explained, I think, 
by the war against the Germans and the Japanese and the fears that it fos-
tered” (4). Out of these fears, the Swede emerges as a figure who represents 
the potential for American victory and Jewish survival. In this case, the 
hope that the Swede represents is translated into a narrative that has a happy 
ending. This was a period, Zuckerman remarks, “when our entire neigh-
borhood’s wartime hope seemed to converge in the marvelous body of the 
Swede” (20).
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 Perhaps more interesting, however, is the Swede’s role in an even more 
particularly Jewish narrative. In this scenario, the protagonist represents the 
potential for overcoming a kind of Jewish angst. Zuckerman describes this 
angst, and how the Swede is seen to resolve it, in a paragraph that is worth 
quoting entirely:
The Jewishness that [the Swede] wore so lightly as one of the tall, blond 
athletic winners must have spoken to us too—in our idolizing the Swede 
and his unconscious oneness with America, I suppose there was a tinge 
of shame and self-rejection. Conflicting Jewish desires awakened by the 
sight of him were simultaneously becalmed by him; the contradiction in 
Jews who want to fit in and want to stand out, who insist they are different 
and insist they are no different, resolved itself in the triumphant spec-
tacle of this Swede who was actually only another of our neighborhood 
Seymours whose forebears had been Solomons and Sauls and who would 
themselves beget Stephens who would in turn beget Shawns. Where was 
the Jew in him? You couldn’t find it and yet you knew it was there. Where 
was the irrationality in him? Where was the crybaby in him? Where were 
the wayward temptations? No guile. No artifice. No mischief. All that had 
been eliminated to achieve his perfection. No striving, no ambivalence, no 
doubleness—just the style, the natural physical refinement of a star. (20)
The Swede is seen here, again, as the happy resolution to a plot that has 
the potential for disaster. He is the Jew who can be but not seem Jewish, 
the Jew who has achieved a “oneness with America” that has consistently 
proved elusive and illusory to many other Jews. The Swede personifies what 
Zuckerman identifies as the hypothetical teleological apotheosis of Jewish-
American assimilation, the product of “each new generation’s breaking away 
from the parochialism a little further, out of the desire to go the limit in 
America with your rights, forming yourself as an ideal person who gets 
rid of the traditional Jewish habits and attitudes, who frees himself of the 
pre-America insecurities and the old, constraining obsessions so as to live 
unapologetically as an equal among equals” (85). The price of this freedom 
seems to be Jewishness itself, but it also seems to be a price that many would 
have been willing to pay.
 The means by which the Swede realizes his apparent success in this area 
both underscores his differences with other Jews and explains his ability 
to forge his “unconscious” connection with America. As a star athlete, the 
Swede is simultaneously an atypical Jew and the prototypical American icon. 
The Swede’s athletic prowess, in fact, enables him to participate in one of 
American culture’s great collective figures: sport as a metaphor for life, and 
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the sports star as one for whom life in general comes easily. As a boy five 
years younger than his neighborhood idol, Zuckerman is dazzled by the 
Swede’s physical gifts, his grace, and his natural style, all of which charac-
terize the Swede not only as an athlete but also as a kind of ideal human. 
Reflecting on one incident during which the sixteen-year-old Swede calls the 
narrator by his nickname (“Skip”) in front of a group of his friends, Zuck-
erman acknowledges that this recognition from one whom he already con-
sidered a “god” transformed, in his mind, the sports hero into something 
even larger and more significant:
The mock jock self-pity, the manly generosity, the princely graciousness, 
the athlete’s self-pleasure so abundant that a portion can be freely given 
to the crowd—this munificence not only overwhelmed me and wafted 
through me because it had come wrapped in my nickname but became 
fixed in my mind as an embodiment of something grander even than 
his talent for sports: the talent for “being himself,” the capacity to be this 
strange engulfing force and yet to have a voice and a smile unsullied by 
even a flicker of superiority—the natural modesty of someone for whom 
there were no obstacles, who appeared never to have to struggle to clear a 
space for himself. (19)
This is a powerful and persistent act of allegorical figuration, or allegoresis, 
one that even today we find tempting, especially with our sports heroes.
 We can see that the Swede functions as the protagonist in a variety of 
related allegories. In just the first chapter of American Pastoral, the Swede 
is the central figure in allegories of the overcoming of the Germans and 
the Japanese, the overcoming of the difficulty of Jewish assimilation into 
American cultural and social life, and the overcoming of the difficulties asso-
ciated with life in general. In all three cases, the literal narrative facilitates 
a movement toward anagogy (interpretation in spiritual terms) on the part 
of the interpreters. Success on the basketball court or baseball field, or a 
simple act of kindness, for example, is endowed with near-mystical meaning 
as it is reread in allegorical terms. The agents behind the allegorizing in this 
early section of the novel are Roth’s characters—including his first-person 
narrator—and this is important to keep in mind because Roth sets out in 
American Pastoral not to write an allegory, but rather to write a novel largely 
about allegory.
 The fact that we have Roth’s narrator acting as a commentator, helping 
us to interpret and assign meaning to these narratives, further strengthens 
the claim that we are in fact dealing with allegoresis here, even if it is as a 
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theme rather than as a genre.6 Zuckerman’s narration includes his explica-
tion of the Swede’s figurative significance and the ways in which that alle-
gorized figure functioned within his particular “interpretive community.” 
Roth’s intention is not to be allegorical in writing this section of American 
Pastoral; rather, he takes as one of his themes the allegorization of the Swede. 
Through Zuckerman, Roth is looking back on and representing realistically 
several fictional acts of allegoresis.
 This representation of allegory (or of allegoresis) is what I am calling 
thematic allegory. In American Pastoral Roth uses the early representation 
of allegory as the impetus to construct a counternarrative, one that will ulti-
mately allow his narrator to rewrite a story that risks leading to a failed 
allegory. In order to understand how Roth’s thematization of allegory leads 
to this rewriting, however, we need to examine the effect that the presence 
of allegory in this work has on three important and closely related narrato-
logical issues that bear heavily on the concept of allegory: characterization, 
plot, and focalization.
■
Since the object of an allegorical narrative is to transform some phenomenon 
into a figural narrative, the primary allegorical narrative depends on the 
careful coordination of character, plot, and focalization. All of these aspects 
of narrative must work together to facilitate the transmission of the author’s 
intended meaning. In such works, the author would ostensibly begin with 
the idea and construct a narrative—including characters and a plot—that 
facilitates its reception by the reader. When allegory appears thematically in 
the context of a realistic narrative, however, we tend to see a case of reverse 
engineering. The author’s representation of the process of allegoresis reveals 
the artificiality that remains behind the scenes and uncovers certain insta-
bilities that seem paradoxical to the nature of allegory. Roth’s depiction of 
the Swede, for example, allows the reader to see that an act of allegoresis 
necessarily occurs in a determinative context—a nexus of historical, polit-
ical, and personal forces that facilitates various interpretations of Seymour 
Irving Levov—and that any allegory that results from a particular act of alle-
goresis is dynamic rather than stable. In thematic allegory, in other words, 
the progression of the narrative continually changes the landscape in which 
 6. The opening chapter of American Pastoral comes close to being what Frye calls an 
actual allegory—or at least the re-presentation of an actual allegory—because Zuckerman fairly 
“explicitly indicates the relationship of his images to examples and precepts” (Frye 90). Indeed, 
Zuckerman tells us quite clearly what the Swede meant to those in his community. 
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interpretation takes place, thereby putting constant pressure on the resultant 
allegory, pressure that it may not always be able to bear.7
 This state of affairs is in keeping with Prince’s general conception of how 
we read for themes: we identify them as possibilities, and then verify as we 
progress through the narrative. Like any narrative, a primary allegorical nar-
rative is kinetic, but the phenomenon transformed by that narrative tends 
to be stable, oftentimes resembling one of a culture’s recognizable master 
plots.8 In strong allegories, the primary narrative always seems to build easily 
toward this secondary narrative; any difficulties in constructing characters 
and a plot that work seamlessly with the intended secondary narrative have 
been “edited out,” as it were, of the final draft. Thematic allegory, on the other 
hand, lays bare all of the inner workings of allegoresis because the narrative 
depicts the process of constructing the allegorical narrative. As the primary 
narrative progresses, the meaning that the act of allegoresis was meant to 
capture is repeatedly assailed by new events, new developments, new revela-
tions, and new interpretations. The passage of chronological time in Amer-
ican Pastoral has precisely this effect on the meaning of the Swede. As Zuck-
erman takes the reader from the 1950s into the 1990s, the Swede’s allegorical 
significance is questioned, denied, and ultimately radically revised.
 If Zuckerman’s commentary serves to clarify the allegorical nature of 
the Swede, as I claim above, its unfolding as the narrative progresses also 
allows the readers to recognize that we are not intended to accept this alle-
gorical representation as a sufficient or final interpretation of this character. 
Although we are not meant to question the fact that the Swede did function 
allegorically, we are meant to think critically about the process of allegoresis 
that led to the Swede’s embodying all that he did for his community and 
to question whether our understanding the Swede as a figure in a series of 
related allegorical narratives is sufficient or even accurate. Indeed, Zuck-
erman himself is skeptical as he remembers and reconstructs the past—the 
Swede’s, his own, and his community’s.
 The impetus to remember the Swede, and then to reinterpret him, comes 
in the mid-1990s in the form of a letter that Zuckerman receives from the 
protagonist himself, a letter that invites the narrator to meet in order to 
discuss the Swede’s recently deceased father, for whom the son is suppos-
edly struggling to write a memorial tribute. The letter and the subsequent 
 7. In retrospect, Zuckerman acknowledges the inherent instability of the allegory his 
community has created around the Swede: “Even as boys,” he avers, “we must have known that 
it couldn’t have been as easy for him as it looked, that a part of it was a mystique” (83).
 8. Abbot defines master plots as “Recurrent skeletal stories, belonging to cultures and in-
dividuals that play a powerful role in questions of identity, values, and the understanding of life” 
(192). He points to Cinderella and the Horatio Alger story, among others, as examples (42–43). 
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meeting have the effect of forcing Zuckerman to revisit the idealized image 
of the Swede that both he and his entire neighborhood held and to come to 
a new understanding of who the Swede is and what he represents. Looking 
back as an adult, Zuckerman is skeptical of the allegories that he and his 
community had constructed around the Swede, and he begins to question, 
to dig beneath the surface, figuratively speaking. Zuckerman recognizes and 
celebrates the smooth surface that facilitated the various allegories about 
the Swede, but he begins, in retrospect, to wonder about the reality beneath 
that surface: “Only . . . what did he do for subjectivity? What was the Swede’s 
subjectivity? There had to be a substratum, but its composition was unimagi-
nable” (20).
 That substratum is unimaginable to Zuckerman because he is, at this 
point, still blinded by the narrative of the Swede that dominated his youth. 
In anticipation of their meeting as adults, Zuckerman wonders “What, if 
anything, had ever threatened to destabilize the Swede’s trajectory” (20). 
That upward trajectory, however, is the one imposed on the Swede; it is the 
natural playing-out of his allegory’s narrative plot. Zuckerman knows intui-
tively that no real life could unfold in the ideal, obstacle-less manner that 
the Swede’s seemed to, and that his allegory would more or less require, but 
he cannot imagine the alternative, the counternarrative that would serve 
as the corrective to the naïve allegory: “No one,” Zuckerman muses, “gets 
through [life] unmarked by brooding, grief, confusion, and loss. Even those 
who had it all as kids sooner or later get the average share of misery, if not 
sometimes more. There had to have been consciousness and there had to 
have been blight. Yet I could not picture the form taken by either, could not 
desimplify him even now: in the residuum of adolescent imagination I was 
still convinced that for the Swede it had to have been pain-free all the way” 
(20). Our narrator, as he admits, is unable to provide a point of view other 
than that of his youth; he can only focalize the Swede and his story in one 
way. This conflicts, however, with his sense of reality. He realizes that his 
vision of the Swede is simplified, naïve, and, in a word, allegorized, but “the 
residuum of adolescent imagination” does not allow him to see the Swede in 
a more complicated, realistic way.
 Although the Swede is not, strictly speaking, an example of a personified 
abstraction (such as Hope or Charity, for example), Zuckerman’s difficulty 
in imagining him leading a life narrative that has a complicated, convoluted, 
or circuitous plot is in keeping with Gordon Teskey’s claim that “in allegory 
narrative and personification are inversely prominent” (23). Allegories that 
rely heavily on personification tend, in other words, to have simple plots. “In 
Johnson’s allegories, for example,” Teskey explains, “the thought represented 
by a series of personified abstractions is carefully worked out so that only 
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the most rudimentary narrative is required to link the elements of the series 
together” (23). Zuckerman’s simplification of the Swede is actually more a 
simplification of plot than of character; given his conception of this figure, 
Zuckerman cannot imagine him in a complicated plot.
 As we get to the end of the first chapter of the novel, however, we see Zuck-
erman actively beginning to reexamine this simplified vision of the Swede; he 
is recounting the allegorical aspects of the Swede in order to reevaluate those 
allegories and to reread the figure at the center of them. Indeed, the narra-
tive moves through the first chapter of the novel from the point where “the 
Swede” was a “magical name” attached to a mythlike figure who is the hero of 
several allegorized narratives, to a moment when Zuckerman, after a meeting 
with the Swede in 1995, decides that “This guy is the embodiment of nothing” 
(39). Even in characterizing him as “the embodiment of nothing,” however, 
Zuckerman continues to see the Swede in figurative terms, as a vessel that 
carries significant meaning at one point, but who, when viewed from a dif-
ferent vantage point at a different time, embodies the concept of nothingness; 
he becomes the representation of the vacuous sports hero or Hollywood star. 
“There’s nothing here but what you’re looking at,” Zuckerman tells himself. 
“He’s all about being looked at. He always was” (39).
 At this point it has become clear to both Zuckerman and the reader that 
we do not know the real Swede, if such a thing can be said to exist. Zucker-
man’s dual role of narrator and participant in the past events of his narra-
tion seem to preclude any objective or mimetic representation of the main 
figure of the narrative. As a writer, Zuckerman recognizes and accepts—even 
embraces—the difficulty of accurately portraying a human figure. When 
trying to understand others, he laments, “You get them wrong before you 
meet them, while you’re anticipating meeting them; you get them wrong 
while you’re with them; and then you go home to tell somebody else about 
the meeting and you get them all wrong again. Since the same generally goes 
for them with you, the whole thing is really a dazzling illusion empty of all 
perception, an astonishing farce of misperception” (35). The first chapter 
of American Pastoral is the chronicling of Zuckerman’s misreadings of the 
Swede, of the various ways in which he gets or has gotten him wrong. But it 
is also Zuckerman’s recognition and confession of the fact that this has been 
the case. Indeed, his difficulty reading the Swede serves as a kind of perverse 
reminder that he is alive: “The fact remains that getting people right is not 
what living is all about anyway. It’s getting them wrong that is living, getting 
them wrong and wrong and wrong and then, on careful reconsideration, get-
ting them wrong again. That’s how we know we’re alive: we’re wrong” (35). 
It is with this pronouncement that Zuckerman begins the process of decon-
structing the allegory that for so many years had stood as his conception of 
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the Swede. In order to do so, he must refocalize the narrative.
 We have in this novel a clear and significant shift in focalization. I’m 
using the term focalization here to refer exclusively to the perspective—as 
opposed to voice—through which the narrative is represented. The narra-
tive voice remains relatively consistent throughout the novel; it is that of 
Zuckerman the narrator. Zuckerman, however, has a kind of epiphany at 
his fiftieth high school reunion and decides to alter the way in which he has 
been focalizing the Swede and his story. In the opening, allegorical section, 
Zuckerman’s status as a homodiegetic narrator (he participated in the nar-
rative he recounts and was profoundly influenced by the figure at the center 
of his story) makes it difficult for him to view the Swede realistically.9 At the 
reunion, however, he learns more about the fate of the Swede after Zuck-
erman was no longer a consistent character in the narrative. It is here, as 
Zuckerman dances with a former classmate, that he admits to a kind of focal 
shift, admits to having
lifted onto my stage the boy we were all going to follow into America, our 
point man into the next immersion, at home here the way the Wasps were 
at home here, an American not by sheer striving, not by being a Jew who 
invents a famous vaccine or a Jew on the Supreme Court, not by being 
the most brilliant or the most eminent or the best. Instead—by virtue of 
his isomorphism to the Wasp world—he does it the ordinary way, the 
natural way, the regular American-guy way. To the honeysweet strains of 
“Dream,” I pulled away from myself, pulled away from the reunion, and I 
dreamed. . . . I dreamed a realistic chronicle. I began gazing into his life—
not his life as a god or demigod in whose triumphs one could exult as a boy 
but his life as another assailable man. (89)
From here, Zuckerman recedes from the diegesis and becomes a more tra-
ditional heterodiegetic narrator. He pulls away from himself, as he says, and 
attempts to see the Swede more objectively so as to portray him more realis-
tically. The voice is still unmistakably Zuckerman’s, but the vision we get of 
the Swede is no longer determined by the allegorical version of the character 
that dominates the first chapter.
 The shift from homo- to heterodiegesis entails a similar shift from 
internal to zero or free focalization. At the beginning, the story is obviously 
 9. The focalization in the first chapter is admittedly somewhat more complicated than 
this. Zuckerman is relating the events of this chapter retrospectively, and so he is not literally a 
participant in those events. Nevertheless, he was an actor in the events that compose that nar-
rative’s plot, and this fact is significant because it has unmistakably limited how he has been able 
to view the Swede.
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focused through Zuckerman the character and, by association, his Jewish 
community. This focalization makes the maintenance of the allegorical 
reading of the Swede understandable in an ethnocentric context. It also 
reveals a kind of childlike naïveté, which Zuckerman recognizes in retro-
spect by acknowledging that he was still under the sway of that “residuum of 
adolescent imagination.” It is only in shedding this limited perspective that 
Zuckerman is able to portray the Swede from a more realistic, “desimplified” 
vantage point, even if the story that comes out of that perspective is largely 
imagined or “dreamed.”
 Roth’s shift in focalization allows him to allow his narrator to tell a story 
that would not be possible to tell if the early allegorized version of the Swede 
remained intact. The initial characterization of the Swede effectively limits 
the direction of any plot that Zuckerman can conceive, given his pre-under-
standing of the central figure. When he removes the filter through which 
he has seen the Swede, new narrative possibilities present themselves. And 
when Zuckerman learns that the Swede had a daughter from his first mar-
riage who killed a man when she exploded a bomb in protest of the war 
in Vietnam, he realizes that the Swede’s “pastoral” narrative has exploded 
as well; this daughter has transported the Swede “out of the longed-for 
American pastoral and into everything that is its antithesis and its enemy, 
into the fury, the violence, and the desperation of the counterpastoral—into 
the indigenous American berserk” (86). At this point, Zuckerman seems 
to realize that his initial conception of the character of the Swede coupled 
with the new plot twist has exploded, so to speak, the allegorical narrative 
established early on. This development then necessitates a re-vision of the 
primary narrative.
 This reworking takes the form of a less idealistic reading of the Swede 
that Zuckerman produces after his epiphany on the dance floor. Interest-
ingly, Zuckerman uses the “dream,” which is a traditional marker of allegory, 
to signify entrance into a mimetic narrative that will serve as a counternarra-
tive to the allegorical, but “real,” narrative that we have had so far concerning 
our protagonist. The reference to dreams and dream worlds is usually indica-
tive not of “realistic chronicles” but rather of allegories. In this case, though, 
what was ostensibly the real narrative—the one Zuckerman “participated in” 
as a youth—seems less plausible than the fictionalized account of the Swede 
that he eventually endeavors to create.
 The primary difference between the two competing narratives is Zuck-
erman’s evolved understanding of the plot, the events of the Swede’s life. 
The first chapter is dominated by a seemingly immutable character, and the 
perceived ontology of the Swede limits plot possibilities.10 As Zuckerman 
 10. I would hold that this limitation is prevalent in all traditional or strong allegories. If a 
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begins to realize the complex nature of his character’s life, he also realizes 
that his allegorical narrative has become insufficient and untenable. His 
eventual move to free focalization allows for the interplay between char-
acter and plot to become much more complicated because the narrator is 
ready to “desimplify” his subject. In Zuckerman’s own words, he sets out to 
“chart [the Swede’s] collapse” and “to make of him, as time wore on, the most 
important figure of my life” (74). As he does so, plot becomes a stronger 
force than character, shattering the original allegories constructed around 
the Swede and forcing both narrator and reader to resituate this figure in a 
revised master narrative that is, given both its juxtaposition with the early 
allegorical reading of the Swede and Roth’s title, ironic.
 Zuckerman’s dualistic approach to the Swede and his story brings us back 
to a question that was raised in the introduction: is all interpretation—even 
of characters—somehow allegorical? This possibility certainly presents itself 
in this novel, for even the “realistic chronicle” that is meant to override the 
simplified notion of the Swede presented in the first chapter leads to an alle-
gorical interpretation. When he is no longer able to see the Swede’s story as 
the story of (Jewish) American success, Zuckerman instead sees it as the story 
of modern American calamity: “His great looks, his larger-than-lifeness, his 
glory, our sense of his having been exempted from all self-doubt by his heroic 
role—that all these manly properties had precipitated a political murder 
made me think of the compelling story . . . of Kennedy, John F. Kennedy, only 
a decade the Swede’s senior and another privileged son of fortune, another 
man of glamour exuding American meaning, assassinated while still in his 
mid-forties just five years before the Swede’s daughter violently protested the 
Kennedy–Johnson war and blew up her father’s life. I thought, But of course. 
He is our Kennedy” (83). Thus, we witness here the process by which Zuck-
erman adapts his reading of the Swede to the allegorical exigencies made 
manifest by the progression of the plot. Zuckerman reweaves his early version 
of the Swede into an allegorical narrative that tracks along a downward, tragic 
trajectory rather than an upward, pastoral, and anagogic one.
 Nevertheless, the recasting of the Swede in an alternative allegorical plot 
(the one meant to correspond with or call to mind the rise and fall of Ken-
nedy) does not lead to the conclusion that all interpretation is allegory or 
that all reading is allegoresis, particularly given the way in which I am using 
“allegory” here. Indeed, my claim is that although Zuckerman’s narrative is 
allegorical, Roth’s narrative is not. Roth uses Zuckerman’s narrative to the-
matize allegory, to highlight Zuckerman’s allegorizing of the Swede and to 
invite us to think about the habit of reading others’ lives in allegorical terms. 
character is going to hold as an allegorical figure, the range both of what can and cannot happen 
to him or her and of what he or she can do is necessarily limited.
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If all interpretation were allegory, then I would have to say that there’s some-
thing allegorical about Roth’s thematizing. But since one of Roth’s thematic 
points is that allegory is often reductive, allegorizing his narrative would 
undermine his thematizing—and do so in a way that I don’t believe the novel 
invites. To put these points another way, I claim—using American Pastoral 
as an example—that an interpretation of a narrative can uncover the repre-
sentation of allegory as a theme within a narrative that is not (necessarily) 
allegorical. Unlike many other themes, allegory is inherently narrative; con-
sequently, the representation of this theme allows readers to glimpse the 
narrative structure that underlies allegory more generally. Ultimately, I hope 
to have demonstrated that a careful analysis of that intradiegetic narrative 
structure—an analysis that highlights what Frye calls those “niggling subtle-
ties of textual studies” (plot, character, and focalization, in this case)—can 
go a long way toward helping us to understand how allegory works and, on 
occasion, why it fails to do so.
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The kind  of treatment that Roth gives allegory in American Pastoral has 
a peculiarly modern stamp on it; it takes a modern, cynical disposition to 
call into question the very possibility of the kind of uplifting and redemp-
tive allegory that the Swede’s story starts out to be. We are perhaps too jaded 
now for this kind of artificial transformation, and so we can accept allegory 
only as an idea or a theme—and a quaint one at that—to be dissected and 
analyzed. When we look to the past, and to allegory’s past in particular, we 
see something far removed from our current climate and that of our recent 
past, something that in many respects strikes us—as it did Nathan Zuck-
erman—as barely plausible anymore. Ironically, we have arrived at a collec-
tive decision that allegory (or a particular kind of allegory, anyway) is no 
longer realistic.
 When we do not believe in allegory anymore, it becomes increasingly 
rare that we see entire allegorical narratives and more likely that when we 
do see allegory present in a narrative it will be in one of the more limited 
ways that I have tried to describe in this book.1 In this chapter, I want to 
explore one additional modern manifestation of allegory, a complicated one 
that depends on our modern skeptical attitude toward allegorical figuration 
but that also reveals its enduring appeal. I call this manifestation “ironic 
 1. When we do encounter contemporary strong allegories—such as John Barth’s “Click,” 
which I discuss in the following chapter—they tend to be very self-aware and self-conscious of 
their status as such.
Ironic Allegory
dante and Mann
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150  •  Chapter 5
allegory.” Ironic allegory, like all allegory according to my definition, entails 
a transformation of some phenomenon into a figural narrative; in the case 
of ironic allegory, however, the authorial audience is not meant to take this 
transformation at face value or seriously. I will use Thomas Mann’s Death in 
Venice as my case study in ironic allegory, but it will be helpful to begin this 
chapter with a look further back historically for some context and for a text 
that I can use as a “straight” foil for Mann’s highly ironic text. I will start, 
therefore, with a brief discussion of Dante and allegory before moving on to 
discuss Death in Venice. This preliminary work will serve two purposes: first, 
it will provide a background against which to read Mann’s modernist work, 
thus allowing me to highlight certain rhetorical and aesthetic facets that are 
central to his text; and, second, it will allow me to demonstrate how we can 
read one particular twentieth-century narrative as an instance of ironic alle-
gory.
 Dante is a logical introduction to any discussion of allegory, because he 
was both an allegorical writer and one of the earliest and most insightful 
theorists of allegory. He was, simply put, a man driven by the metaliterary, 
and he was constantly trying to explain all that literature could be and all 
that one could say with it. Dante used the idea of allegory to free himself 
from both the limitations and the potential incriminations of the literal. As 
he explains it in the Banquet, a postexile2 commentary on his own poetry, 
the allegorical is the sense that is concealed by a beautiful lie.3 Such an expla-
nation was intended to protect literature from the charge that it was a genre 
that dealt only in lies, and was thus a dangerous enterprise. Unlike theology, 
which is true on every level, literature speaks the truth only once the reader 
has gotten beyond the literal. The object of the reader, then, is to unveil the 
truth through his or her understanding of the poem. As this proves a dif-
ficult task, Dante often reads his poetry for us, telling us explicitly how to 
work through the literal to the allegorical, and even beyond that to the moral 
and the anagogic. Despite his facility with them, however, words frustrate 
Dante,4 and he seems to sense that once he has committed himself to paper, 
the work of controlling his meaning is just beginning. Because Dante wants 
to maintain that truth underlies the literal, he finds himself in the somewhat 
 2. As a result of his being on the “wrong side” of a political struggle, Dante, at about 
thirty-six years of age, was exiled from his native Florence, and he never returned.
 3. Dante defines these terms at the outset of the second book of the Banquet. Here he 
argues that beyond the literal sense of a work of fiction, there is a second sense, the allegorical, 
which is “a truth hidden under a beautiful fiction” (73).
 4. Dante’s De Vulgari Eloquentia (On the Eloquence of the Vernacular) is essentially the 
search for a language that works better for expressing meaning than either Latin or any one 
particular Italian vernacular. Significantly, this work is unfinished.
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awkward and undoubtedly exhausting position of continually playing Virgil 
to the lost pilgrims reading his works, always pointing us toward an extralit-
eral significance. In Dante in particular there is always a personal imperative 
behind his project; indeed, one often feels while reading Dante that Dante’s 
own existence, or at least its significance, depends on his defense and inter-
pretation of allegory.
 There is, in fact, an interesting connection between Dante’s allegorical 
construction of literary character and the way in which he deconstructs 
and reconstructs his own self. This relationship is particularly apparent in 
the pre-exile libello The New Life, a work in which Dante, in his mid-to-late 
twenties, looks back at what he considers the most formative experience 
of his life: his peculiarly one-sided relationship with Beatrice, the young 
woman whom he first sees when both are about nine years old and who 
continues to absorb his thoughts and dominate both the substance and the 
tenor of his work throughout his life. As The New Life has no real plot—the 
“action” is essentially confined to Dante’s musings about his beloved and 
the effect that she has on him—character takes center stage. And central to 
Dante’s project is allegorical figuration.
 Prosopopeia is Dante’s trope of choice in this endeavor, as he makes Love 
one of the principal characters in his narrative. Although confined to Dante’s 
dreams and imagination, Love assumes a prominent role in this story; so 
much so, in fact, that Dante, just after seeing Beatrice for the first time, con-
fesses that “Love ruled over my soul, which was so early espoused to him, 
and he began to assume over me such assurance and such mastery, through 
the power that my imagination gave him, that I was obliged to do all his 
bidding fully” (49). Yet Dante does not limit his personification of Love to 
the rhetorical realm—speaking or writing of Love as if it had human quali-
ties—but rather undertakes the complete anthropomorphism of this figure. 
Love, as an emotion, does not simply rule over Dante, but really appears to 
him, and through him to the reader, as “a figure of a master, of an aspect 
frightening to whoever might behold him” (49), or, later, as “a young man 
dressed in whitest garments; and with the aspect of one deep in thought . . .” 
(63).5 That Dante ascribes to Love such human physical traits conforms to 
 5. Dante is concerned about how his readers might react to his use of an allegorical figure 
such as this one, and he addresses the issue directly in this work. Following one of his sonnets 
in The New Life, a sonnet in which he characterizes Love as a personified abstraction, Dante 
undertakes a complicated argument in support of the propriety of his using such an allegorical 
figure in his versification. His “proof ” ends as follows: 
Consequently, because to poets is granted greater license of expression than to prose 
writers, and these writers in rhyme are none other than poets of the vernacular, wor-
thy and reasonable it is that to them is granted a greater license to speak than is 
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the original meaning of prosopopeia, which derives from the Greek prosopon 
(person or face) and poiia (to make), and makes this figure a good example 
of the trope.6
 Just as important as the visage is Dante’s attribution of a voice to this 
figure, for it is through Love’s speech that the protagonist-narrator establishes 
and maintains a separation between himself and his figure.7 To a certain 
extent, this work depends on the readers’ understanding Love as an example 
of prosopopeia rather than as a synecdoche, rather, that is, than a part of the 
narrator which, at the time of the events narrated, has become the dominant 
aspect of his own personality and, as a result, seems to speak for the whole. 
Indeed, as in all of his writings, Dante strives here to maintain a rather care-
fully conceived sense of order and proportion. Thus, he does not allow his 
love for Beatrice to manifest itself as a temporary infatuation that forces 
him to lose perspective (as what we call love often tends to do), but rather 
abstracts love from himself, gives it an aspect and a voice, and makes of it a 
rational figure to which one may logically submit oneself. As Dante concedes 
near the opening of the narrative, “although [Beatrice’s] image . . . gave Love 
its strength to rule over me, it was nevertheless of such noble power that at 
no time did it allow Love to rule me without the faithful counsel of reason, in 
those things where such counsel was useful to heed” (49).
 In ceding power and control to Love, Dante has, in a sense, made this 
figure the allegorical hero of the tale, for it is Love that, or perhaps who, ulti-
mately calls the shots for Dante. In his influential work on allegory, Angus 
Fletcher argues that “A systematically complicated character will generate a 
large number of other protagonists who react against or with him in a syl-
logistic manner. I say ‘generate,’” Fletcher continues, “because the heroes 
granted to the other writers in the vernacular; hence if a certain figure or rhetorical 
color is granted poets, it is granted to vernacular versifiers. Therefore, if we see that 
poets have addressed inanimate things as if they had sense and reason, and have made 
them speak to each other: and not only of true things but of things not true: that is, 
they have said of things non-existent that they speak, and said that many accidents 
speak as if they were substances and human beings; worthy is the vernacular writer 
in rhyme to do the same, but not without a reason, rather with a reason that is then 
possible to disclose in prose. (109)
Dante wants to make room for his treating Love allegorically, as a personified abstraction that 
rules his thoughts and actions. If he can do so, then his motives can be seen as pure; if Love 
is indeed his master, then his approach to Beatrice must be validated, if not entirely beyond 
reproach. He might not always have been good, but he had good intentions.
 6. Prosopagnosia, interestingly, is the term for the rare condition of being unable to rec-
ognize others by their faces. Sufferers often have experienced trauma to the cerebral cortex.
 7. In The Poetics of Personification, James Paxon claims that “the speaking aspect of a 
prosopopeia is essential in describing a personification character’s essential status” (3).
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in Dante and Spenser and Bunyan seem to create the worlds about them” 
(35). While this claim seems particularly valid in reference to a work such 
as Dante’s The Divine Comedy, where the pilgrim does in some sense gen-
erate the allegorical figures he encounters during his travels, The New Life 
is not a perfectly analogous case. Dante, in this earlier work, goes to great 
lengths to assure himself and his reader that he has not generated the figure 
of Love, but rather that the figure of Love has somehow generated him, has 
given him, both literally and figuratively, a new life. Although we readers 
intuitively know that Love, Beatrice, and even the figure we know as Dante 
in this work are really generated by the author Dante, the text itself asks us 
to participate in the fiction’s narrative audience by allowing the separation 
that the author wants to effect between what would seem to be the insepa-
rable pair of a person and one of his emotions. If Dante can successfully 
negotiate for the autonomy of Love, then he will have ultimately succeeded 
in relegating himself to a secondary role in his own story. “The allegorical 
hero,” as Fletcher explains, “is not so much a real person as he is a generator 
of other secondary personalities, which are partial aspects of himself ” (35). 
And Dante, more than anything else, wants to be recognized as participating 
in a Love that is noble and transcendent, not as simply and obsessively being 
in love, in the sense that he is characterized by that particular, and particu-
larly human, emotional state.
 To convey this complicated relationship between himself and Love, Dante 
represents his allegorical protagonist as, not unlike the monster in Shelley’s 
Frankenstein, quickly becoming independent of the mind that begot him. 
One of the ways that Dante accomplishes this is by representing Love as, at 
times, incomprehensible, both insofar as Love transcends the limits of the 
human protagonist and insofar as what Love actually says to Dante often 
proves indecipherable. Love’s occasional obscurity furthers Dante’s allegor-
ical ends because it forces both him and the reader to question the literal and 
to look for “deeper” meanings.
 When, for example, Love appears to Dante in the twelfth chapter and 
confronts the protagonist with the Latin metaphor “Ego tanquam centrum 
circuli, cui simili modo se habent circumferentie partes; tu autem non sic” 
[“I am like the center of a circle, to which all the points of the circumference 
bear the same relation; you, however, are not”] (65), I suspect that the reader, 
like the protagonist, is not supposed to understand. That neither he nor the 
reader does understand effectively releases Love from the confines of the 
literal and intimates that its real meaning is figural, and perhaps somehow 
beyond our ken. It is—significantly—at this point in the narrative that Love 
becomes an active and guiding force, relegating the young Dante to the 
role of a minor character. “Ask no more than may be useful to you,” Love 
154  •  Chapter 5
replies to Dante’s question about the obscurity of the Latin circle metaphor, 
after which he proceeds—in a style remarkably similar to that of a hostage-
taker—to instruct the poet to compose for Beatrice “certain words in rhyme, 
in which you make clear the power that I hold over you through her. . . . Let 
these words be like an intermediary, so that you do not speak to her directly, 
which is not fitting; and do not send them without me to any place where 
she might hear them, but let them be adorned with sweet harmony, in which 
I will be present whenever it is necessary” (65).
 Love’s counsel serves as the intended modus operandi for the duration of 
the work; essentially, Dante will write courtly love poems for Beatrice. As the 
story moves forward, however, Dante’s point of emphasis often shifts from 
Beatrice to his own emotional state, a shift that leads to his being upbraided 
by a group of female acquaintances and subsequently to an important 
moment of self-criticism. The crucial passage occurs after Dante has com-
posed a sonnet that reveals some of the suffering caused by his unrequited 
love:
Oftentimes there come to mind
the dark qualities that Love bestows upon me,
and there comes to me pity, so that often
I say: “Ah! can this happen to someone?”;
for Love assails me suddenly,
so that life almost abandons me:
there survives in me but one live spirit,
and that remains because it speaks of you.
Then I struggle, seeking to help myself;
and all pale, of all valor empty,
I come to see you, thinking to be healed:
and if I raise my eyes to look,
in my heart arises a tremor
that from my pulses causes the soul to part. (77, 79)
Stepping back to review his work, Dante senses that his poetry—including 
this sonnet and two that have immediately preceded it—has become too 
personal, and perhaps too maudlin, because, he confesses, “After I wrote 
these three sonnets in which I spoke to this lady, for they were the narrators 
of almost everything about my condition, I believed I should keep silent and 
write no more, for I seemed to have revealed much about myself . . .” (79). 
A chance meeting with several “gentle ladies” reinforces this feeling, as one 
of them asks Dante to what end or purpose he loves Beatrice, when it seems 
as though he cannot even bear to be in her presence. Dante responds that 
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Beatrice’s mere greeting “was the end of all my desires. But because it pleased 
her to deny it to me,8 my Lord Love, in his mercy, has placed all my beatitude 
in that which cannot fail me” (81), which he reveals to be the words that 
he uses to praise Beatrice. In a sharp rebuttal, however, one of the women 
replies to Dante: “If you were speaking the truth to us, those words that you 
have said to us in making known your condition you would have used with 
another purpose” (81). This comment serves as a catalyst for Dante’s decision 
to focus all of his literary efforts on offering “words in praise of this most 
gentle one” (81).
 Dante’s subsequent praise of Beatrice brings to mind the kind of hyper-
bolic rhetoric that we often associate with being in love, or just loving more 
generally. And this rhetoric has a storied history in literary works. As exam-
ples, Romeo’s often over-the-top claims about Juliet (“She doth teach the 
torches to burn bright”)9 or even Hamlet’s praise of his murdered father (“so 
loving to my mother / That he might not beteem the winds of heaven / Visit 
her face too roughly” [I.ii. 10–12]) can serve nicely. But as readers, we need 
to evaluate these claims, to decide what intention prompts their utterance 
and to decide whether we should take them at face value, or not. So, do we 
accept Dante’s claims regarding Beatrice’s perfection as being made in good 
faith and as being true; do we accept that he believes these claims but recog-
nize his words of praise as the rhetorical manifestations of a youthful obses-
sion; or do we dismiss the claims altogether because we sense that Dante has 
some ulterior motive in making them?
 While we can obviously never know with complete certainty, most 
readers tend to believe that Dante acts and speaks in good faith in this 
work, even as we remain skeptical about his “reading” of Beatrice. We trust 
Dante’s sincerity for several reasons; these include our ability to empathize 
with the condition of loving someone; our historical understanding of the 
traditions of the European troubadours and the concept of courtly love; the 
fact that Dante does not appear averse to self-criticism (in fact, at times he is 
almost too critical of himself); and, finally, the fact that Dante’s feelings for 
and treatment of Beatrice remain constant long past her death, despite the 
opportunities he has to “move on with his life,” to use a phrase in the current 
vernacular.
 8. Earlier in the narrative Dante has feigned interest in another woman as a kind of screen. 
This relationship becomes the source of some gossip within Dante’s circle, and he is spoken of in 
terms that go “beyond the bounds of courtesy” (63). Consequently, Beatrice once fails to greet 
him when they encounter each other; this snub has a profound impact on Dante.
 9. For an interesting interpretation of Romeo’s feelings for Juliet and of the reader’s will-
ingness to credit these feelings, see the chapter titled “Love Stories” in Tzachi Zamir’s Double 
Vision: Moral Philosophy and Shakespearean Drama.
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 The death of Beatrice, as one would expect, has a profound influence 
on Dante, and the poetry that issues immediately from it naturally returns 
to the theme of his “condition,” which can only be characterized as pitiable. 
A full year later, still depressed by Beatrice’s passing and still plagued by 
“painful thoughts to such an extent that they gave [his] outward appearance 
a look of dreadful dismay” (131), Dante notices a young and very beautiful 
woman whom he perceives to have noticed his own anguish and who seems 
to empathize with him. Reasoning that one who evinces such compassion 
for someone else’s suffering must possess in herself “a most noble love” (131), 
Dante resolves to write a sonnet in which he describes this event and his 
interpretation of it. This leads to his paying a visit to this lady and to what 
appears to be a growing attraction to her. “I came to such a point,” he con-
fesses, “through the sight of this lady that my eyes began to delight exces-
sively in seeing her” (133). This strikes me as a pivotal point in the narra-
tive because it offers up the possibility of Dante’s “getting over” Beatrice and 
moving on to a new love interest. And if we were dealing with contemporary 
notions of romantic love, this plot turn is indeed what we might expect. 
Even Dante senses this possibility, revealing that he found this new gentle 
lady to be “beautiful, young, and wise” and thinking that, perhaps, “she has 
appeared . . . through the will of Love, so that [his] life might find some rest” 
(135).
 Dante, however, does not allow himself to pursue this line of thinking, 
choosing instead to reinterpret his interest in the new lady as a failure to 
remain true to Beatrice. He works out his conflicted feelings in an allegorical 
sonnet in which he casts his “appetite” for the enticing living woman as his 
heart and his fidelity to Beatrice as his soul or reason. Reason, not surpris-
ingly, carries the day and Dante, following a vision of Beatrice dressed in the 
same crimson clothes she wore when he first saw her, begins to refocus his 
attention on the true source of his beatitude: “I then began to think about 
her; and remembering her according to the order of time past, my heart 
began painfully to repent the desire by which it had so basely allowed itself 
to be possessed for several days against the constancy of reason: and after 
casting out this malicious desire, all my thoughts began to revert to their 
most gentle Beatrice” (137). Several sonnets follow this recommitment to 
Beatrice, but the narrative ends rather abruptly with Dante’s decision—one 
catalyzed by “a wonderful vision,” the contents of which he never describes—
to “write no more of this blessed one until I could more worthily treat of her” 
(145).
 We do not know why Dante ultimately found his treatment of Beatrice 
in the sonnets and canzone of The New Life to be unworthy, but it seems 
clear that we readers are being prepared for Dante’s masterpiece, The Divine 
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Comedy, and we might assume that the vision that Dante experiences con-
tains the germ of that larger work. If this is so, then we might also attribute 
some part of Dante’s disappointment with his work to the fact that Beatrice, 
in The New Life, remains too human. To be treated in the manner that truly 
befits her, she must become completely transcendent and she must serve 
some larger purpose; she must, in other words, become a figure in a strong 
allegory, a figure who can extend the significance of Dante’s work to the 
anagogical level.
 Even though The New Life contains descriptions of Beatrice that exalt her 
in such a way that she sounds more perfect than any human could be and 
that imply her close connection with the divine—“She is no earthly woman, 
but one of those most beautiful angels of heaven” (111)—we cannot overlook 
the fact that we hear such hyperbolic language from real people as well as 
fictional characters with some regularity. And while Dante does his best to 
render Beatrice as something extraordinary, readers are left with the sense 
that this side of her belongs exclusively to the poet. She is his beatitude, per-
haps, but this could also just be love speaking. One of the most perceptive 
readers of The New Life, Charles S. Singleton, argues, in fact, for a strictly 
human interpretation of Dante’s love, at least in this work: “.  .  . Beatrice is 
a creature, a wonderfully beautiful individual of flesh and blood who lived 
once in a time. In The New Life we see her die. Beatrice will not happen 
again. Let us for the moment forget the allegories of the Convivio, and let us 
forget Beatrice as she is in the Comedy. For there Beatrice unquestionably 
becomes an allegory, though she does not, for that, cease to be the person 
she was in The New Life” (111). Beatrice, then, exists between two worlds in 
this text; Singleton is correct to emphasize her humanity, but Dante clearly 
wants this “glorious lady of [his] mind” to be and to represent more (47). The 
reader senses throughout this text that the young Dante never fully articu-
lates the significance of the figure he sees, worships, and eulogizes. Despite 
his persistent attempts, Dante cannot decide what Beatrice means, and his 
writing, in some ways, represents an unsuccessful attempt to determine how 
he should read and then represent this enigmatic figure.
 For me, the “failure” of The New Life results from Dante’s inability to 
have the various elements of his narrative coalesce into the kind of allegory 
he wanted—a strong one. Dante has, in other words, allegorical elements 
(most notably Love), but he lacks the narrative thread that can hold them 
together in a meaningful way; the phenomenon that he wants to transform 
into his narrative never clearly materializes from the narrative that he does 
construct, and this produces a work that is weak, allegorically speaking. I 
need to reiterate here that I do not mean to imply that strong allegories are 
always somehow qualitatively superior to weak ones, or that weak allegories 
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cannot by their very nature be cohesive works of literary art (the weakly alle-
gorical but extraordinarily coherent The Metamorphosis demonstrates that 
this is not so), but in this case Dante clearly recognizes that his work fails 
to achieve the rhetorical end he seeks, and we know that the next work in 
which Beatrice figures is the strongly allegorical Commedia. We may deduce, 
therefore, that even Dante saw the earlier work as something of a prelude to 
what was to come, and what was to become his greatest creation.
 Yet even as Dante struggles with the question of how to speak about 
Beatrice, readers, as I have argued, generally do not call into question his 
motives. Dante’s love for Beatrice seems genuine, and so his struggle involves 
how to convey the phenomenon that she is to him in a narrative form rather 
than simply to win her love. In other words, Dante’s attempt to weave Bea-
trice into a strong allegory—an effort that he begins in The New Life but that 
he fully accomplishes only in the Commedia—strikes us as legitimate, or 
genuine, or straight, or whatever term we might want to use as an antonym 
for ironic. Dante has constructed an ethos through his narrative that war-
rants our good faith.
■
Such is not the case with Aschenbach in Thomas Mann’s Death in Venice, a 
novella that gives us access to the psyche of a man who, like Dante, is both 
a man of letters and a man obsessed by a figure in his text. As we will see 
below, Dante and Aschenbach have much in common, but while we readers 
are willing to credit Dante’s attempt to allegorize his relationship with Bea-
trice, even if he fails to transform her effect on him into a strong allegorical 
narrative, Aschenbach’s similar design relating to Tadzio is depicted in a 
highly ironic way. We can use the tools of a rhetorical approach to narrative 
and to allegory to account for this significant divergence.
 Although rarely the subject of comparative study, there are some striking 
structural and thematic similarities between Mann’s narrative and Dante’s 
The New Life, similarities that belie the seven centuries that separate them. 
Indeed, the central relationship in both works is a tenuous one in which 
there is little or no direct contact between a lover and the object of his affec-
tion. Moreover, the relationship that does evolve in each work is a triadic 
one that depends on an intermediate figure for authorization and validation. 
In The New Life that figure is (Christian) Love, while in Death in Venice it is 
(Classical) Eros. In both stories the lover uses his intermediary as a way of 
triangulating his position relative to the object he desires, and thus attempts 
to define or characterize that object according to the conventions and ideals 
embodied by the intermediary. This figure, therefore, functions as a legiti-
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mizing and normalizing force for a character whose motives and actions 
might otherwise seem deranged and illicit. Within each narrative, then, we 
see that one character’s desire for another character results in a rhetorical 
process whereby the desired object (ostensibly a “fellow” human being) 
undergoes a process of allegoresis.10 The apparent goal for both Dante and 
Aschenbach is to make Beatrice and Tadzio signify Love and Eros, respec-
tively; or, to put it another way, to overcome the differences that separate 
Beatrice and Tadzio from the ideals of Christian love and Classical love, as 
Dante and Aschenbach understand those ideals.
 Mann’s Death in Venice takes place in the early part of the twentieth 
century, first in Germany and then in Venice. The protagonist is Gustav von 
Aschenbach, a middle-aged, respected, and well-known author in his home 
country. While on vacation in Venice, Aschenbach becomes obsessed by a 
young Polish boy, Tadzio, and this obsession becomes the focus of Aschen-
bach’s efforts and of Mann’s novella. My interpretation of this novella rests 
on the premise that Mann’s intention is to represent his character’s efforts 
at transforming his (Aschenbach’s) sexual desire for the young boy into a 
historically informed aesthetic allegory in which Tadzio plays the part of a 
classical work of art and Aschenbach acts as a passionate but disinterested 
art critic. By the end of the narrative, however, Mann has made it impossible 
to accept the validity of Aschenbach’s allegorical transformation, thereby 
creating an ironic allegory.
 I want to begin this reading by pointing out two major differences 
between The New Life and Death in Venice: Dante, because he acts as author, 
narrator, and character, has near-total control over his text, and the love that 
dominates his work is the love of a man for a female, albeit a very young 
one at the outset. Aschenbach, conversely, is a character, a character with 
no “real” authority over his own story and a character who, from all appear-
ances, is gay. We must resist the tendency to confuse Aschenbach with the 
author of Death in Venice, despite the apparent similarities between them, 
and recognize that the former, as a character, represents more than a man, a 
gay man, a gay artist, or a repressed gay artist at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. Although interpretations that have characterized Aschenbach 
in these terms have been provocative and instructive, we should not feel 
as though we have understood Death in Venice when we decide that this 
novella is about such a man. I believe, in fact, that critics who read this work 
as the depiction of the psychological struggle and eventual downfall of a 
man trying to deal with his sexuality in an intolerant society do the text a 
 10. I recognize that Dante acts as both character and author in his work, while Aschenbach 
is just a character. I discuss the significance of this difference below.
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disservice. Such an approach relies too heavily on a mimetic and literal con-
ception of character and ignores aesthetic and rhetorical considerations that 
are crucial to our interpretation of the text and its characters.
 In general, the homoerotic nature of the novel did not receive in the 
first fifty or sixty years following its publication the kind of attention it does 
today. One explanation for this, T.  J. Reed contends, can be found in the 
novel’s style. The work’s form, insofar as it maintains an “elevated style and 
noble tone” and insofar as the narrator grows increasingly critical of his sub-
ject, who finishes rather badly, seems to support the argument for Mann as 
moralist and, consequently, to give the work a conservative feel. As Reed 
correctly notes, however, few critics “have come to terms with the trenchant 
irony associated with the high style and what might lie beneath it” (Death 
16), an irony so pervasive and so corrosive that it leaves any interpretation 
of the novel on shaky ground. Be that as it may, the style of Death in Venice, 
if one overlooks the irony beneath it, might have given, as Reed contends, 
critics and reviewers something other than the taboo idea of homosexuality 
to focus on and to write about.
 Yet things have changed rather dramatically during the last thirty years or 
so. The issue of the protagonist’s sexual orientation, in fact, has now assumed 
center stage. This is due partly to changing social mores in the West, partly 
to a relatively more tolerant political and professional (within the academy, 
that is) environment, partly to a more powerful and focused homosexual 
community, and partly to the publication of Mann’s diaries, in which he 
confirms his own semirepressed homosexuality. In an essay written from the 
perspective of a gender studies critic, Robert Tobin notes the importance of 
such firsthand confirmation of Mann’s sexual leanings for gay readers and 
critics: “Although it has always been obvious that male–male desire plays 
a prominent role in Mann’s writings, and gay readers have often leaped to 
the conclusion that only another gay person could write so fluently about 
such topics, it has only been in the last twenty years, with the posthumous 
publication of Mann’s diaries, that readers have become aware of just how 
homosexual Mann was” (227).
 Why does it matter that we now know definitively that Mann was, in his 
own estimation and despite a heterosexual marriage that produced children, 
gay? Tobin, for one, suggests that our awareness and acceptance of “just how 
homosexual Mann was” can lead to a fuller appreciation of Death in Venice 
because the reader can finally allow and encourage the text to be what it 
naturally is: “Rather than suppressing the story’s homosexual tones, as gen-
erations of previous critics have done, the reader can augment them, bring 
them out. Such a search for the homosexual signifiers of the story will put 
Aschenbach into a clearer context and provide for a much richer reading of 
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the novella and its understanding of society” (229). And on this point Tobin 
is correct: gay criticism has contributed immeasurably to our interpretation 
of Mann and his works and, as regards Death in Venice in particular, has 
illuminated one aspect of the novel that previously received scant attention.
 In some ways, however, readings that adhere to a particular perspective 
or that come out of a particular ideology can transform literary texts from 
aesthetic objects into evidence in support of a critical approach or stance. 
And there is often a reluctance today to deal with the notion of the aesthetic, 
a reluctance that stems not only from a feeling of unease with the subjective 
nature of aesthetics and the value judgments it engenders but also from a 
desire to construct an interpretation that is politically and socially appli-
cable. Thus, many contemporary critics approach a text with a predeter-
mined agenda and a desire (and too often a professional need) to produce a 
relevant interpretation. In doing so, however, they often lose, or discard, the 
aesthetic character of texts, something that Hans-Robert Jauss argues is “a 
hermeneutic bridge . . . which makes possible the historical understanding of 
art across the distance in time in the first place, and which therefore must be 
integrated into the execution of the interpretation as a hermeneutic premise” 
(146). When we rush past the aesthetic moment of interpretation in our 
attempt to find something applicable or relevant to say we often fail to recog-
nize the text’s determinate horizon of understanding, and a full appreciation 
of literary character is often the first casualty of this failure.
 The centrality of aesthetic issues in Death in Venice demands that we pay 
closer attention to them in our interpretations, particularly as regards char-
acter. Critics have always recognized the aesthetic elements in the novella—
Aschenbach’s status as an author, the wondrous prose that Tadzio inspires, 
references to classical beauty and to Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium—but 
have treated aesthetics thematically, rather than constitutively.11 We have 
recognized, in other words, that the book is, on one level, about aesthetics, 
but have failed either to recognize or to articulate how aesthetics has made 
the text and its characters signify what and as they do.12 For my purposes, 
aesthetic history actually plays a central role in the allegory that Aschenbach 
wants to construct, an allegory that will be the transformation of his illicit 
desire into a narrative of art appreciation.
 Turning to a typical, but important, passage from Death in Venice, we can 
begin to understand how aesthetic considerations not only reveal something 
 11. See, for example, Alice van Buren Kelley’s “Von Aschenbach’s Phaedrus: Platonic Allu-
sion in ‘Death in Venice.’”
 12. On the literal level, critics have talked about aesthetic issues—particularly style—as a 
constitutive element of this work. See, for example, Frederic Amory’s “The Classical Style of 
‘Death in Venice.’”
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of Aschenbach’s character (psychology, if we want to call it that), but are also 
absolutely crucial in producing Aschenbach as a character. In the fourth 
chapter, where Aschenbach’s apotheosizing of Tadzio culminates in a burst 
of aesthetic productivity and, finally, in “that page-and-a-half of choice prose 
that soon would amaze many a reader with its purity, nobility, and surging 
depth of feeling” (39), Aschenbach takes shape for us not only as an artist but 
also as a historically determined, aesthetic figure. Indeed, more important 
than the five hundred words or so that Aschenbach purportedly produces 
here is the narrator’s ironic undercutting of that achievement, a rhetorical 
act that thrusts issues of hermeneutics to the fore.
 Immediately after informing the reader of Aschenbach’s production, the 
narrator remarks that it is good that the world knows only that work, and 
neither its origin (Ursprünge) nor its context (Entstehungsbedingungen), for 
to understand these would confuse readers and thus compromise the text’s 
purity and nobility, if not its depth of feeling. I say that this is an ironic 
move on the narrator’s part because the readers of Death in Venice know 
only the origins and context of Aschenbach’s work, and nothing of the text 
itself. Whereas the narrative audience of Mann’s novella might well take the 
narrator at his word here, the authorial audience picks up on the irony and 
understands full well that any sense of “purity” or “nobility” regarding what 
Tadzio inspires in Aschenbach has already been compromised. Yet even if 
we cannot read the text that Tadzio inspires, we can nevertheless read or 
interpret that inspiration. In doing so, we must submit Aschenbach’s inter-
pretation of Tadzio to a hermeneutic analysis in order to determine how the 
former responds to the latter. Once we understand Aschenbach’s response 
to Tadzio, we can better understand what and how Tadzio signifies in the 
context of the novella. The origins and context of Aschenbach’s reading of 
Tadzio will prove more telling than the page-and-a-half of narrative that we 
never see.
 Aschenbach’s response to Tadzio is predominately aesthetic, in both 
senses of that term: Tadzio is an object of beauty and the cause of a sen-
sual response on the part of a perceiving subject. In Death in Venice, these 
two aspects of aesthetics are intimately related and often indistinguishable 
because Aschenbach functions as both the artist behind Tadzio and the 
observer facing and responding to him. This novella depicts Aschenbach’s 
often desperate attempt to create a Tadzio (as an aesthetic object) that can 
accommodate and validate the visceral response occasioned by his beauty. 
Aschenbach’s goal in this endeavor resembles Dante’s aim in The New Life: 
he wants to find a way to transform a love object into an allegory, one that 
will therefore acquire a meaning that transcends the literal, the immediate, 
and the mundane. Tadzio represents the same kind of challenge that Beatrice 
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represents for Dante—a surfeit of significance that must somehow be repre-
sented rhetorically. The successful allegorization of Tadzio would represent 
the ultimate artistic achievement for the intellectual Aschenbach, for Tadzio 
seems to represent the kind of life force that stands in opposition to the rela-
tively staid and intellectual artist we meet in the second chapter, the artist 
who labors for years to create a single work.
 Until Tadzio’s appearance, Aschenbach resembles an intellectual Schrift-
steller—or author—more than he does a Dichter—or poet, in its most clas-
sical and laudatory sense; and this is an important distinction. Indeed, Mann 
himself struggled with these terms, primarily because few of his contempo-
raries would recognize him as the kind of Goethean artist who merited the 
title “Dichter.” T. J. Reed explains that “Within the cultural scene [Mann’s] 
notes recreate, the honorific term Dichter, always an arbitrary judgment, was 
accorded only to writers whose work offered some analogy with the visual 
beauty, sensuousness, unintellectual immediacy of the plastic arts and could 
be given the accolade plastich” (Thomas Mann 127). Like that of his cre-
ator, most of Aschenbach’s works—or what we know of them—sound like 
Literatur, not Dictung; they are the compositions of a knowledgeable and 
often cynical intellect. Yet near the close of chapter 2, readers learn of a shift 
in Aschenbach’s approach that prepares both us and him for his encounter 
with Tadzio. We learn, in fact, that Aschenbach has relatively recently turned 
away from the intellectual approach of his youth, an approach that betrays a 
“moral skepticism” and a “sympathy with the abyss,” and has instead experi-
enced the “miracle of ingenuousness reborn” (11).
 Together, this information concerning Aschenbach’s changed approach 
to his craft, our knowledge of the “classical” quality that ultimately results 
from this change, and Aschenbach’s classical characterization of Tadzio 
(which I will discuss in more detail below) all function as a kind of aes-
thetic (as opposed to objective) correlative that can help the reader under-
stand the tortured writer’s emotional state and his character more generally. 
According to T. S. Eliot in his famous essay on Hamlet, “The only way of 
expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an objective correlative; in 
other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the 
formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which 
must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immedi-
ately evoked” (124–25). Eliot goes on to argue that Hamlet is a flawed play 
because, in fact, there is no objective correlative for Hamlet’s emotion, that, 
in other words, “Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an emotion which is 
inexpressible, because it is in excess of the facts as they appear” (125).
 Although this concept has generated much provocative discussion, it has 
not been widely accepted. One of the most trenchant critiques of it comes 
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in W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley’s “The Affective Fallacy,” wherein 
they point out that Hamlet’s “emotion must be expressible, . . . and actually 
expressed too (by something) in the play; otherwise Eliot would not know 
it is there—in excess of the facts” (35). Wimsatt and Beardsley are correct 
to alert us to the logical inconsistencies in Eliot’s reasoning, but their objec-
tions do not necessarily succeed in discrediting the idea of the correlative 
itself. Eliot’s concept, which depends on a kind of aesthetic symmetry, in that 
a character’s emotions must refer to or stem from a reasonable (objective) 
cause, maintains its interest despite its philosophical shortcomings. Like the 
rest of us, Eliot wrestles with what makes characters convincing, interesting, 
and successful. Hamlet is an interesting character, but not a successful one, 
because he “is up against the difficulty that his disgust is occasioned by his 
mother, but that his mother is not an adequate equivalent for it; his disgust 
envelops and exceeds her” (125). Wimsatt and Beardsley’s critique notwith-
standing, I find Eliot’s inclination to assess the relative success of an author’s 
attempt at characterization to be worth pursuing, and the idea of the objec-
tive correlative does have some value as a way of linking a character’s actions 
to the larger context of the work.
 The objective correlative, however, does not exhaust the list of such 
potential linkages, and I want to suggest another—the aesthetic correlative. 
This concept seeks to address in the realm of emotion the same issues that 
Eliot wants to cover in the realm of actions. Strictly applying Eliot’s criteria 
for the objective correlative, we would have to call not only Hamlet but also 
The New Life and Death in Venice artistic failures because the objects, situ-
ations, or events that we find in these narratives never effectively express or 
justify the emotions of the respective protagonists. If Eliot desired a verisim-
ilar and proportionate correspondence in the relationship between emotion 
and its cause, he would not find it in either The New Life or Death in Venice, 
where the figures of Beatrice and Tadzio—if we read them as representations 
of real people—strike us, when we look at the situations from a rational and 
disinterested perspective, as absurdly inadequate to elicit from their texts’ 
protagonists the type and depth of emotion that they apparently do. But this 
aporia between emotion and expression is precisely what these works are 
about. In order to understand them, we must shift our attention to the nature 
of the characters (particularly the protagonists) and try to find an aesthetic 
correlative to their feelings, responses, and emotions, as they are represented 
in the text. Ultimately, we will find that the characters themselves function 
allegorically, as figures that occupy a role in the transformation of some phe-
nomenon into a narrative.
 In the case of Aschenbach, one of our first and most important clues to his 
aesthetic correlative is his relatively recent experience with “ingenuousness 
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reborn.” Given that Aschenbach is a cultured and learned German artist with 
a classical bent, this reference to ingenuousness should recall for the reader 
the ingenuousness, or naïveté, described by Friedrich Schiller at the end of the 
eighteenth century.13 All poets, according to Schiller, can be classified as either 
naïve or sentimental, depending on their general temperament. The naïve/ 
sentimental distinction effectively corresponds with Schiller’s distinction 
between the classical and the modern, and rests on the very issues that Aschen-
bach faces in his own work. His move away from intellectualism and moral 
skepticism toward ingenuousness and classicism, in fact, not only describes 
a move from Schriftsteller to Dichter but also brings into play the crucial dis-
tinction between the sentimental (modern) poet and the naïve (classical) one.
 The naïve poet, who appears rarely and almost miraculously in the 
guise of genius in the modern, civilized world of ideas, is characterized by 
a childlike innocence and naturalness. Those with a childlike temperament, 
according to Schiller, “often act and think naively in the midst of the arti-
ficial circumstances of fashionable society; they forget in their own beau-
tiful humanity that they have to do with a depraved world, and comport 
themselves even at the courts of kings with the same ingenuousness and 
innocence that one would find only in a pastoral society” (93). In general, 
however, modern society, Schiller argues, has lost its connection with nature, 
and modern man suffers from this disconnect. When we encounter objects 
in nature, objects such as streams and birds singing, we appreciate them 
because they represent for us a unity of being, a oneness with their own 
nature, that we have lost: “They are what we were; they are what we should 
once again become” (85, emphasis in original). This too describes our attitude 
toward the ancient Greeks, who, unlike modern European society, “had not 
lost nature in [their] humanity” (85), and who had remained naively naïve. 
“They felt naturally,” Schiller explains; “we feel the natural. . . . Our feeling for 
nature is like the feeling of an invalid for health” (105). This longing for lost 
nature ultimately manifests itself in modern sentimental art, and particularly 
in poetry, through the nostalgic treatment of nature as idea or object.
 The sentimental poet seeks nature. More specifically, he or she points 
to an idealized image of nature as a figure for the unity of self that has 
been lost. “The correspondence between his [modern man’s] feeling and 
 13. Mann himself was clearly familiar with and influenced by Schiller. In 1905, in fact, he 
wrote a piece, Schwere Stunde, to commemorate Schiller on the one-hundredth anniversary of 
his death. Indeed, as T. J. Reed points out, Mann’s work on this essay enabled him “to create an 
impression of total familiarity with Schiller and his situation” (Thomas Mann 323), a familiarity 
that clearly manifests itself in Death in Venice. We should also note that Mann’s uncompleted 
essay on art and culture (“Geist und Kunst”) owes much to Schiller’s philosophy. See Reed’s 
chapter titled “Art and Intellect” in Thomas Mann: The Uses of Tradition.
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thought,” Schiller explains, “which in his first condition actually took 
place, exists now only ideally; it is no longer within him, but outside him, 
as an idea still to be realized, no longer as a fact in his life” (111). When 
we meet Aschenbach as he begins to develop his plans for a vacation to the 
South, we sense, I think, something of this self-alienation, and his recent 
discovery of ingenuousness reborn suggests the type of nostalgia for the 
naïve and the natural that Schiller describes. If we understand the figure 
of Aschenbach in these terms, then we are better prepared to understand 
how he finds in Tadzio precisely what he has been seeking and, moreover, 
how what he finds becomes his own sentimental creation.
 Aschenbach’s first encounter with his object of desire occurs in a set-
ting that dramatizes Schiller’s naïve/sentimental dichotomy and that serves 
as a cultural and aesthetic backdrop against which Tadzio takes shape as a 
figure. In the lobby of the Lido’s Hotel des Bains, where Aschenbach will 
be staying, “A broad horizon, tolerant and comprehensive” unfolds before 
Aschenbach, revealing a scene in which “All the great languages of Europe 
melded together in subdued tones,” and in which “Evening dress, the uni-
form of cultured society, provided a decorous external unity to the variety of 
humanity assembled here” (21). This is humanity in its most cultured, and 
perhaps least natural state: thoroughly adult, restrained, dressed, and proper. 
Not surprisingly, Aschenbach feels quite at home—even content—here, as he 
looks on from a somewhat detached vantage point and with a newspaper, 
gleaned from a nearby table, as a kind of buffer between himself and the rest 
of humanity.
 As he scans the room before him, Aschenbach finds his attention drawn 
to a group of young people who are speaking Polish. Up to and including this 
point in the description of the scene, Mann’s narrative has been a model of 
realism, a controlled and ostensibly objective description from a third-person 
narrator that both matches and helps to establish the tone and the mood of 
the lobby tableau. Indeed, the narrator provides us with a series of details—the 
names of actual hotels, the fabric (leather) of the chair Aschenbach selects 
in which to await the dinner hour, the color (green) of the elevator opera-
tor’s uniform, the nationalities represented in the lobby (American, German, 
French, Slavic)—that allows the reader to participate in Aschenbach’s careful 
and keen observation of his surroundings; like the protagonist whose eyes 
we are borrowing, we miss nothing and are rather pleased with our ability to 
notice and interpret the minutiae of the environment.14 Ours is a scholarly and 
 14. In “The ‘Second Author’ of Death in Venice,” Dorrit Cohn notes that “the narrator 
steadfastly adheres to his protagonist’s perspective on the outside world; from the initial mo-
ment when he observes the strange wanderer standing on the steps of the funeral chapel to the 
final moment when he watches Tadzio standing on the sandbar we see the events and figures of 
the outside world through Aschenbach’s eyes” (Distinction 134). She correctly goes on to note, 
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intellectual detachment, and so a thoroughly “modern” one.
 Yet the time we have spent with Aschenbach, as he reclines in his leather 
chair and intermittently and distractedly reads his newspaper, amounts to 
only a brief interlude of subjective control and order in the midst of an oth-
erwise strange journey. Just hours before he descends to the hotel lobby, in 
fact, our narrator tells us that Aschenbach has been troubled by the rather 
odd events—including his encounters with the repugnant old man on the 
boat to Italy and with the mysterious and illegitimate gondolier who brought 
him to his hotel—that have preceded his arrival. Though these events, we 
are told, were not necessarily incongruous with reason, they were neverthe-
less troubling because they struck Aschenbach as odd, perhaps even porten-
tous, and thus produced in him a feeling of unease. After washing his face, 
instructing the maid, taking afternoon tea, walking along the boardwalk, 
and dressing himself in his customarily deliberate and fastidious manner for 
dinner (21), however, Aschenbach has effectively exercised his demons and 
seems to be himself once again, a fact that is reflected in and reinforced by 
the carefully controlled narrative portrait of refinement and culture in the 
hotel lobby.
 And it is of course here, while taking inventory of the group of youths 
speaking Polish, and while in relative control of his faculties, that Aschen-
bach’s gaze alights, finally, on that longhaired youth who will become his 
Tadzio. Given what we already know about Aschenbach’s interest in the 
ingenuous or naïve, it should not surprise us that his initial reaction to 
Tadzio results in a classical aesthetic characterization. After informing the 
reader that Aschenbach noted with amazement Tadzio’s perfect beauty, the 
narrator seems to step back, and the successive description of Tadzio takes 
the form of an essay or lecture on a work of art, in this case one that recalls 
“Greek statues from the noblest period of antiquity” (21). For almost a page, 
“Aschenbach” is replaced by general pronouns (“onlooker,” for example), and 
our introduction to Tadzio amounts to an academic reading of him as a 
classical aesthetic figure. Although we know that the point of view in this 
passage is Aschenbach’s, his nominal absence from this initial description 
is meant to betray a kind of critical—and Kantian—disinterestedness. At 
this point, Aschenbach has engaged Tadzio, but he has done so from a safe 
distance and from behind a buffer of aesthetic differentiation.
 As we see him through Aschenbach’s eyes, Tadzio appears to us as a 
posed figure, like one of the statues to which our narrator has just referred: 
“He sat so that the observer [Aschenbach] saw him in profile. His feet were 
clad in black patent leather and arranged one in front of the other; one elbow 
was propped on the arm of his wicker chair with his cheek resting on his 
however, that in contrast to the empirical solidarity he maintains with Aschenbach, the narrator 
becomes increasingly distanced “on the ideological level” as the novel advances (134).
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closed hand; his demeanor was one of careless refinement, quite without the 
almost submissive stiffness that seemed to be the norm for his sisters” (22). 
Moreover, Tadzio’s long, curly hair recalls for the observer the Greco-Roman 
statue of the young boy removing a thorn from his foot. The combined effect 
of this early aesthetic description of Tadzio is twofold. First, it reinforces the 
roles of the novella’s two principal characters; Aschenbach continues as the 
observant, intellectual artist and critic, and Tadzio emerges as his object of 
study. Yet the description also provides the reader with material that will 
allow us to characterize Aschenbach, who is, in turn, characterizing Tadzio, 
and thus laying the foundation for his intended allegorical transformation.15
 It is clear from the beginning of the story that the mature Aschenbach 
sees himself as an important part of a larger German cultural heritage. His 
oeuvre, in fact, includes both a prose epic about Frederick the Great, the 
eighteenth-century King of Prussia, and an essay, “Geist und Kunst,” whose 
“power of organization and antithetical eloquence had prompted serious 
observers to rank it alongside Schiller’s ‘On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry’” 
(7). Moreover, we know through the narrator of the story that from early 
on Aschenbach had been bent on achieving public notoriety through his 
art, that as his career and work evolved he became anthologized in school 
textbooks, and that “he did not refuse” when a German prince awarded him 
an honorary title on his fiftieth birthday (12).
 With this in mind, we can pursue a reading of Death in Venice that will 
allow us to see Aschenbach as an aesthetic and cultural composite, a figure 
whose responses, emotions, and language derive from and point us to an 
earlier aesthetic context. Having already pointed out the methodological and 
philosophical affinities between Aschenbach and Schiller, I will now turn 
more specifically to Aschenbach’s interpretation of Tadzio in order to dem-
onstrate that Aschenbach’s character signifies more than a self.
 Three principal aspects of his characterization of Tadzio allow the reader 
 15. We should also note that Aschenbach’s initial description of Tadzio has undertones of 
decadence, which seem to work against the classical, aesthetic description of this figure. It is tell-
ing that Aschenbach wonders at the end of this first encounter whether, given his pale complex-
ion, Tadzio might be sick. Although he decides that the boy is probably just coddled, the seeds 
of death and decline have been sown, and this theme—or threat—will oppose the “healthier” 
aesthetic descriptions of Tadzio throughout the novella. Interestingly, it is not Tadzio who 
declines during the course of the story, but Aschenbach. For a provocative discussion of the 
decadent elements of this work, see Edward S. Brinkley’s “Fear of Form: Thomas Mann’s Death 
in Venice.” Brinkley’s main point is that “Death in Venice signals a decisive break with decadent 
modernism by refusing any transseminal link between Aschenbach and Tadzio, by transferring 
the decay from adolescent male to adult male, and thus by returning the trope of interior dis-
integration back to its ‘author’” (4). For a more general discussion of decadence in relation to 
Mann’s novella, see Naomi Ritter’s “Death in Venice and the Tradition of European Decadence.” 
This article also suggests further reading on the subject.
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to identify Aschenbach’s aesthetic correlative and, consequently, to under-
stand how he responds to the figure of the boy and why it is a boy who 
attracts his attention in the first place. Indeed, the fact that the object of 
Aschenbach’s desire is a boy is one of these telling aspects, the others being 
Tadzio’s purported statuelike and classical qualities. Combined with the allu-
sions to Aschenbach’s move toward a naïve approach to his art, these elements 
collectively recall an eighteenth-century German neoclassicism and, in par-
ticular, the figures of Schiller (as already noted), Goethe, Gotthold Lessing, 
and Johann Winckelmann.16 Once we see Tadzio in this light, we can begin 
to understand how his existence in the text depends on Aschenbach’s inter-
pretation and description of him, and also how our understanding of him 
as a rhetorical figure—as an element in an allegory that seeks to transform 
an aesthetic phenomenon into a figural narrative—allows us to understand 
Aschenbach. Our experience in reading these characters takes the form of an 
interpretive (hermeneutical) circle: we can understand Aschenbach only by 
interpreting Tadzio, and we know Tadzio only through Aschenbach’s percep-
tion and interpretation of him.
 When we recognize the influence of eighteenth-century aesthetic theory 
on Aschenbach’s character, the hermeneutic circle becomes a produc-
tive interpretive tool and the text as a whole—as well as the characters in 
it—begins to make more sense. Even the initial descriptions of Tadzio in 
sculptural terms, for example, which might at first seem to be merely the 
hyperbolic reactions of a smitten man, ultimately help to reveal the nature 
of Aschenbach’s character. We cannot, in other words, afford to dismiss the 
significance of Aschenbach’s characterization of Tadzio as being like a Greek 
statue because to do so will prevent us from fully understanding Aschen-
bach’s own character.
 Given what we already know about Aschenbach and his relationship to 
German aesthetic culture, we must read his response to the figure of Tadzio 
from within a particular aesthetic context. In this regard, the remarks con-
cerning the similarity between Tadzio and Greek sculpture are particularly 
informative and resonant. Indeed, the reference to the plastic arts at this 
point reinforces the neoclassical motif that has already been established by 
the allusions to Schiller and his distinction between naïve and sentimental 
poetry. Here, though, we are reminded of the importance of painting and 
 16. In her article on Death in Venice, Lida Kirchberger touches on Mann’s use of eigh-
teenth-century aesthetic theory—and particularly how it transmits ideas of Greek antiquity—in 
this novella. However, she limits herself to “explicit references in the Novelle to eighteenth-
century phenomena” (324), all of which she finds in the second chapter, and which only deal 
with Frederick the Great and Schiller. I believe that we need to pursue this issue further, and to 
look for its resonances throughout the text.
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sculpture in the aesthetic theories of German critics such as Winckelmann 
and Lessing. These eighteenth-century critics were concerned with the 
nature of beauty and with its representation in the arts, both the plastic arts 
and poetry writ large. The historical figures that these formidable critics 
became, as well as the issues they struggled with, are unmistakably present 
in Death in Venice.
 The figure of Winckelmann, in particular, seems to haunt, and in a way 
to determine, Aschenbach’s reception of Tadzio. Like Schiller, Winckelmann 
believed that the ancient Greeks were intimately in touch with and blessed 
by a naturalness or naïveté that modern humans have somehow lost. And 
it was Winckelmann’s work in art criticism and art history that ushered in 
the era of German neoclassicism that was to be one of the most important 
and productive in the history of aesthetics. That the Greeks were simply 
more beautiful than modern humans is a key assumption of Winckelmann’s 
work. He claims, for example, that “everything that was instilled and taught 
from birth to adulthood about the culture of their bodies and the preserva-
tion, development, and refinement of this culture through nature and art 
was done to enhance the natural beauty of the ancient Greeks. Thus we can 
say that in all probability their physical beauty excelled ours by far” (11). 
Moreover, Winckelmann continues, “The probability is that in the beautiful 
bodily forms of the Greeks as well as in the works of their masters there was 
a greater unity of the entire structure, a nobler connection of parts, and a 
greater fullness of form, without the emaciated tensions and depressions of 
our bodies” (19).
 Tadzio’s body brings to Aschenbach’s mind images quite similar to those 
evoked by Winckelmann; or perhaps we should say that Aschenbach’s rhet-
oric characterizes Tadzio in a way that recalls Winckelmann. In a scene in 
which Aschenbach watches Tadzio swim toward the beach, for example, the 
narrator relates Aschenbach’s classically inspired reading of the event: “The 
sight of this lively adolescent figure, seductive and chaste, lovely as a tender 
young god, emerging from the depths of the sky and sea with dripping locks 
and escaping the clutches of the elements—it all gave rise to mythic images. 
It was a sight belonging to poetic legends from the beginning of time that 
tell of the origins of form and of the birth of the gods” (28). The references 
here to myth, the origins of form, and the birth of the gods clearly associate 
Tadzio with the classical tradition, but with the classical tradition as it was 
interpreted and understood by eighteenth-century aesthetic critics. In charac-
terizing Tadzio as a tender young god and in casting him as a living example 
of a Greek statue (much like the Pygmalion story, if Pygmalion had never 
spoken with Galatea), Aschenbach allows himself to participate in a kind of 
idol worship that has both cultural antecedents and, thus, some amount of 
intellectual credibility.
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 Aschenbach uses the aesthetic tradition that has influenced him as an 
artist to characterize Tadzio allegorically, thereby giving his figure an aes-
thetic significance that might justify and validate the protagonist’s ques-
tionable visceral reaction to the boy. It is not surprising, then, that Tadzio’s 
face, which reminds Aschenbach of Greek statues, causes “the onlooker” to 
doubt his having ever witnessed anything of equal perfection either in nature 
or in art (28). This description of Tadzio as being somehow beyond both 
nature and art should recall for us Schiller’s description of modern human-
ity’s encounter with naïve objects. When we encounter such objects, he con-
tends, we appreciate in them their “existence in accordance with their own 
laws, [their] inner necessity, [and their] eternal unity with themselves” (181). 
Effectively, naïve objects remind us of what we have lost and can never truly 
regain through art or through nature herself. “In them . . . we see eternally 
that which escapes us, but for which we are challenged to strive, and which, 
even if we never attain to it, we may still hope to approach in endless prog-
ress” (181). As an artist, Aschenbach recognizes in Tadzio a naïve aesthetic 
ideal that he has not captured in his own work; as a man, Aschenbach rec-
ognizes in Tadzio the promise of a physical fulfillment that is equally inac-
cessible, but equally compelling. Aschenbach is careful, however, to try to 
describe his attraction to Tadzio in acceptable aesthetic and cultural terms, 
just as Dante has tried to do with his Beatrice.
 We see another example of this later in the third chapter, when Aschen-
bach watches Tadzio enter the hotel’s dining area. Here again we witness the 
transformation of Aschenbach into an “observer,” and follow along as our 
protagonist receives, describes, and appreciates the figure of the boy as he 
enters the scene:
Smiling, he murmured a word in his soft, indistinct speech and took his 
place, showing his full profile to the observer. The latter was once more, and 
now especially, struck with amazement, indeed even alarm, at the truly god-
like beauty possessed by this mortal child. . . . It was the face of Eros, with the 
yellowish glaze of Parian marble, with delicate and serious brows, the tem-
ples and ears richly and rectangularly framed by soft, dusky curls. (24–25)
Like Dante, Aschenbach attempts to mitigate the mundane reality of his 
object by casting him allegorically. In this case the allegory is an aesthetic 
one that points back to the eighteenth century and that is meant to lend 
significance and integrity to Tadzio, to Aschenbach’s appreciation of him, 
and to Aschenbach, who still—at this point in the narrative—fashions him-
self as a respectable and respected intellect. As the narrator tells us, in fact, 
Aschenbach, after recognizing Tadzio’s as the face of Eros, sits back and 
simply admires the figure with “that professional, cool air of appraisal artists 
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sometimes use to cover their delight, their enthusiasm when they encounter 
a masterpiece” (25).
 Looking carefully at the figure that Aschenbach sees and describes in 
this scene, the reader of Mann’s novella should be struck by the complexity 
and significance of the image described. Tadzio emerges here as a gestalt of 
allegorical references that at once “characterize” him and dehumanize him: 
He is mortal but godlike, alive but like a work of art, modern but classical. 
Aschenbach works quite diligently to describe Tadzio in such a way that the 
resultant image will, like Dante’s Beatrice, be sufficient to carry the meaning 
he wants to ascribe to the figure. For Aschenbach, classical aesthetics offers 
the most resonant material with which to construct Tadzio’s exterior because 
it provides him (Aschenbach) with a set of pre-established cultural meanings 
conducive to the propagation of an image of himself that he has worked for 
years to construct.
 At the heart of Aschenbach’s emerging allegory lies the close association 
that many eighteenth-century critics claimed existed between classical aes-
thetics and morality. For Winckelmann in particular, the beauty of the Greek 
figures represented not simply a superficial perfection available to be copied 
but also an idealized conception of beauty and, perhaps more importantly, 
a sense that outer beauty coincided with a noble (inner) nature. In one of 
the most famous passages from his study of Greek painting and sculpture, 
Winckelmann makes the provocative claim that the most telling character-
istics of the greatest Greek works of art are the “noble simplicity and quiet 
grandeur” revealed in both the posture and the expression of the figures 
represented. “Just as the depths of the sea always remain calm however much 
the surface may rage,” Winckelmann explains, “so does the expression of the 
figures of the Greeks reveal a great and composed soul even in the midst 
of passion” (33). The Laocoön, according to Winckelmann, is the greatest 
example of this phenomenon because the pain that he must be experiencing 
while in the grip of the serpents “expresses itself with no sign of rage in his 
face or in his entire bearing. He emits no terrible screams such as Virgil’s 
Laocoön, for the opening of the mouth does not permit it. . . . The physical 
pain and the nobility of soul are distributed with equal strength over the 
entire body and are, as it were, held in balance with one another” (33–35).17 
For Winckelmann, then, the figures in Greek art represent a correspondence 
between aesthetic and moral perfection, between inner and outer beauty. In 
the process of reading these figures, he finds a sublime integrity and a rare 
state of signification—that state that eluded, at least temporarily, Dante in his 
 17. Laocoön, as depicted in the Aeneid, is the priest of Apollo who tries to warn the Trojans 
not to trust the Greeks and their apparent gift of the wooden horse. As punishment, Aethena 
sends two large serpents to crush Laocoön and his two sons.
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The New Life—wherein form exactly expresses content.
 Equally important for our purposes, is Winckelmann’s belief that the art-
ists of these works had to share in this dignified nature in order to be capable 
of producing such art: “The expression of such nobility of soul goes far 
beyond the depiction of beautiful nature. The artist had to feel the strength 
of this spirit in himself and then impart it to his marble” (35). Thus, the rela-
tionship between artist and art is a symbiotic one in which the artist must 
participate in the beauty and the nobility of his subject. A similar philos-
ophy underlies Aschenbach’s peculiar relationship with Tadzio, and we sense 
this more acutely as the narrative progresses. In the fourth chapter, in fact, 
Aschenbach begins to mingle his classical interpretation or characterization 
of Tadzio with his “other” work as an artist in an apparent attempt to partici-
pate in the general beauty and nobility of his object. Watching the youthful 
figure at play on the beach, Aschenbach describes Tadzio in terms meant to 
evoke a sentiment akin to Winckelmann’s belief in the mutually reinforcing 
relationship among beauty, intellect, and morality in art and artist:
His honey-colored hair clung in circles to his temples and his neck; the sun 
made the down shine on his upper back; the subtle definition of the ribs 
and the symmetry of his chest stood out through the tight-fitting material 
covering his torso; his armpits were still as smooth as those of a statue, 
the hollows behind his knees shone likewise, and the blue veins showing 
through made his body seem to be made of translucent material. What 
discipline, what precision of thought was expressed in the stretch of his 
youthfully perfect body! But was not the rigorous and pure will that had 
been darkly active in bringing this divine form into the clear light of day 
entirely familiar to the artist in him? Was this same will not active in him, 
too, when he, full of sober passion, freed a slender form from the marble 
mass of language, a form he had seen with his spiritual eye and that he 
presented to mortal men as image and mirror of spiritual beauty? (37)
Here again Aschenbach casts Tadzio as being both “classically” beautiful 
and statuelike, but the professional and disinterested demeanor that he has 
heretofore maintained as an “observer” now gives way to a more active, par-
ticipatory role as he makes the connection between what he wants Tadzio to 
represent and what he (Aschenbach) does—as well as who he is—as an artist. 
Like Winckelmann’s description of the Greek artists who must have felt and 
shared in the spiritual beauty of the figures they represented, Aschenbach’s 
representation of himself as a rhetorical sculptor whose medium is an aes-
thetic and spiritual beauty implies that he must be a good man to participate 
in such a beautiful aesthetic project.
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 This particular encounter with Tadzio on the beach culminates in 
Aschenbach’s ultimate work—that page and a half of pure and noble prose 
whose origins, ironically, are better left obscure. As the narrator tells us, 
Aschenbach wants to work with Tadzio in view, to use—like a painter or 
sculptor—“the boy’s physical frame as the model for his writing, to let his 
style follow the lines of that body that seemed to him divine, to carry his 
beauty into the realm of the intellect as once the eagle carried the Trojan 
shepherd into the ethereal heavens” (39). Informed as we are of the events 
that have led to this moment, however, readers of the narrative should by 
now suspect that Aschenbach’s classical rhetoric serves as a veil behind 
which to hide his lascivious desires and that his participation in eighteenth-
century aesthetic tradition has become something of a self-delusional cover-
up. At this point, everyone involved in the narrative knows that Aschenbach’s 
motives are neither pure, noble, nor principally aesthetic, a fact reinforced 
by the feeling he experiences after this episode with Tadzio: “Strange hours! 
Strangely enervating effort! Strangely fertile intercourse between a mind and 
a body! When Aschenbach folded up his work and left the beach, he felt 
exhausted, even unhinged, as if his conscience were indicting him after a 
debauch” (39). This unhinging marks the beginning of the end for Aschen-
bach, for he now abjures “self-criticism” and devotes himself to the pursuit 
of Tadzio. In a sense, Aschenbach has abandoned his original character—the 
one described as leading a tense but controlled existence, like a tightly balled 
fist—and has relaxed into a licentious old man.
 To borrow a phrase from the plastic arts, Aschenbach has failed to hold 
his pose. Although he has generally managed to maintain the image of 
Tadzio as a Greek-like figure (and all that that means), he loses control of 
his own image, or character, as the narrative unfolds. Aschenbach’s aesthetic 
ideal amounts to a composite of the depictions of Saint Sebastian and Lao-
coön, both of whom are depicted as showing dignity, calmness, and modesty 
while enduring great pain. Indeed, until the very climax of his story Aschen-
bach has attempted to appear publicly in a “refined and respectable bearing” 
that would reveal nothing of his “inner tumult” (42). This pose is in keeping 
with Winckelmann’s conception of beauty, one in which the subject’s noble 
nature triumphs over his pain and silences the unaesthetic scream that might 
otherwise result. Like Winckelmann, Aschenbach seems to believe that “The 
more tranquil the state of the body the more capable it is of portraying the 
true character of the soul. . . . A soul is more apparent and distinctive when 
seen in violent passion, but it is great and noble when seen in a state of unity 
and calm” (Winckelmann 35).18 And it is this state of unity and calm so 
 18. It is interesting to note that—in “reality” as well as in aesthetics—Aschenbach and 
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carefully cultivated throughout his career that Aschenbach cannot maintain 
when faced with Tadzio.
 Aschenbach’s most pressing problems in Death in Venice are narrative 
progression and character development, both of which arise because he does 
not have control of this story. As readers, we know that Aschenbach has 
created a character and an image for himself outside of the narrative we are 
reading, but in this story he cannot control, or stop, the rather unaesthetic 
climax that undermines his self-characterization. Unlike Dante, Aschenbach 
does not have the option of simply writing no more until he feels ready and 
worthy to continue, but rather must struggle to redescribe people, events, 
and himself as the narrative unfolds. The sculptural metaphor that Aschen-
bach adopts is revealing—particularly since he is a writer—but not alto-
gether surprising. In sculpture, Aschenbach can allude to the same sense of 
permanence and stasis that critics such as Winckelmann found so appealing 
in classical works. Unlike traditional narrative, sculpture—as interpreted by 
the eighteenth-century neoclassical Germans—allows the artist to render 
and isolate a beautiful figure in such a way that it transcends both time and 
the physical world while also reflecting the nobility and purity of its creator. 
Aschenbach would clearly like for Tadzio to stand as such a monument.
 Not all of the eighteenth-century critics, however, agreed with Winckel-
mann’s assertion that the calmness and serenity of the embattled figures of 
Greek art directly conveyed the nobility of the Greek soul. Gotthold Lessing, 
for example, argues in his own essay on the Laocoön that the Greek, in gen-
eral, actually “felt and feared, and he expressed his pain and grief. He was not 
ashamed of any human weakness, but it must not prevent him from attaining 
honor nor from fulfilling his duty” (9). If, therefore, Lessing reasons, “crying 
aloud when in physical pain is compatible with nobility of soul, then the 
desire to express such nobility could not have prevented the artist from rep-
resenting the scream in his marble” (11). According to Lessing, the figures of 
Greek art—and particularly the Laocoön—look as they do because of purely 
Winckelmann might have been working toward similar ends. Kevin Parker claims—in a pro-
vocative attempt to read Winckelmann’s project as one of controlling, repressing, or redirecting 
his own (Winckelmann’s) homosexual desires—that “as an historian, rather than a philoso-
pher,  .  .  . Winckelmann can  .  .  .  take up his relationship to the object of his desire, which is 
Greek art, in the conviction that he will be able to master it by mastering himself ” (543). That 
is to say, in essence, that Winckelmann is able to take the life and, thus, the danger, out of the 
forms he studies by bracketing them historically. As a result, Parker argues, “The seductive spell 
of the others’ lived body .  .  . has been broken. The absence of the Greek body, guaranteed by 
Winckelmann’s institution of historical difference as a relation of presence to absence, is now 
the unapproachable object of our gaze” (543). This historical distance is what Aschenbach needs 
in order to sustain his allegorical reading of himself and Tadzio, and their relationship, but it is 
also precisely that which he does not have and which finally proves to be his undoing. 
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aesthetic considerations, and his essay establishes that “among the ancients 
beauty was the supreme law of the visual arts” and that “whatever these arts 
may include must give way completely if not compatible with beauty, and, if 
compatible, must at least be subordinate to it” (15). Regarding the Laocoön, 
Lessing maintains that the artist “strove to attain the highest beauty possible 
under the given condition of physical pain” (17). Thus, while Winckelmann 
reads the visage of the figure as a perfect representation of the nobility of 
the Greek soul, Lessing attributes the pose to an aesthetic decision: “The 
demands of beauty could not be reconciled with his pain in all its disfiguring 
violence, so it had to be reduced. The scream had to be softened to a sigh, 
not because screaming betrays an ignoble soul, but because it distorts the 
features in a disgusting manner” (17).
 Lessing makes some important generic distinctions in this essay, which 
first appeared in 1766, two years before Winckelmann’s death. He claims, 
for example, that Laocoön’s expression is determined by the fact that it is 
represented in one of the visual arts and is, therefore, constrained by the 
aesthetic laws that govern it. When he turns his attention to poetry, Lessing 
argues that the concern with physical beauty or perfection that we see in the 
Laocoön statue would be misplaced in narrative or verse. What Lessing calls 
the “external form” can, he argues,
at best be only one of the least significant means by which he is able to 
awaken our interest in his characters. Often he ignores it entirely, being 
convinced that once his hero has won our favor his other qualities will 
either occupy us to such a point that we do not think of his physical form 
or, if we do think of it, we will be so captivated that we give him of our own 
accord if not a beautiful form, at least an ordinary one. (23)
As an example, Lessing cites Virgil’s depiction of Laocoön in the Aeneid, 
pointing out that although the Roman poet’s Laocoön does cry out in pain, 
his character is not diminished in the eyes of the reader because “we already 
know and love him as a prudent patriot and loving father” (24).
 In reading Death in Venice, however, we are never quite as convinced of 
our main character’s character as readers of Virgil are of Laocoön’s. More-
over, and perhaps more importantly, we sense through the narrator’s tren-
chant irony that even Aschenbach himself has doubts about the character 
that underlies the image he has created. In a troubling and foreboding pas-
sage following Aschenbach’s initial sighting of Tadzio, the narrator informs 
us that in the nature of the artist “is inborn . . . an indulgent and treacherous 
tendency to accept injustice when it produces beauty and to respond with 
complicity and even admiration when the aristocrats of this world get prefer-
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ential treatment” (22). Indeed, the feeling from the beginning of the novella 
is, as many critics have pointed out, portentous, and we sense somehow that 
there is more to the disciplined and controlled Aschenbach than meets the 
eye. The narrator’s early reflections on Aschenbach’s artistic “rebirth” and 
his increased “rigor” and “discipline” (at least prior to leaving for Venice) 
prepare us for the impending difficulties. Musing about the new, formally 
classical bent of Aschenbach’s work, the narrator wonders, provocatively, 
whether the idea of form itself might not be Janus-faced, at once moral and 
amoral, “moral insofar as form is the product of expression of discipline, 
but amoral and indeed immoral insofar as it harbors within itself by nature 
a certain moral indifference and indeed is essentially bent on forcing the 
moral realm to stoop under its proud and absolute scepter” (11).
 The relationship between form and morality, or more generally between 
aesthetics and morality, is apparently a more complicated one for our nar-
rator, for Aschenbach, and for the contemporary reader than it was for eigh-
teenth-century interpreters of the Greeks, or for Dante for that matter. These 
latter critics generally maintained that a beautiful form bespeaks a noble 
nature and would concur with Dante’s definition of allegory as truth cloaked 
in a beautiful lie or fiction. Thus, Beatrice’s incomparable beauty in Dante’s 
The New Life fittingly conceals a beatific soul; the challenge for Dante is not 
to justify his belief in what Beatrice represents but rather to figure out how 
best to express that belief in words. As an artist, Dante wants to participate in 
what Beatrice represents. In Death in Venice, however, the prevailing ironic 
mood of the narrative constantly reminds us that the beautiful fiction on the 
surface or literal level might actually belie a rather ignoble, amoral, or even 
immoral nature. In contrast to Dante, Aschenbach’s biggest challenge in this 
twentieth-century story is to convince himself that there might in fact be 
some connection between formal beauty and spiritual or moral nobility and 
that he, as an artist, can benefit from this connection.
 It is not surprising, then, that Aschenbach refers to and reminds us of 
figures such as Schiller, Winckelmann, and Lessing, because these are the 
figures who believed what Aschenbach wants to signify. By borrowing the 
rhetoric of these critics for his characterization of Tadzio, Aschenbach hopes 
to characterize himself in a way that comports with the public image he 
has so carefully cultivated. He is the artist who, in his own words, sculpts 
images of spiritual beauty from the mass of language, who wants to recog-
nize Tadzio’s form as the manifestation of a noble and naïve spirit, and who 
embraces the classical stance—or at least what has been interpreted as the 
classical stance—that beauty is “the sensitive man’s way to the spirit” (39).19 
 19. Here, Aschenbach draws from Plato’s Phaedrus.
178  •  Chapter 5
Aschenbach’s choice of a sculptural metaphor is meant to anchor his charac-
terization of both Tadzio and himself and to reinforce the idea that beauty of 
form can represent an unwavering nobility of character. Aschenbach senses 
that a relationship with Tadzio, seen through to its logical conclusion in the 
context of this narrative, will not have a particularly beautiful ending, and 
so he works as an artist to forestall that ending by invoking the plastic arts. 
As Lessing claims, the painter and sculptor must “never present an action 
at its climax” because the climax, once depicted, leaves nothing more to the 
imagination (19). Regarding Laocoön, Lessing contends that if he sighs, “the 
imagination can hear him cry out; but if he cries out, it can neither go one 
step higher nor one step lower than this representation without seeing him 
in a more tolerable and hence less interesting condition. One either hears 
him merely moaning or else sees him dead” (20). Aschenbach wants to avoid 
rendering himself in either of these two states, and thus seeks that moment 
of pregnant equilibrium that the master of Laocoön managed to depict.
 In this context, Death in Venice would have a more aesthetically fitting 
ending were it to reach its climax and its conclusion at the end of the third 
chapter. Here, we see Aschenbach posed, literally, in such a way that reminds 
us of Laocoön’s calm and dignified manner of meeting his supreme chal-
lenge. For Aschenbach, however, the threat does not manifest itself in an 
encounter with serpents, but rather in the possibility of a physical encounter 
with Tadzio:
He sat quite still, quite unseen in his elevated location and looked into him-
self. His features were active; his brows rose; an alert, curious, witty smile 
crossed his lips. Then he raised his head and with both his arms, which 
were hanging limp over the arms of his chair, he made a slow circling and 
lifting movement that turned his palms forward, as if to signify an opening 
and extending of his embrace. It was a gesture of readiness, of welcome, 
and of relaxed acceptance. (34)
At this point, Aschenbach has not yet abandoned self-criticism, and he 
seems acutely aware of the image he presents as he looks at himself and the 
pose he strikes from his observer’s vantage point. He portrays himself as 
active, alert, curious, and still in control as he readies himself—with a feeling 
of both joy and pain in his soul—for the inevitable encounter with Tadzio. 
Like Winckelmann’s interpretation of the Laocoön sculpture, Aschenbach 
seems to want to convey a sense of calm resignation here and to cast himself 
in the role of the Trojan hero who, Winckelmann attests, clearly suffers, but 
does so in a dignified and noble manner: “his pain touches our very souls, 
but we wish that we could bear misery like this great man” (35).
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 In keeping with the pervasive ironic mode of Death in Venice, however, 
the story continues forward, forcing Aschenbach down from his pedestal. 
Ultimately, the passage of narrative time erodes Aschenbach’s classical facade 
and moves him and the reader toward an inexorable and decidedly unaes-
thetic climax.20 In the fifth chapter, Aschenbach’s pose of relaxed acceptance 
becomes active lechery as he abandons his reason in favor of his senses. 
Following a disturbing dream in which Aschenbach sees himself merging 
with the figure of Dionysus, the protagonist begins a downward moral spiral 
that is mirrored by his physical decline.21 Quickly, Aschenbach’s once active 
features and solid brow become haggard and wan, giving him the modern, 
emaciated, and unhealthy look that Winckelmann laments in his essay. 
Finding his own image suddenly disgusting in comparison to that of Tadzio, 
Aschenbach increases his visits to a barber who not only colors his hair 
but also applies various cosmetics to give the impression of vibrancy and 
health to our degenerating protagonist. This made-up but sickly Aschenbach 
stands in stark contrast to the image we had at the end of chapter 3, but he 
can maintain even this weak and pathetic pose only briefly. Indeed, we will 
shortly have our last view of Aschenbach, one that has him collapsed and 
dying beside his beach chair, his features slack and sunken. This is the climax 
we were never meant, at least from Aschenbach’s perspective, to see.
 Stepping back and looking at Death in Venice as a whole, the problem for 
our protagonist can be read as an interesting rhetorical one. On one level, 
Aschenbach functions as a successful allegory; that is to say, he appears as a 
figure that points to, but never exactly coincides with, an aesthetic correlative 
that is anterior to his own existence. In this regard, the character of Aschen-
bach is a highly suggestive rhetorical figure, one that clearly refers—in my 
particular reading—to something beyond a single, autonomous individual 
and to a particular aesthetic philosophy. At least in his own mind, Aschen-
bach has transformed his encounter with a boy into a narrative in which he 
(Aschenbach) represents an eighteenth-century aesthetic ideal and the boy 
 20. We should note again that Tadzio’s continued presence in some ways undoes Aschen-
bach. Like Dante, Aschenbach undertakes a poetic project of transforming his desire into some 
kind of aesthetic allegory. But Beatrice’s death allows for “Dante,” as Robert Pogue Harrison 
claims, to bring his “subject to rest in aesthetic stasis. [In death] Beatrice no longer initiates de-
sire but placates it” (44). This possibility never presents itself to Aschenbach, who must always 
deal with a living and continually tempting Tadzio. 
 21. The figure of Dionysus reminds us of the centrality of Nietzsche both to Mann’s pro-
tagonist and to his work as a whole. While I have been arguing for an eighteenth-century aes-
thetic correlative, I would be remiss not to note that Nietzsche looms as a nineteenth-century 
aesthetic correlative. In fact, the work that Nietzsche did on classical art—particularly in his 
Birth of Tragedy—seems to be one of the impediments to Aschenbach’s successful construction 
of his intended allegory. Dionysus constantly threatens the Apollonian image that Aschenbach 
wants to proffer.
180  •  Chapter 5
represents the object of aesthetic contemplation. Ironically, however, it is 
precisely this allegorical aspect of Aschenbach, and particularly his inability 
to coincide with the figures to which he refers, that leads to his downfall. He 
has created a flawed allegory of himself—an ironic allegory in which there is 
ultimately no correspondence between the beautiful lie on the outside and 
the truth on the inside.
 Aschenbach ultimately fails because the story he tries to tell himself—his 
attempt, in other words, to transform his obsession with Tadzio into a palat-
able figural narrative—diverges markedly from the narrative that the reader 
of Mann’s text receives. In her “The Second Author of Death in Venice,” 
Dorrit Cohn notes that “the relationship of the narrator to his protago-
nist . . . may be described as one of increasing distance. In the early phases 
of the story it is essentially sympathetic, respectful, even reverent; in the later 
phases a deepening rift develops, building an increasingly ironic narratorial 
stance” (180). While this distance and the irony it engenders do not lead to 
Aschenbach’s fall (that seems to be his own doing), they do facilitate our 
ability to know (of) it and to interpret it. The importance of the narrator to 
our exegetical effort is obvious: without the narrator we would have no story; 
we would not even know of that page and a half of magnificent prose, much 
less of its sordid origins.22 Yet as Cohn points out, the distance that increas-
ingly characterizes the relationship between narrator and protagonist proves 
to be just as crucial to our understanding of the text. The cracks in this 
relationship allow for irony to seep in and to undermine the aesthetic foun-
dation that Aschenbach is trying to lay (in not wanting to appear as though 
he wants to “lay” Tadzio). Aschenbach’s allegory is ironized and therefore 
undercut by the moralizing narrator; this is not something that Dante—as a 
first-person narrator—had to face.23
 All of this leaves unresolved, of course, the question of the implied 
author in Death in Venice, a question that does not trouble us in regard to 
 22. In an interesting article devoted to that page and a half of prose, Scott Consigny argues 
that we should interpret the passage in which we learn of its production ironically. We should 
read it “as a distorted and self-deceptive act” rather than as the one point in Aschenbach’s artis-
tic life where he successfully reconciles his passion and his craft. 
 23. Cohn goes on to argue that the narrator himself becomes ironized, and that at the end 
we are left with the sense that “the author behind the work is communicating a message that 
escapes the narrator he placed within the work” (145, emphasis in original). She never fully 
explains, however, what that message is. Whether Mann’s narrator is wholly reliable or not is, 
in one sense, irrelevant. We do not need him to be infallible or infallibly objective to see that 
Aschenbach’s allegorical endeavor is a farce. If the narrator does not speak for Mann and if 
he is, as Cohn suggests, limited by irony, then we might have more sympathy for the pathetic 
Aschenbach, but we are no more likely to believe in his allegory. The narrator would have to be 
completely unreliable to alter drastically our interpretations of Aschenbach, and that does not 
seem to be the case.
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The New Life, where Dante, the author, both speaks for himself and has the 
authority to stop narrating when he feels as though he has lost control of his 
story. Mann has placed Aschenbach—himself an author—at two removes 
from real authorial control (author → narrator → character) to convey his 
powerlessness over the unfolding narrative that becomes the culmination 
of his own life. Aschenbach cannot control what happens to him, how he 
responds, or—significantly—whether anyone ever hears the story of what 
does transpire in Venice. That such powerlessness and lack of control stand 
in stark contrast to the manner in which he has tried to construct his life up 
to this point only exacerbates the prevailing irony of this short novel. Mann 
wants us to recognize the potential for humiliation when forces beyond our 
control—whether those forces be our emotions, our sexuality, other people, 
or society more generally—make it impossible to construct our own narra-
tives, or allegories, out of whatever fabric we have at hand. Aschenbach is, 
in some ways, a pitiful character at the end, but he is not one for whom we 
have no sympathy, and I believe that that is as Mann intended it.
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as i  recognized in the introduction, not all instances of allegory serve as 
clear-cut examples of the categories that I have devised. I do not see the 
potential uncertainty that this entails as a threat to my schema. My theory 
gives us the concepts and the vocabulary necessary to talk productively 
about some of these challenging cases in ways that we would not other-
wise be able to do. Indeed, without the ideas that I have put forward, we 
might well encounter narrative texts whose allegorical nature or aspect we 
completely, but wrongly, overlook simply because we would have lacked the 
critical tools—the concepts and vocabulary—necessary to address or even 
recognize it. John Barth’s short story “Click” will serve as an example of one 
such work.
 I am tempted to call Barth’s work a postmodern treatment of allegory, 
a treatment that is playful, allusive, and ultimately difficult to define. It is a 
hybrid case that contains an embedded allegory in the service of a strong 
thematic allegory. Ultimately, Barth transforms the phenomenon of narra-
tion itself into a figural narrative for the rhetorical purpose of promoting a 
particular view of the self. Barth accomplishes this transformation by con-
structing three intersecting levels of allegory—the first about a couple called 
Fred and Irma, the first second about a couple called Mark and Val, and the 
third about the author–reader relations enacted in the telling of the first two. 
Each of these levels is foregrounded at particular points in the narrative, and 
each helps to facilitate the transmission of Barth’s dominant theme.
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The Theme
In this case, it will help us to start with the main thematic claim that Barth 
wants to put forward, and then to see how his deployment of several types 
of allegory helps him to convey and illustrate that theme. The point toward 
which Barth works throughout his story is this: that the “self ” is what he calls 
a “center of narrative gravity,” an entity, in other words,
that, in order to function in and not be overwhelmed by the chaotically 
instreaming flood of sense-data, continuously notices, ignores, associ-
ates, distinguishes, categorizes, prioritizes, hypothesizes, and selectively 
remembers and forgets; that continuously spins trial scenarios, telling itself 
stories about who it is and what it’s up to, who others are and what they’re 
up to, that finally is, if it is anything, those continuously revised, continu-
ously edited stories. (259)
Barth has adopted a position regarding the nature of the self similar to that 
espoused by a number of contemporary intellectuals from different aca-
demic disciplines, including Jerome Bruner, Oliver Sacks, and some within 
the field of literary studies: that the idea of the human self is best understood 
through the concept of narrative; we are the stories we tell about ourselves. 
Barth is not a cognitive psychologist like Jerome Bruner, or a neuroscientist 
like Oliver Sacks, or even (primarily) a literary theorist; he is a writer of fic-
tion, so his way of conveying his message differs significantly from that of 
these other thinkers. Barth seeks to make his case about the importance of 
narrative through that very medium, and, as we shall see, he makes extensive 
use of allegory in its various manifestations in order to do so.
Embedded Allegory
“Click” is a story with a complex narrative structure (the story in some ways 
represents the effort to mimic hypertext fiction on the printed page), and 
this complicates efforts to summarize it effectively or efficiently.1 Fittingly, 
the form of the narrative reflects its content: the story begins as a representa-
tion of what Barth calls E-fiction, created by a figure called CNG (“Center of 
Narrative Gravity”) and located at the fictional Web site http://www.epiphs.
 1. For those readers who want the full impact of Barth’s story, I have reprinted it as an 
appendix.
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art. This site, we are told, is the “homepage of an anonymous oddball (Net-
named ‘CNG’) who offered a shifting menu of what he/she called ‘electronic 
epiphanies,’ or ‘e-piphs.’” (240). “Click” opens with two characters—“Fred” 
and “Irma”—perusing the Web offerings of CNG.2 Fred and Irma find their 
way to this site because, as they go to the computer to check e-mail mes-
sages, the imperative “Click” is the only item displayed on their monitor. 
Obediently, they do as bidden and are directed to one of CNG’s e-piphs, 
titled The Hypertextuality of Everyday Life. The underscoring indicates that 
one may click on any of those words and follow the links wherever they lead; 
it is, in other words, an example of hypertext, albeit an inoperative one for 
the reader of “Click.” The menu of scenarios on the Web site purportedly 
changes, but Barth’s narration, determined as it is by its more traditional 
medium, focuses on The Hypertextuality of Everyday Life, under which we 
find the second-level link “Fred and Irma Go Shopping,” a link that takes us 
into what is a dependent embedded allegory.
 The story of Fred and Irma is a figural narrative whose rhetorical pur-
pose is to convince its readers of the veracity of the epiphanic metaphorical 
expression “The hypertextuality of everyday life.” Fred and Irma, it turns out, 
are a fictionalized version of a couple named Mark and Val whom CNG, who 
is also the narrator of the short story we are reading, had observed the day 
before he posted “Fred and Irma Go Shopping” on his e-piphs Web site.
 Mark and Val are a romantically involved and cohabitating couple who 
get into an argument during a weekend visit to Baltimore’s Inner Harbor. 
Ostensibly, the narrator of “Click” witnessed the climactic scene of their 
argument near the USS Constellation, which was, at one time, moored in 
the harbor. Mark and Val’s argument stems from a disagreement concerning 
their visit to the harbor’s attractions. They spend a considerable amount of 
 2. Fred and Irma appear in slightly altered form in an essay—“Ad Lib Libraries and the 
Coastline Measurement Problem: A Reminiscence”—that Barth published several years before 
“Click” first appeared in the Atlantic Monthly. In the essay, Fred and Irma were married but 
are now estranged. Irma functions as an example of a narrative conundrum: how much detail 
should a narrator spend on any given incident or character? “How long does it take Irma to 
answer the telephone, once she hears it ring?” Barth asks rhetorically. “In real life,” he answers 
for us, “anywhere from a few seconds up to maybe half a minute, if the caller persists and the 
answering machine doesn’t intervene; in narrated life, however, whether factual or fictional, the 
answer depends on the author’s verbal/narrative waypoints” (241). Barth finds an analogy for 
this narrative problem in cartography, pointing out that different measurements of the same 
coastline can vary greatly depending on how much detail the one doing the measuring wants 
to include: “Measuring ‘as the crow flies’ gives us a rough-and-ready though not very realistic 
lower limit; but as soon as that crow . . . begins to deviate from its course to follow the contours 
of reality, the coast of Portugal or the shoreline of the Chesapeake is as long as you want it to 
be. . . .” (240–41). Along with Irma, this coastline-measurement “problem” makes its way into 
“Click” as one of CNG’s electronic epiphanies.
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time doing various shopping errands (hence the main action [shopping] of 
the embedded Fred and Irma story) on their way, and once they reach their 
destination they are left facing the prospect of a long line and just a short 
time to visit the aquarium, which had been the focus of their plans. As they 
continue to hem and haw about what to do, Mark gets increasingly upset for 
at least three reasons, the first proximate, the second underlying, and the 
third unrevealed. As the narrator describes it,
The problem, in Mark’s ever-warmer opinion, was—rather, the problems 
were—that (a) this constant sidetracking, this what’s-the-rush digression, 
can take the edge off the main event by the time one gets to it, the way 
some restaurants lay on so many introductory courses and side dishes that 
one has no appetite for the entrée, or the way foreplay can sometimes be 
so protracted that (etc.). Having no timetable or deadlines doesn’t mean 
having no agenda or priorities, wouldn’t she agree? And (b) it wasn’t as if 
this were just something that happened to happen today, or he’d have no 
grounds to grouse; it was the way certain people went at everything, from 
leaving for work in the morning to telling an anecdote. . . . (247)
 Val, however, interrupts Mark in mid-rant; as the narrator explains: “he 
never reached (c) (click on it if you’re curious), because by this time V was giving 
as good as she got . . .” (247). In short, Val accuses Mark of erring too far in the 
opposite extreme—calling him “a bullheaded whambamthankyouma’amer of 
a Taurus whose idea of foreplay was three minutes of heavyweight humping 
to ejaculation instead of two” (248)—and, essentially, of being so focused on a 
specific goal that he loses the ability to see or do anything not directly related 
to the achievement of that goal. This quality is especially troubling in Mark’s 
case because he is an aspiring, but as yet unsuccessful, novelist; his stories, 
Val contends, have no middles (257). Thus, we see the nature of the disagree-
ment, one that essentially boils down to two different, and at times seemingly 
incompatible, ways of being in the world. Everyday life, then, is hypertextual 
in the sense that one must choose how to maneuver through the Web: go 
straight to the desired location, or allow oneself to explore to whatever extent 
one prefers the “links” that are perhaps related to one’s goal, or perhaps not. 
This insight regarding Mark and Val lies at the heart of “Click,” for it serves as 
the source of the narrator’s epiphany—which he will convert to an “e-piph,” 
which takes the form of the dependent embedded allegory in which Fred-the-
expeditor and Irma-the-enhancer represent Mark and Val and their respec-
tive ways of being in the world.
 As Barth transforms Mark and Val into Fred and Irma within an allegory 
about the suitability of the concept of hypertext to characterize “everyday 
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life,” he reifies the vehicle (hypertextuality) of that metaphor by feigning 
the use of hypertext as the medium through which to transmit the allegory. 
Barth’s reification of the vehicle is a characteristic effort to have his cake and 
eat it too: on the one hand, he takes an abstract concept (the hypertextuality 
of everyday life) and gives it a concrete representation in the formal features 
of his text, while, on the other hand, his use of print rather than digital 
hypertext underlines his ultimate interest in the metaphorical dimension 
of this concept (it is not hypertext itself but the hypertextuality of everyday 
life that he is thematizing). Unlike Orwell’s Animal Farm, for example, a 
narrative that takes real historical phenomena and transforms them into 
figures that convey abstract concepts, Barth has taken an abstract concept 
and transformed it into a narrative that makes that concept real (because it 
is represented through hypertext) and, at the same time, figural.
 In the context of his larger narrative (the story “Click”), this embedded 
allegory about Fred and Irma serves three primary functions. On the most 
basic level, as I have already mentioned, it stands as evidence in support of 
the veracity of the metaphor “the hypertextuality of everyday life.” Beyond 
this, the embedded allegory also opens the door for Barth to discourse on 
the process and the rationale for allegorizing the Mark and Val experience, 
which pushes the story into the realm of thematic allegory; this discus-
sion both depends on and subsumes the embedded allegory. Finally, the 
embedded allegory allows Barth to introduce another figure into his narra-
tive and, in doing so, to draw readers’ attention to the relationship between 
author and narrator. This figure is the purported author of the embedded 
allegory and the proprietor of the Web site that purportedly hosts that narra-
tive: that “anonymous oddball” CNG. Ultimately, Barth will need this figure, 
as we will see below, to help him make his central claim about the self-as-
narrator, and this explains why he (Barth) needs an embedded allegory that 
reifies the concept of hypertextuality. The embedded allegory in this case 
has little hermeneutic potential in its own right, even as it does illustrate an 
important concept; rather, it performs the crucial narrative task of providing 
Barth with a believable—that is, realistic—way of talking about narrating 
and about narrators in an age in which hypertext is a reality.
Thematic Allegory
We can safely say, then, that the embedded allegory in “Click” does not 
exhaust the allegorical potential of this story; Barth, I suspect, has more 
ambitious aims when it comes to the figural aspect of his narrative. Thus, 
while he has constructed a clever, self-reflexive story, one that his own nar-
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rator opposes to “proper” (i.e., conventional) stories (253), it becomes quite 
clear by the end that Barth does not intend this work only to display his 
formal innovativeness. Rather, the story’s conclusion foregrounds issues of 
meaning and significance to such an extent that the reader cannot help but 
see the formal qualities of the work as part of a vehicle rather than as self-
sufficient ends. The central question that emerges over the last third of the 
story is “so what?” (258): what, in other words, is the point, the value, of 
narrating this story? Indeed, the literal level of this story entails primarily the 
“set-to” between Mark and Val, and the value—or lack of value—of narrating 
or even thinking about this rather pedestrian argument is an issue addressed 
directly by the narrator, and by Mark himself as he reflects on what has hap-
pened between him and Val: “If this were fiction (the wannabe writer asked 
himself), a made-up story, why should anyone give a damn?” (253).
 This question has two levels of significance for Mark. On one hand, it 
results from his attempts to put his argument with Val into some kind of 
global perspective. The future of his relationship is in doubt, at least at this 
moment, but “So what? He has asked himself before any of us can ask him. 
The world comprises approximately 4.7 zillion more mattersome matters, 
from saving the tropical rainforests to finding money enough in the cha-
otic post-Soviet Russian economy to bring their fiscally stranded cosmo-
nauts back to earth. Not that love and loss, or commitment and (potential) 
estrangement, aren’t serious even among Volvo-driving yuppies, but really, 
what of real consequence is at stake here?” (252–53). The second level of 
significance for Mark emerges out of his interest, as a “wannabe” writer, in 
storytelling. If the argument he has just had with Val were to have happened 
to two literary characters, why should the reader care, and what might he or 
she ultimately take from that episode? How, in other words, does one give 
meaning to such a seemingly mundane incident?
 While Mark never arrives at his own answers, Barth’s CNG clearly sees 
the argument between Mark and Val as the key in transforming his metaphor 
(the hypertextuality of everyday life) into the embedded allegory featuring 
Fred and Irma. The argument and the events that lead up to it may not ulti-
mately be particularly meaningful on the surface level—as Mark intuits—
but as the raw material for a narrative (characters and incidents) they offer 
great promise as the means for transforming that metaphor into something 
that conveys meaning, in this case an allegory. Thus, the narrator of “Click” 
makes it abundantly clear to the reader that the Mark and Val story has a 
level of significance that transcends the apparent insignificance of its literal 
existence; it is not just a fight between two random people, it is a means to 
allegorize and thereby to invite the audience to realize and to participate in 
the significance of “the hypertextuality of everyday life.”
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 But Barth does not stop here. After working to convince readers that the 
episode that occurs between Mark and Val has meaning that transcends that 
particular incident, he seeks to extend that point to the realm of narration 
more generally:
. . . as to the aforedemonstrated essential difference between Ms. Valerie’s 
sensibility and Mr. Mark’s, it is nowhere more manifest than in the way 
each, in the other’s opinion, tells a story. “Anna train squish” is how Val 
claims Mark would render Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina; indeed, given 
the man’s Middle-challengedness, she suspects he might skip the train. 
She, on the other hand (claims he, whether teasingly or in their Sunday 
Set-To mode), would never get beyond Count Tolstoy’s famous open-
ing sentence—“Happy families are all alike,” etc.—indeed, would never 
get through, much less past it, inasmuch as she would need to pause to 
explore such counter-evidence as that her family and Mark’s, for example, 
while both prevailingly quite “happy,” are as different in nearly every other 
respect as aardvarks and zebras; and once having clicked on Mark’s family, 
or equally on hers (or, for that matter, on aardvarks or zebras), she would 
most likely never get back to Tolstoy’s proposition, not to mention on to its 
second half and the eight-part novel therebeyond.
 • Myself, I’m on both their sides in this matter, not only because M 
and V seem equally reasonable, decent, harmless souls, but also because 
their tendencies represent contrary narrative impulses of equal validity 
and importance. A satisfyingly told story requires enough “Valerie”—that 
is, enough detail, amplification, and analysis—to give it clarity, texture, 
solidity, verisimilitude, and empathetic effect. It requires equally enough 
“Mark”—i.e., efficiently directed forward motion, “profluence,” on-with-
the-storyness—for coherence, anti-tedium, and dramatic effect. In suc-
cessful instances, a right balance is found for the purpose (and adjusted for 
alternative purposes). (257–58)
Thus, a figural rendering of the trouble between Mark and Val becomes a 
lesson in creative writing. And this is why Barth needs to have the embedded 
allegory in which Mark becomes Fred-the-expediter and Val becomes Irma-
the-enhancer. Barth is not aiming exclusively for a realistic representation 
of the intricacies of Mark and Val’s relationship problems and how their 
respective dispositions contribute to them. He also wants to tell a story about 
telling the story of Mark and Val, and to convince us that this is a worthwhile 
enterprise.
 Barth’s approach to thematic allegory is procedural rather than con-
ceptual; he focuses, in other words, on how one tells a story that has sig-
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nificance beyond or other than its literal meaning and not on the kinds of 
ontological questions (can allegory exist in the modern world?) that Roth 
and Collins have made central to their respective works. As a result, Barth’s 
embedded allegory functions in an important way as the “workshopping” 
(to borrow a pedagogical term from the discipline of Creative Writing) 
of the theme that plays out in the Mark–Val relationship. Given this 
dynamic, it is not surprising that “Click” moves back and forth between 
the embedded allegory and its “real world” antecedent, foregrounding now 
one, now the other, and using each to comment on or underscore some 
point relating to the other. The interplay between the dependent embedded 
allegory (Fred and Irma) and the larger thematic issues that emerge in the 
telling of the Mark and Val saga serves as a good example of the “amor-
phous borders” that might obtain in contemporary or postmodern fiction 
that makes use of allegory.
 The procedural nature of Barth’s approach to allegory also allows for the 
enhancement of the thematic allegory with an ongoing discussion about 
hermeneutics, and in particular about the levels of interpretation that critics 
beginning with Dante (especially in the Banquet) have argued characterize 
the allegorical process. According to Dante, an allegorical work might make 
four levels of significance available to a good reader: the literal, the alle-
gorical, the moral, and the anagogic. Barth, who is well read in the medi-
eval period (references in his work to Dante, Boccaccio, Scheherazade, etc. 
abound), makes use of all of these: on the literal level, the story of Mark and 
Val is simply the story of a frustrating day-trip; it is then refashioned as an 
allegory (the Fred–Irma story); and it is later ascribed moral significance (in 
the form of a “lesson” on narrative fiction) as Barth reflects on and thereby 
thematizes the allegory.
Strong Allegory
Beyond the moral level, according to Dante, lies the anagogic or spiritual 
level of allegorical significance, and Barth extends the meaning of his work 
to this level as well, a move that propels Barth toward his major claim about 
the self as a center of narrative gravity. Why, the narrator asks, should the 
reader not interested in the strategy of successful narration care that a good 
story requires the right proportions of both Mark and Val, so to speak? 
Having explained the connection between the enhancer (Val)–expediter 
(Mark) dichotomy and the challenge of telling stories, the narrator offers 
another “hot link” (So What), that we readers ostensibly can choose or not, 
a link that will take us to the anagogical level of the allegory.
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So what? you ask, unless one happens to take some professional interest 
in storytelling, which you for one do not? Thanks for clicking on that 
Frequently Asked Question, reply CNG and I: The “so what” is that that 
same right-balance-for-the purpose finding applies to the measurement 
of coastlines, the appropriate scaling of maps, and—hold that clicker—not 
only interpersonal relations, Q.E.D., but intrapersonal ones as well.
 Intrapersonal relations?
 Thanks again, and yes indeed. For what is Valerie, finally, what is 
Mark, what are you, and what am I—in short, what is the self itself—if 
not what has been aptly called a “posited center of narrative gravity” . . . . 
(258–59)
At this stage, the reader of “Click” recognizes that Barth has used Mark, Val, 
and their argument as the textual elements for the narrative transformation 
of his epiphany about the hypertextuality of everyday life. The larger narra-
tive—the one we are reading—then becomes a narrative whose main theme 
is the decoding of the significance buried within that allegorized epiphany.
 The form of Barth’s story allows the author to guide the reader through 
the process of arriving at the same multilayered allegorical epiphany that his 
narrator experiences and narrates. Ultimately, we see that it is a rhetorical 
exchange between author and reader—mediated of course by the text—that 
produces this allegorical epiphany. In short, the author–reader exchange that 
occurs as the story progresses enacts the relation between Expediter and 
Enhancer that occupies the thematic center of the story. Even if the form of 
Barth’s story is not typical, or not “proper,” what it appears to reveal about 
the transmission of the allegorical effect does, I think, accurately reflect the 
nature of typical allegorical narratives.
 Furthermore, the fact that “Click” reaches its climax at what Dante con-
siders the apex of the allegorical enterprise (the anagogic level) might well 
justify the claim that the story itself is a strong allegory whose purpose is to 
make the argument that calling the self a center of narrative gravity is a valid 
way to conceive of human nature, the argument toward which the embedded 
allegory and the thematic allegory have been working. Barth takes a very dif-
ferent route toward strong allegory than does either Orwell or Jackson, but 
he seems to end up in a similar spot. The strength of Barth’s allegory depends 
as much on the layering of allegorical elements (Fred–Irma, Mark–Val, and 
author–reader) to guide the audience to the successive levels of figuration 
(expediter v. enhancer; hypertextuality of everyday life; self as collection of 
stories) as it does on figuration itself. This highly self-conscious and trans-
parent approach to constructing a strong allegory would be in keeping with 
a general postmodern literary ethos.
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 Given that Barth seems to be weaving together a medieval conception 
of the allegorical process with a postmodern literary style, the end of the 
story is fitting as it represents the successful outcome, the lesson learned, so 
common in medieval and Renaissance allegory. The final lines of Everyman, 
for example, leave the audience with a pithy summary of the play’s primary 
message, a message delivered by the respected and learned theologian:
And he that hath his account whole and sound,
High in heaven he shall be crowned,
Unto which place God bring us all thither,
That we may live body and soul togither.
The dénouement of “Click” does not share in the religious spirituality of 
Everyman but it does echo the theme of unification that the morality play 
emphasizes. Barth’s conclusion contrives to have Mark and Val put their 
argument behind them, profess their love for each other, and “recouple” 
(259) in an act of lovemaking that brings the story to a conclusion that works 
for them on a personal level but that also works on the allegorical level, as 
the narrator/CNG “encourages them from the hyperspatial wings”: “Not too 
fast there, Mark. Not too slow there, Val. That’s got it, guys; that’s got it  .  .  .” 
(260). This recoupling represents the (at least temporary) reconciliation of 
Mark and Val while it also figuratively represents success in achieving the 
right balance between the “enhancer” and the “expediter” that Val and Mark 
have come to represent, respectively. This balance allows Barth’s narrator 
to bring his own narrative to a successful conclusion, and in so doing it 
allows the reader of the print narrative to recognize narrative itself as the 
prime exemplar of the hypertextuality of everyday life, the place wherein 
one always has the possibility of striking the perfect balance and “writing” 
a pleasing self.
 In what is an interesting twist for a supposedly postmodern story and a 
postmodern writer, the author plays a very prominent role in coaching or 
conducting both his characters (Not too fast . . . not too slow . . . that’s it . . .) 
and his readers (So what, you ask .  .  .) toward resolution and significance; 
this fact reinforces my sense that the very old-fashioned idea of allegory and 
the host of hermeneutic issues that it carries with it lie at the heart of this 
most current and cutting-edge narrative. Marjorie Worthington has argued 
that “instead of challenging the primacy of authorship, Barth’s metafictional 
experiments serve to cement the author into a position of authority over 
the text” (114). Worthington does not claim that the term “author” in her 
construction means the real John Barth, but asserts rather that it refers to 
“the narrator who is ostensibly also the author of the text he narrates” (116), 
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a dynamic that applies equally well to Lost in the Funhouse—the focus of 
Worthington’s essay—and to “Click.” In both of these cases, the narrator 
plays the role of an author (and this is crucial for the allegories in “Click”), 
which draws attention to the important questions of authorial intent and 
narrative control, questions that are central to the concept of allegory that I 
have put forth in this book. I still maintain that we need to recognize a dis-
tinction between the implied Barth and his narrator, even if that narrator is 
also an author, because it is the implied Barth who has placed that figure in 
his story-world so that he, the narrator, is also a component of the narrative 
shaped in the service of the implied author’s rhetorical purpose. Neverthe-
less, the composition of that figure as an authorial voice makes a significant 
contribution to the allegoricalness of the text.
 Looking at “Click” through the lens of allegory as I have defined it 
allows us to understand why the author figure remains such a critical player 
in Barth’s fiction. That fiction is often about conveying and finding meaning 
in figures, and that, at its heart, is the stuff of allegory. “So what?” Barth 
asks. What, in other words, is the point of fiction? What’s the use of telling 
stories, of making things and people up? The answer that “Click” invites 
us to extrapolate from its figuration is the same one that we can give—and 
that has been given for centuries—to defend allegory: fictional narrative 
can carry important messages about both everyday life and life beyond 
its everyday concerns from authors who are worth listening to. Barth just 
reminds us how strangely fun and surprising the process of finding those 
messages can be.
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My priMary  aim in this book has been to offer a new conception of a very 
old literary and rhetorical concept. In so doing, I hope that I have encouraged 
my readers to rethink allegory from the perspective of their own reading 
experience. During the course of the many discussions that I have had with 
friends, family, and colleagues about the nature of my research, one thing 
has struck me repeatedly—once they know what I am trying to do, almost 
everyone can come up with a good example, often one with which I am com-
pletely unfamiliar, that fits well within at least one of my main categories of 
allegory—strong, weak, dependent, independent, interdependent, thematic, 
or ironic. This heartens me, as it indicates that the terms and concepts that 
I have introduced here might have relevance beyond the set of texts that I 
have used to illustrate them.
 As opposed to producing the definitive treatise on allegory, my intention 
has been to provide a framework and a vocabulary to use when a reader 
encounters a narrative text that seems purposively figural or a text that has 
allegorical elements that need to be explained. I hope, therefore, that what 
I have presented has some practical value as readers confront allegorical 
texts. In addition to its heuristic value, I hope that readers of this book will 
find themselves better equipped to answer some of those difficult conceptual 
questions—some of which have dogged allegory forever—that I posed in 
my introductory chapter. I will use this concluding chapter as a venue for 
reflecting back on what I’ve done in the preceding pages and tackling these 
questions head-on.
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194  •  Conclusion
■
Can a text still be an allegory if the author did not have a particular phenom-
enon or purpose in mind when he or she composed the work?
Some theorists of allegory would answer yes, definitively. Those, for example, 
who believe that readers ultimately determine whether a narrative is allegor-
ical or not would not concern themselves much with this issue of authorial 
intention. But even E. D. Hirsch, a critic who built the early part of his career 
around the issue of authorial intention, would answer this question affirma-
tively. In a 1994 essay from New Literary History, Hirsch argues that writers, 
in many cases, want their work to “apply across time,” and so that work 
“typically intends to convey meaning beyond its immediate occasion into a 
future context which is very different from that of its production” (“Tran-
shistorical” 552). Thus, Hirsch can make the case that “original intentions 
are not, as a matter of empirical fact, limited to original meanings” because 
authors often “intend their writings to have meanings that go unforeseeably 
beyond their original, literal contents” (555, emphasis in original).1 If Hirsch 
is correct, then a writer can intend for his or her work to be an allegory of 
something, but that something does not need to be predetermined.
 From my rhetorical perspective, I would argue that Hirsch might be right 
about this, but the end result would more than likely tend toward weak rather 
than strong allegory. Indeed, the kind of allegorical intentions that Hirsch 
imagines here would almost certainly produce the kind of figural indeter-
minacy that evokes allegory without a commitment to some specific phe-
nomenon or purpose. A reader would likely pick up on the author’s allegor-
ical intentions, but the allegorical effect would be dampened by the lack of 
specificity. The feedback loop of interpretation would provide resistance to a 
strong allegorical reading. As Hirsch postulates, though, the possibility cer-
tainly exists that an author would have a strong intention to write a work that 
would be read as a weak allegory, as I tried to show was the case with Kafka.
 In a hypothetical situation in which the author had no allegorical inten-
tions at all but some reader or readers of that text interpret the work allegori-
cally, we would find ourselves in a similar situation. We might demonstrate 
 1. Hirsch’s line of thinking here comes out of a later turn in his work where he attempts to 
grapple with the issue of the effect of the passage of time on textual meaning. In addition to the 
essay on transhistorical intentions cited here, readers might be interested in his “Meaning and 
Significance Reinterpreted.” In “Meaning as Concept and Extension: Some Problems,” James 
Battersby and James Phelan take issue with Hirsch’s revisions to his earlier claims about mean-
ing and significance, arguing that the direction Hirsch takes in his later work—including this 
essay on allegory—muddles the helpful distinction he made earlier between these two concepts.
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that the narrative can support a weak allegorical interpretation, but strong 
allegory would, again, be very unlikely. If an author did not intend for his 
or her readers to arrive at such an interpretation, then the textual elements 
would almost assuredly not fit together as coherently as they do in a work 
such as Animal Farm or “The Lottery.”
■
Does a reader have to know the phenomenon that is to be transformed prior to 
reading the narrative in order to “get” allegory?
No.
 In many respects, the process of allegorical interpretation takes us back 
to the apparent paradox of the hermeneutical circle. That paradox, as Fried-
rich Ast describes it, arises from the presumption that “the particular can be 
understood only through the whole, and conversely, the whole, only through 
the particular” and that “the perception or concept precedes cognition of 
the particular, even though perception and concept seem to develop only 
through these” (45). Ast formulates the problem of the hermeneutical circle 
(or the problem of understanding more generally) as an interpersonal one, 
as something that describes the relationship between two beings—an author 
and a reader—separated by time. This formulation places him in the com-
pany of other theorists who, according to David Couzens Hoy, conceive of 
understanding as “a process of psychological reconstruction. The object of 
understanding is the original meaning of a text handed down to the present 
from a past that is no longer immediately accessible. Reconstruction—which 
can take place only when there is a bridge between past and present, between 
text and interpreter—is psychological when this bridge consists of a relation 
between two persons: the author and the reader” (11).
 Although Ast uses terminology that gives the interpretive process a 
more metaphysical feeling than I would prefer to do, Ast’s resolution of the 
apparent paradox comes close to the view of reading that I am promoting 
here. “In the explication of a work or of a particular part,” Ast asserts,
the idea of the whole is not generated by the combination of all its indi-
vidual parts, but is rather evoked in the person who is capable of compre-
hending the idea in the first place with the comprehension of the first par-
ticular, and becomes ever clearer and livelier, the further the explication of 
the particular progresses. The first comprehension of the idea of the whole 
through the particular is conjecture, i.e., as yet still indefinite and undevel-
oped foreknowledge of the spirit, which turns into vivid and clear cogni-
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tion through growing comprehension of the particular. Upon exploration 
of the sphere of the particular, the idea, which was still conjecture at the 
point of first comprehension, emerges now as a clear and conscious unity 
of the manifold presented in the individual. Understanding and explica-
tion are now complete. (46)
A rhetorical approach to narrative—and to allegory specifically—is largely 
consonant with this view of understanding insofar as it presumes that an 
author intends to convey something to a reader; there is an important com-
municative function to the literary act. The question is: how does the reader 
reach an understanding of the author’s intended meaning?
 The idea of “narrative as rhetoric” rests on the premise that readers 
make judgments about texts—and revise those judgments—as the narra-
tive unfolds temporally. In Narrative as Rhetoric James Phelan puts forward 
a view of narrative that “focuses on the text as an invitation to an experi-
ence that is dynamic in at least two ways. First, the experience is crucially 
influenced by the movement of the narrative through time. Second, the 
experience is multilayered, one that engages a reader’s intellect, emotions, 
judgments, and ethics simultaneously” (90). Phelan employs the term “pro-
gression” to capture the dynamic nature of a reader’s experience with nar-
rative. “Progression,” he explains, “refers to the way in which a narrative 
establishes its own logic of forward movement . . . and it refers to the way 
that movement carries with it invitations to different kinds of responses in 
the reader . . .” (90). In allegorical texts, the forward movement of the nar-
rative will generally serve to invite some very specific responses from the 
reader; collectively these responses will result in a recognition on the part of 
the reader that the author has figural and transformative intentions.
 “Click,” the story by John Barth that I discussed in the previous chapter, 
provides an excellent example of the progressive nature of the allegorical 
experience. In this story, Barth’s narrator walks the reader through the 
dynamic process that Phelan has identified. As the discourse moves forward 
through time, characters and events become thickened with thematic impor-
tance. A reader’s initial inklings of allegorical potential are corroborated by 
the positive feedback of textual phenomena and the interjections of Barth’s 
narrator. The dénouement of this narrative depends less on a plot revelation 
or resolution than it does on the final unfolding of the story’s allegorical 
significance.
 When we move out of the realm of strong or weak allegories, then the 
question of whether a reader has to know the phenomenon or rhetorical 
purpose that is to be transformed becomes largely meaningless because, as 
we consider dependent, independent, interdependent, thematic, or ironic 
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allegory, we should no longer think of the narrative as a unified transfor-
mation. The text is no longer an allegory of something; instead, it includes 
allegory or the idea of allegory as a textual element or a theme.
■
Does allegory depend on “elite” readers?
I offer a qualified “yes.” But by “elite” readers I simply mean good readers, 
those who are attentive, generally well informed, and willing to play 
according to conventional literary rules. (And this is the same answer that 
rhetorical theorists would give for any literary genre.) In Before Reading 
Peter J. Rabinowitz claims that “Every literary theoretician these days needs 
a governing metaphor about texts” (37); for his, Rabinowitz takes the idea 
of the unassembled swing set, and this metaphor can help explain what the 
kind of reader I refer to here as “elite” needs to be able to do. The swing set, 
Rabinowitz explains, is
a concrete thing that, when completed, offers opportunities (more or less 
restricted depending on the particular swing set involved) for free play, but 
you have to assemble it first. It comes with rudimentary directions, but you 
have to know what directions are, as well as how to perform basic tasks. 
It comes with its own materials, but you must have certain tools of your 
own at hand. Most important, the instructions are virtually meaningless 
unless you know, beforehand, what sort of object you are aiming at. If you 
have never seen a swing set before, your chances of riding on the trapeze 
without cracking open your head are slight. (38)
As I argued in the chapter devoted to strong allegory, authors of allegorical 
works generally intend them for a sophisticated audience, an audience that 
does have the tools and the prior experience required to assemble the meta-
phorical swing set. This “authorial audience” stands in contrast to, and in 
some ways above, the “narrative audience,” a far more credulous and less 
astute group of readers.
 In the realm of allegory in narrative or allegories of narrative (as opposed 
to allegories as narrative), the need for something like an ideal reader is just 
as pronounced. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello, for example, almost demands 
a reader with some knowledge of Kafka, or at least a willingness to learn 
something about Kafka. Without this, an individual reader cannot hope 
to participate in Coetzee’s authorial audience. This audience-related short-
coming does not change the author’s intention, nor does it vitiate the alle-
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gorical aspect of the narrative, but it does change the experience of reading 
that narrative for a reader or a group of readers.
■
I hope that this book has raised more questions about allegory than I could 
possibly answer in this short conclusion; indeed, if we do ever reach the 
point where all of the questions have been answered, then we might truly be 
able to say that allegory has died. I doubt that that will be the case, however, 
because, as with many other literary genres or devices, authors will certainly 
continue to find new ways of manipulating allegory and incorporating it into 
their narratives. As I have shown, the term “allegory” can effectively describe 
a class of works that achieves an author’s rhetorical purpose through the 
transformation of some phenomenon into a figural narrative. As long as we 
readers are willing to recognize the myriad ways that this transformation can 
happen, and as long as we recognize that this transformation can happen in 
a number of different contexts, then I believe that we will see critical work 
on this concept that matches the creativity with which authors continue to 
employ it.
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